Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co.
Decision Date | 26 July 1939 |
Docket Number | No. 7521.,7521. |
Citation | 131 S.W.2d 73 |
Parties | GULF LAND CO. et al. v. ATLANTIC REFINING CO. et al. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Gerald C. Mann, Atty. Gen., Wm. McCraw, Former Atty. Gen., and Chas. D. Rutta and Harry S. Pollard, Former Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff in error Railroad Com. of Texas.
Henry H. Brooks, of Austin, for plaintiff in error Gulf Land Co.
Powell, Wirtz, Rauhut & Gideon, C. B. Jeffrey, Black, Graves & Stayton, and C. B. Ellard, all of Dallas, for defendants in error.
J. W. Wheeler, of Austin, amicus curiae.
This is a Rule 37 case. When oil was discovered in East Texas on or about October 12, 1930, one Willis Smith owned in such field 128 acres of land, all in one tract. On January 14, 1931, Willis Smith leased 39.98 acres of the above 128-acre tract to one Byrd, and through mesne assignments this 39.98-acre tract now belongs to Atlantic Refining Company.
On January 28, 1931, Willis Smith leased to Hudson et al. 43 acres of the above 128-acre tract. This 43-acre tract was later subdivided into smaller tracts. One of these subdivisions contains 6.88 acres. This 6.88-acre tract is involved in this suit. Another subdivision of the 43-acre tract contains 23 acres, and now belongs to Hawkeye Petroleum Corporation. We do not attempt to trace the title to the balance of the 128-acre tract, as to do so would serve no purpose here.
At the time the above 6.88-acre tract was segregated from the 43-acre tract, and at the time the 128-acre tract was subdivided, the spacing provisions of Oil and Gas Rule 37 was 150-300 feet. By this was meant that no well could be drilled at any point less than 150 feet from any property or division line, or at any point less than 300 feet from any other well, unless a special permit was secured. As we understand this record, at the time the 6.88-acre tract was segregated from the larger tract of which it was then a part, it, the 6.88-acre tract, was capable of being developed as a whole under Rule 37 as it then existed, without the necessity of granting an exception as provided for in such rule. At this point we pause to note that Rule 37 as it then existed provided for exceptions to its spacing provisions "in order to prevent waste or protect vested rights."
On February 25, 1932, the Railroad Commission amended the oil and gas rule as applicable to oil and gas wells in the East Texas field so that it read as follows:
On May 29, 1934, oil and gas Rule 37 was again amended so that it now reads as follows:
On May 29, 1934, the day oil and gas Rule 37 was amended to read as just above set out, the Railroad Commission adopted another order which to our minds has the same force and effect as a rule. Such order reads as follows: "It is ordered by the Railroad Commission of Texas that in applying Rule 37 (Spacing Rule) of Statewide application and in applying every special rule with relation to spacing in every field in this State no subdivision of property made subsequent to the adoption of the original spacing rule will be considered in determining whether or not any property is being confiscated within the terms of such spacing rule, and no subdivision of property will be regarded in applying such spacing rule or in determining the matter of confiscation if such subdivision took place subsequent to the promulgation and adoption of the original spacing rule."
On August 30, 1933, the Railroad Commission entered the following order, which we think also has the effect of a general rule:
This suit involves the validity of an order of the Railroad Commission entered on July 29, 1936, granting Gulf Land Company a permit to drill a second well on a tract of 2.35 acres of land. The 2.35-acre tract was a part of the 6.88-acre tract above mentioned. The 6.88-acre tract is, roughly speaking, a triangular tract. At the time the permit here questioned was granted, the 6.88-acre tract had been subdivided into six smaller tracts, each owned by a separate owner. Each of these six smaller tracts had one producing well thereon. The subdivision of the 6.88-acre tract into six smaller tracts took place after it was segregated from the larger tract of which it was then a part. We presume that each of the wells in operation on each of the six smaller tracts at the time this permit was granted had been lawfully granted. We indulge this presumption...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Burford v. Sun Oil Co Sun Oil Co v. Burford
...for fact finding and for policy making and the courts expressly disclaim the administrative responsibility, Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, but on the other hand, the orders of the Commission are tested for 'reasonableness' by trial de novo before the cou......
-
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co.
...trial court in the first trial evidently tried the case in accordance with the rules announced in the case of Gulf Land Company v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, which was decided in 1939. The Austin Court of Civil Appeals undoubtedly reversed the trial court upon this c......
-
Railroad Com'n of Texas v. Lone Star Gas Co., a Div. of Enserch Corp.
...(1936) ("The duty to carry out the details under the statutes is placed on the Railroad Commission."); Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, 81, 85 (1939). See also Texaco, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 583 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.1979) ("[T]he Railroad Commission is v......
-
Coastal Oil & Gas v. Garza Energy Trust
...47. Texaco, Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n, 583 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.1979); see also Brown, 83 S.W.2d at 940. 48. Gulf Land Co. v. Atl. Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, 80 (1939) (emphasis 49. Seagull Energy, 226 S.W.3d at 389. 50. Gulf Land, 131 S.W.2d at 80. 51. Seagull Energy, 226 S.W.3d at 38......
-
CHAPTER 1 POOLING AND UNITIZATION: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC VOCABULARY
...(Wyo. 1984). [102] Kramer & Martin, note 2 supra at §§ 5.01[4][g], 5.02[2][a]. [103] Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, 80 (1939). [104] The efforts of Mr. Doherty are well documented in Robert E. Hardwicke, Antitrust Laws, et al. v. Unit Operation of Oil an......
-
CHAPTER 1 BASIC CONSERVATION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND BASIC DEFINITIONS
...(Wyo. 1984). [123] Kramer & Martin, Note 1 supra at §§ 5.01[4][g], 5.02[2][a]. [124] Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, 80 (1939). [125] The efforts of Mr. Doherty are well documented in Robert E. Hardwicke, Antitrust Laws, et al. v. Unit Operation of Oil an......
-
CHAPTER 1 PRINCIPLES AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION
...(Wyo. 1984). [55] 1 Kramer & Martin, Note 1 supra at §§ 5.01[4][g], 5.02[2][a]. [56] Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, 80 (1939). [57] The efforts of Mr. Doherty are well documented in Robert E. Hardwicke, Antitrust Laws, et al. v. Unit Operation of Oil and......
-
CHAPTER 4.I. Motion Authorities
...purposes). d. Where Accuracy Is Not Disputed Atl. Refining Co. v. Gulf Land Co., 122 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1938), aff'd, 131 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. 1939) (admitting maps shown to be substantially same in number and location as larger maps already admitted). I. Motion to Exclude Imprope......