Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham
Decision Date | 31 January 1969 |
Citation | 355 Mass. 275,244 N.E.2d 311 |
Parties | GULF OIL CORPORATION v. BOARD OF APPEALS OF FRAMINGHAM. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Avram G. Hammer, Boston (Joseph H. Lewis, Framingham, with him), for defendant.
Victor H. Galvani, Framingham, for plaintiff.
Before WILKINS, C.J., and CUTTER, KIRK, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.
This is a bill in equity by way of an appeal under G.L. c. 40A, § 21, from a decision of the board of appeals of the town of Framingham (board) denying Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) a special permit to construct a gasoline service station within a 'business district zone.' The board appealed from a final decree annulling its decision and directing the issuance of the permit. The judge filed 'Findings, Rulings and Order for Decree' which he subsequently adopted as a report of material facts. The evidence is reported.
We state the pertinent findings of the judge. The judge ruled that the action of the board denying the permit was 'arbitrary and capricious.'
General Laws c. 40A, § 4, as amended through St.1966, c. 199, provides in pertinent part that a (emphasis supplied).
The zoning by-law of Framingham allows retail gasoline and oil stations within 'business districts' only according to such an exception. III.F 1 e(3). It provides that '(w)hen in its judgment the public convenience and welfare will be substantially served, and where such exception will not tend to impair the status of the neighborhood, the Board of Appeals may in a specific case * * * determine and vary the application of the regulations here established in harmony with their general purposes and intent' (emphasis added). V.D. 6.
Gulf contends that because the judge found that the granting of the special permit would substantially serve the public convenience and welfare and would not tend to impair the status of the neighborhood, the board was required to grant the permit and therefore its secision not to do so was arbitrary and capricious. Gulf also argues that the board improperly considered the 'possible future development in this area of Framingham.'
Neither the Zoning Enabling Act (G.L. c. 40A, § 4), nor the zoning by-law of Framingham (§§ III.F 1 e(3) and V.D. 6.), gives Gulf an absolute right to a special permit. The board is not compelled to grant a permit. It has a discretionary power. See Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 557, 120 N.E.2d 916; BOTTOMLEY V. BOARD OF APPEALS OF YARMOUTH, MASS., 238 N.E.2D 354.A The decision of the board can be disturbed only if it...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Welch v. Paicos
...not the deciding one, in its decision. This discretion is essentially unreviewable in court. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277-78, 244 N.E.2d 311 (1969). As a result, developers challenging adverse decisions must contest their Every appeal by a disappo......
-
Roberts v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc.
...MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970), citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277, 244 N.E.2d 311 (1969). On the other hand, the substantial evidence standard of review of an administrative record "goes to the re......
-
Kay v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes
...(reasonableness); Stansbury v. Jones, 372 Md. 172, 812 A.2d 312, 318-19 (2002) (substantial evidence); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bd. of Appeals, 355 Mass. 275, 244 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1969) (unreasonable, whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary); Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3606 (substantial evidence); Honn v.......
-
Maher v. City of New Orleans
...as the present effects of authorizing demolition of a building which had value as part of the scene, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 244 N.E.2d 311 (1969), could easily lead to the conclusion that the potential effect of such demolition on a larger scale wou......