Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Co. v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 15 March 1909
• Docket Number: 13,823
• Citation: 94 Miss. 484,48 So. 823
• Parties: GULF & SHIP ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL. v. VIRGINIA M. BARNES ET AL
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

48 So. 823

94 Miss. 484

GULF & SHIP ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL. v. VIRGINIA M. BARNES ET AL

No. 13,823

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 15, 1909

FROM the chancery court of Forrest county, HON. THADDEUS A. WOOD Chancellor.

The Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company, one of the appellants was complainant in the court below, Virginia M. Barnes and others, appellees, and the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company, an appellant, were defendants there. The latter railroad company made its answer a cross-bill against the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company and the appellees. From a decree adverse to the two railroad companies they both appealed to the supreme court.

The opinion of the court states the facts.

Decree affirmed.

N.C Hill, for appellants.

The facts admitted by the pleadings show that a collision occurred between the trains of the two railroad companies at a railway crossing, and that the engineer of one train was killed, his fireman seriously injured and two passengers were more or less seriously hurt; and, in addition, an engine of one of the railway companies was seriously damaged. There are three actions at law pending against the two railroad companies, instituted by Mrs. Barnes, the window of the deceased engineer, one action being against the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad company for seventy-five thousand dollars and one against the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company for seventy-five thousand dollars and one against both of these railroad companies jointly for seventy-five thousand dollars. There are three other actions at law now pending, instituted by John Goldsby, the injured fireman, for his alleged damage, one action being against the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company for ten thousand dollars, one against the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad company for ten thousand dollars, and one against both companies jointly for ten thousand dollars. There are two actions at law pending wherein Mrs. Maggie Gilbert claims twenty thousand dollars damage, one being in Harrison county circuit court against the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad company, and one in the circuit court of Greene county against the Mobile, Jackson &amp Kansas City Railroad company. And, in addition, there is one action at law pending against the two railroad companies, in the circuit court of Jones county, instituted by L. W. Youmans for two thousand dollars damages. There are thus several actions at law pending wherein large damages are claimed, and each of these actions at law is predicated of precisely the same statement of facts: namely, the collision between two trains of the different railroad companies occuring in July, 1907.

The facts necessary to establish all the defenses to all these actions at law are precisely the same; the only possible difference that could exist would be a difference as to the liability of the railroad company as concerns the employees and as concerns passengers. The law governing all of these cases is the same. It is difficult to conceive a situation more clearly within the rules authorizing chancery to take jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits, than the one at bar.

If equity refuses to intervene in this cause then there must necessarily be long and expensive litigations on the part of both railroad companies in determining the various actions at law brought against them. Pollock v. Okolona Savings Bank, 61 Miss. 294; Illinois, etc., Railroad Co. v. Garrison, 81 Miss. 257, 32 So. 996; Hightower et al. v. Mobile, etc., Railroad Co., 83 Miss. 708, 36 So. 82; Thames v. Mangum, 87 Miss. 575, 40 So. 327; Whitlock v. Yazoo, etc., Railroad Co., 91 Miss. 779, 45 So. 861; Tisdale v. Insurance Companies, 84 Miss. 709, 36 So. 568; Williams v. City of Jackson, 82 Miss. 301, 46 So. 551; Butler v. Scottish, etc., Co., 93 Miss. 215; 46 So. 829.

On the question of "community of interest" this court has held that where a common state of facts and a common principle of law are involved equity will assume jurisdiction and prevent a multiplicity of suits. Pollock v. Okolona Savings Bank, 61 Miss. 294; Crawford v. Mobile, etc., Railroad Co., 83 Miss. 708, 36 So. 82. See also Pomeroy Eq. Jur., §§ 244, 274.

In Thames v. Mangrum, 87 Miss. 575, 40 So. 327, this court in holding that it was necessary for equity to take jurisdiction in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, said: "It is a well established rule in this state that in many different classes of suits, equity will not refuse to settle in one suit all matters at issue, even though the various defendants may have different interests or interpose various defenses. All matters in dispute may be litigated in one proceeding, so that the ultimate decision of one suit will obviate all necessity of instituting and prosecuting many different actions at law. In this case, the right of plainants as against all the defendants, arises from one and the same state of facts. It is in just such a case, that the wisdom of the rule permitting equity to assume general jurisdiction, is most apparent."

In Illinois, etc., Railroad Co. v. Garrison, 81 Miss. 257, 32 So. 996, jurisdiction in equity was upheld in a case of multiplicity of suits, and the case of Pollock v. Okolona Savings Bank Co., 61 Miss. 293, was quoted and approved, as was also the case of Insurance Co. v. Van Cleave, 191 Ill. 410. A reference to this Illinois decision shows that there was no community of interest between the parties complainant other than a community of interest in the law and facts. The action was based upon an allegation filed by sundry insurance companies that they had paid under protest two per cent of their earnings as a tax, which was illegal, and they jointly sued the state insurance commissioner for a return of the tax, and the Illinois court held that equity had jurisdiction in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits; the law and facts being applicable to all alike.

The case of Whitlock v. Yazoo, etc., Railroad Co., 91 Miss. 779, 45 So. 861, put this matter, however, beyond dispute. In that case a number of persons had bought round-trip excursion tickets from the city of Vicksburg and being duly delayed in returning, brought actions at law in the circuit court, claiming actual and punitive damages, whereupon the railroad company filed its bill in the chancery court, alleging that the law and facts in all the cases were similar, and asking for an injunction against the prosecution of them at law and that chancery settle all of the controversies in one suit, to this bill a demurrer was filed, the grounds of which were almost identical with the grounds in the case at bar, and certainly raising the same questions that are raised here. In that case, WHITFIELD, C. J., said: "It is clearly and thoroughly settled by the best considered modern decisions in this state and elsewhere, that such jurisdiction exists in all cases of this character," citing Railroad Co. v. Garrison; Crawford v. Mobile, etc., Railroad Co.; Pollock v. Okolona Savings Bank. In Railroad Co. v. Garrison, 81 Miss. 257, 32 So. 996, the court referred to and approved the case of Woodward v. Seely, 50 Am. Dec. 451, and especially, referred to pages 452 and 453, 50 Am. Dec. where it is held, that "community of interest" other than a similarity of law and facts, is not necessary for chancery jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of suits.

James H. Neville and R. L. Dent, on the same side.

The law governing each of the cases here concerned is the same, and in all of the cases the same rules of procedure must be applied. It is true that Barnes and Goldsby were employes of the Mobile, Jackson and Kansas City Railroad Company, but they held no such relationship towards the Gulf and Ship Island Railroad Company. The other plaintiffs were passengers of the Mobile, Jackson and Kansas City Railroad Company, but the Gulf and Ship Island Railroad Company sustained no such relation to them. The same rules of law which determine the liability of the Gulf and Ship Island Railroad Company to the representatives of the engineer of the Mobile, Jackson and Kansas City Railroad Company, will determine the liability of the Gulf and Ship Island Railroad Company to Youmans and to Gilbert, and here we have as to all of them a community of interest and a similarity of law and facts, and this court has held that community of interest, other than similarity of law and facts, is not necessary to maintain an injunction to prevent a multiplicity of suits.

The bill and the supplemental bills filed in this chancery suit allege the insolvency of all the parties defendant, save the Mobile, Jackson and Kansas City Railroad Company. The court is here presented with this state of facts; several suits for large sums of money are severally pending against the appellants, all instituted by insolvent plaintiffs; all to be determined on the same state of facts and by the same questions of law, and it does seem that this mere statement is sufficient to warrant a reversal of the decree of the court below in dissolving the injunction and awarding damages against appellant.

The case of Railroad Co. v. Garrison, 81 Miss. 257, 32 So. 996; is in point. The Illinois Central Railroad Company filed a bill in chancery against Garrison and six others who had instituted their separate actions against the railroad company in the court of a justice of the peace. The allegations of the company's bill showed that it was filed to prevent a multiplicity of suits and to prevent threatened suits by persons pecuniarily irresponsible. The supreme court, through the learned chief justice, in that case declared that the jurisdiction of the chancery court was too well settled to be doubted; that it should convene all these parties in one suit and determine therein...