Gulla v. North Strabane Tp., 97-3302

• Decision Date: 08 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-3302,97-3302
• Citation: 146 F.3d 168
• Parties: Ronald GULLA, v. NORTH STRABANE TOWNSHIP; Norma Wintermyer, individually and in her capacity as North Strabane Township Supervisor; Alan A. Axelson, M.D.; Lindencreek Associates; T.A. Ward Constructors Advanced Building Development. Ronald Gulla And Evelyn Gulla, Appellants. *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 168

146 F.3d 168

Ronald GULLA, v. NORTH STRABANE TOWNSHIP; Norma Wintermyer, individually and in her capacity as North Strabane Township Supervisor; Alan A. Axelson, M.D.; Lindencreek Associates; T.A. Ward Constructors Advanced Building Development Ronald Gulla And Evelyn Gulla, Appellants. ^* No. 97-3302.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Dec. 12, 1997.

Decided June 8, 1998.

Peter M. Suwak (Argued), Washington, PA, Attorney for Appellants.

George R. Farneth, II, Zimmer Kunz, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, Attorney for Appellees Lindencreek Associates and Alan A. Axelson, M.D.

John M. Giunta, C. Leon Sherman & Associates, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, Attorney for Appellee Norma Wintermyer in her individual capacity.

Daniel P. McDyer, Paul G. Mayer, Jr., Anstandig, McDyer, Burdette & Yurcon, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, Attorneys for Appellee Advanced Building Development.

Paul J. Walsh, III, Shannon E. Elby (Argued) Summers, McDonnell, Walsh & Skeel Pittsburgh, PA Attorneys for Appellees North Strabane Township and Norma Wintermyer in her official capacity.

Charles D. Sheehy, Charles D. Sheehy & Associates, Pittsburgh, PA, Attorney for Appellee T.A. Ward Constructors.

Before: NYGAARD and ALITO, Circuit Judges, and DEBEVOISE, District Judge. ^**

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALITO, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Ronald and Evelyn Gulla challenge the dismissal of their federal civil rights claims based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because we conclude that the Gullas' claims are not barred by that doctrine, we reverse.

I.

The Gullas own a home in North Strabane Township, Pennsylvania. ¹ In April 1993, Lindencreek Associates ("Lindencreek") applied to the Township for permission to subdivide and develop land adjacent to the Gullas' property. The Township's Board of Supervisors approved Lindencreek's proposal on June 28, 1994.

The Gullas were first informed of the Board's approval in July 1994 when Lindencreek notified them that construction of the subdivision would interfere with their spring, which was located on land within the new subdivision, and the right-of-way that conveyed spring water to the Gullas' home. Shortly after Lindencreek gave this notice, its contractors T.A. Ward Constructors ("Ward") and Advanced Building Development ("ABD"), began excavating on the subdivision property. This excavation destroyed the Gullas' spring and a water line in their right-of-way. The Gullas demanded that Lindencreek and its contractors restore the spring and water line, but Lindencreek did not make the requested repairs.

The Gullas appealed the Board of Supervisors' approval of the subdivision to the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County. In that court, the Gullas alleged that the actions and policies of the Township "violate[d] due process and equal protection provisions of the state and United States Constitutions." The Gullas further alleged that the Board's decision to approve the Lindencreek subdivision was "invalid, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and contrary to law." The Court of Common Pleas affirmed the Board's approval of the subdivision and dismissed the Gullas' appeal. The court held that, under Pennsylvania law, the Gullas lacked standing to challenge the subdivision approval. Alternatively, the court concluded that the Township followed the applicable ordinances and statutes governing the subdivision process. The Gullas appealed this decision to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The Gullas filed an allocatur petition with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which granted review. That appeal is pending.

After the Commonwealth Court issued its opinion, the Gullas brought suit in federal district court. The Gullas alleged that Lindencreek, its owner Alan Axelson, Ward, ABD, North Strabane Township, and Norma Wintermyer (a member of the Township Board of Supervisors) violated their civil rights as guaranteed by the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Just Compensation Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Gullas also asserted pendent state-law causes of action against all of the defendants except the Township.

The defendants to the Gullas' federal suit moved to dismiss. The district court granted this motion because it concluded that the Gullas' federal claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Gullas' remaining state-law claims and therefore dismissed those claims without prejudice. The Gullas appealed these dismissals to this court.

II.

Since the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is subject to plenary review, FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 839-40 (3d Cir.1996), we must independently decide whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the Gullas' federal claims. In so doing, we are mindful of our obligation to preserve the avenues of direct review established by Congress. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622-23, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 2048-49, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, state court litigants who have appealed an adverse judgment through the state system may seek review in the United States Supreme Court; the lower federal courts may not sit in direct review of the decisions of a state tribunal. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1314-15, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (3d Cir.1993); Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass'n v. Port Auth., 973 F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir.1992).

While the rule barring our appellate review of state decisions is easily stated, the test for determining whether a particular litigant seeks such direct review is more complex. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts cannot entertain constitutional claims that have been previously adjudicated in state court or that are inextricably intertwined with such a state adjudication. FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840; Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir.1992). A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a prior state adjudication if

the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. In other words, Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal action if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state decision or void its ruling. Accordingly, to determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars [plaintiff's] federal suit requires determining exactly what the state court held.... If the relief requested in the federal action requires determining that the state court's decision is wrong or would void the state court's ruling, then the issues are inextricably intertwined and the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit.

FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840 (omissions and alterations in original) (quoting Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 n. 1 (8th Cir.1995)).

As this passage from FOCUS indicates, the first step in a Rooker-Feldman analysis is to determine "exactly what the state court held." Id. Accordingly, we begin by examining the judgments of the Pennsylvania courts.

In their first court filing, the Gullas alleged that the Township's actions in considering and approving the Lindencreek subdivision "violate[d] the due process and equal protection provisions of the state and United States Constitutions" and that the Board of Supervisors' decision was "invalid, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and contrary to law." App. at 67a-71a. The Court of Common Pleas responded to these allegations by first addressing the issue of the Gullas' standing. The court concluded that, under Pennsylvania law, adjacent landowners with a private interest in the property of a proposed subdivision do not have standing to challenge the approval of the subdivision. See Gulla v. North Strabane Township, Civ Div. No. 94-3933 at 2-4 (C.P. of Washington County Sep. 18, 1995). Since the Gullas alleged an injury to private rights that they received by deed, the court held that they could not challenge the subdivision proceedings. See id. Additionally, the court analyzed and rejected the Gullas' claim that the Township and Lindencreek failed to comply with the ordinances governing the subdivision process. The court emphasized that, even if the Township's ordinances had been violated, the Gullas lacked standing because "the Township is not permitted to consider the private rights of individuals before granting subdivision approval" and because the Township's environmental regulations are "unaffected by the alleged private water rights of individuals." Id. at 4-5. Despite this conclusion that the Gullas lacked standing, the court substantively analyzed whether the defendants complied with the Township's ordinances. The court concluded that the Township followed the procedures for approving a subdivision and that Lindencreek's final subdivision plan contained all of the information necessary to comply with the Township's development and environmental ordinances.

If the Court of Common Pleas had closed its opinion with the analysis just discussed, we would easily conclude that the opinion does not invoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar the Gullas' federal claims. "Rooker-Feldman applies only when in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render that judgment ineffectual." FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840. The essence of the Court of Common Pleas' opinion is that, under Pennsylvania law, the Gullas lack standing to challenge the subdivision process. Since the Gullas' standing to bring their federal claims is solely a matter of federal law, the district court clearly could consider the Gullas' due process,...