Gulledge v. Gulledge

• Decision Date: 18 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 562-CA., No. 32, No. 561-CA
• Citation: 738 So.2d 1229
• Parties: Sandra Faye GULLEDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David Allen GULLEDGE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

738 So.2d 1229

Sandra Faye GULLEDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David Allen GULLEDGE, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 32,561-CA, 32,562-CA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

August 18, 1999.

Mary A. Bryant, Monroe, Counsel for Appellant.

James A. Hobbs, West Monroe, Counsel for Appellee.

Elizabeth C. Brown, West Monroe, Counsel for Megan Ashley Gulledge.

Before WILLIAMS, GASKINS and CARAWAY, JJ.

WILLIAMS, Judge.

The plaintiff, Sandra Faye Gulledge, filed a motion to set aside a consent decree in which she relinquished sole custody of her minor daughter, Megan Ashley Gulledge, to the defendant, David Allen Gulledge. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion, finding that she had freely and voluntarily agreed to the consent decree and had stipulated that the defendant would be awarded the sole custody of their minor daughter. The plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sandra and David Gulledge were married on November 12, 1982. The parties divorced on August 31, 1989. The divorce judgment awarded the parties joint custody of their minor child, Megan Gulledge. Sandra Gulledge was designated as the domiciliary parent and David Gulledge was awarded reasonable visitation rights. On May 23, 1990, the plaintiff filed a rule to modify the child support and custody judgment¹ and for past due child support. On March 3, 1993, the defendant filed a rule for contempt and for change of custody. The court consolidated these cases, thus creating the present case.

The trial court appointed a counselor, Dr. Daniel Prior, Ph.D., to evaluate the mental health of the parties and their minor child. Dr. Prior concluded that a serious problem existed concerning Megan's mental health. On June 3, 1997, the trial court held a hearing to consider Megan's welfare. The court ordered that the then current custody plan be maintained. The court also granted the plaintiffs request for an independent psychological evaluation and appointed psychologist, Dr. George Seiden, M.D., Ph.D., to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of all of the parties and to determine whether Megan suffered from a mental illness which would require a change in her custodial situation as recommended by Dr. Prior.

A hearing was held on April 28, 1998². The trial court considered the recommendations of Dr. Prior and Dr. Seiden and the stipulation of the parties concerning those recommendations. As a result, David Gulledge was granted the sole custody of Megan. Sandra Gulledge was granted supervised visitation on Saturdays.

Subsequently, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs motion to set aside the consent decree and the plaintiff applied to this court for supervisory writ. We remanded the cases and ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Sandra Gulledge consented to the conditions of the consent decree entered into on April 28, 1998. Gulledge v. Gulledge, 31,765-CW consolidated with 31,766-CW, (La.App.2d Cir.8/27/98).

After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that Sandra Gulledge understood and consented to the conditions of the consent decree. The plaintiff appeals.

THE LAW

Louisiana Civil Code article 3071 provides:

A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on, and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing.

This contract must be either reduced into writing or recited in open court and capable of being transcribed from the record of the proceeding. The agreement recited in open court confers upon each of them the right of judicially enforcing its performance, although its substance may thereafter be written in a more convenient form.

A consent judgment is essentially a bilateral contract which is voluntarily signed by the parties and accepted by the court. It has binding force from the voluntary acquiescence of the parties, not from the court's adjudication. Williams v. Williams, 586 So.2d 658 (La. App. 2d Cir.1991); Martin Forest Products v. Grantadams, 616 So.2d 251(La.App. 2d Cir.1993); Sigur v. Sigur, 94-1736 (La.App. 4th Cir. 3/16/95), 652 So.2d 1046. Thus, "consent" judgments, as opposed to other final judgments which are rendered against a party without consent, may be annulled for error of fact or of the principal cause of the agreement. Williams v. Williams, supra.

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff contends that she did not consent to the stipulations of the consent decree, that instead, she was "railroaded" into accepting the conditions of the decree, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying her motion to set aside the consent decree or, in the alternative, to grant a new trial.

The stipulations which became the terms of the consent decree were based on the results of a psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. George Seiden. The results were presented in a written report and during his deposition taken on March 27, 1998. Dr. Seiden recommended that sole custody of Megan be granted to David Gulledge and that Sandra Gulledge be granted supervised visitation for at least one year. He also recommended family therapy for David Gulledge, his wife, Gaye, and Megan. Individual therapy was recommended for Sandra Gulledge with any...