Gumtow v. Kalamazoo Motor Express
| Decision Date | 06 March 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 101.,101. |
| Parties | GUMTOW v. KALAMAZOO MOTOR EXPRESS et al. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Fred Gumtow, opposed by the Kalamazoo Motor Express, employer, and the General Accident Assurance Corporation, Limited, insurer. From an order of the Department of Labor and Industry reversing deputy commissioner's denial of compensation to claimant, employer and insurer appeal.
Reversed.
Argued before the Entire Bench.Kerr, Lacey & Scroggie, of Detroit, for appellants.
William J. Howard, of Kalamazoo (Harry C. Howard, of Kalamazoo, of counsel), for appellee.
The Kalamazoo Motor Express, employer, and the General Accident Assurance Corporation, Limited, insurer, appeal from the award of the Department of Labor and Industry granting compensation to Fred Gumtow, of Kalamazoo, Mich. The latter claims that on the 17th day of August, 1932, he was hauling freight for his employer by motor truck from Kalamazoo to Chicago and return; that at the village of Lawrence, in Van Buren county, while changing a tire, he punched his finger so that a blood blister formed and opened; that he proceeded on his trip, but upon arriving at Gary, Ind., he suffered from a chill; that he nevertheless continued on his way to Chicago, where he unloaded and reloaded the truck, but subsequently on the return trip, he became so ill that his wife was obliged to take his place at the wheel from Gary to Benton Harbor, when he called up James g. Westenberg, the owner of the Kalamazoo Motor Express, notifying him that he was unable to proceed any further; that thereupon Westenberg drove to Benton Harbor and brought plaintiff home in his automobile, another driver taking charge of the truck. Plaintiff claims that the injury to his finger caused blood poisoning in his left hand and arm, as a result of which he was bedridden for five weeks and is still unable to use that arm. The testimony shows that the circumstances of the left arm shortly below the elbow measures about three-quarters of an inch less than the right arm at the same place.
Appellants claim the testimony does not show that plaintiff suffered an accidental injury, or that his present condition resulted from such injury. They particularly stress the fact that, owing to plaintiff's objection, the introduction of testimony by the physician who first attended him was excluded on the ground that it was a confidential communication. It is, however, not within our province to analyze or weigh the testimony, if there be any to support the findings of the commission. There was such testimony in the case at bar.
Appellants further claim that they had no notice or knowledge of the alleged injury within the three months following its occurrence, and therefore no proceedings for compensation can be maintained. Sections 8431-8434, Comp. Laws 1929. The failure of the employer to report the accident as required by sections 8431 and 8456, Comp. Laws 1929, does not bar his right to raise the defense of the statute of limitations unless he had notice or knowledge of the injury within the three-month period. It is admitted that appellants received no written notice whatever until some time in February, 1933, at the earliest, a period in excess of three months. Therefore the sole question to which we limit our discussion is whether or not the employer had notice or knowledge of the injury in some other manner within three months after its alleged occurrence.
The deputy commissioner, in denying compensation, held that the employer had no such notice. This order, however, was reversed by the full board. The evidence shows beyond a doubt that the employer knew the claimant had contracted an illness while in the discharge of his duties. Workmen's compensation, however, is not health insurance; it was not intended to compensate for disability through sickness or disease not caused by an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The notice required to be given to the employer is notice of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. An analysis of the testimony,...
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