Gunderson v. School Dist. of Hillsborough

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Wolf
• Citation: Gunderson v. School Dist. of Hillsborough, 937 So.2d 777 (Fla. App. 2006)
• Decision Date: 13 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1D05-4323.,1D05-4323.
• Parties: Tammy GUNDERSON, as Personal Representative for The Estate of Alan Gunderson, Deceased, Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY and Broadspire fka CNA Claims Plus, Appellees.

937 So.2d 777

Tammy GUNDERSON, as Personal Representative for The Estate of Alan Gunderson, Deceased, Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY and Broadspire fka CNA Claims Plus, Appellees.

No. 1D05-4323.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

September 13, 2006.

William H. McKnight, of William H. McKnight Esquire P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

L. Gray Sanders and Denise Puckett, of Barbass, Koenig, Nunez, Sanders & Butler, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.

WOLF, J.

In this workers' compensation appeal, the claimant's widow, as personal representative of his estate, seeks to enforce a settlement agreement signed by the deceased and his former employer (E/C) immediately prior to his death. Because we find the settlement agreement became a binding, enforceable contract upon the later entry of an order approving attorney's fees, we reverse the trial court's order denying the claimant's widow's request to enforce the agreement.

The disputed settlement agreement read in its entirety:

This is a Washout Settlement under F.S. 440.20(11).

Parties agree to a complete and final settlement of all claimant's claims for medical care and indemnify for $52,808 inclusive of attorney's fees and costs. [Claimant] to pay $9,000 fees and $3,308 costs.

Claimant agrees to execute a general release and voluntary resignation. General release will not affect any vested pension or defined compensation rights. Parties understand settlement is effective and binding upon entry of order approving motion for attorney's fees.

Both parties concede that the claimant failed to execute a general release or sign a voluntary resignation prior to his death. Both parties equally concede that the claimant's widow sought and received an order approving her motion for attorney's fees as personal representative of her husband's estate and later executed a general release and voluntary resignation on her husband's behalf. The E/C argues the deceased's failure to execute these documents prior to his death negates its duty to pay the settlement fee. However, the claimant's widow asserts that her execution and service of both the general release and a voluntary resignation, as personal representative of the deceased's estate, amounts to performance of the contract, thereby requiring performance on the E/C's part. The E/C never objected to the form of the voluntary release or resignation, but merely objected because they were not executed by the claimant prior to his death.

Where the order on appeal turns on the validity of a contract, it is subject to a de novo standard of review. See Cintas Corp. No. 2 v. Schwalier, 901 So.2d 307, 308, 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (citing Brasington v. EMC Corp., 855 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)). However, to the extent that the issue of enforcement of a workers' compensation settlement agreement following the claimant's death is intermingled with findings of fact, this court should apply the competent substantial evidence standard to those determinations of fact made by the lower court. See Quinlan v. Ross Stores, 932 So.2d 428, 429 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); cf. Calderon v. J.B. Nurseries, Inc., 933 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

In defense of its failure to perform the settlement agreement, the E/C asserts that the deceased's execution of the general release and voluntary resignation were either conditions precedent or conditions subsequent to the formation of a valid contract and, thus, the failure to execute the documents renders the settlement agreement non-binding. This argument is without merit. Provisions of a contract will only be considered conditions precedent or subsequent where the express wording of the disputed provision conditions formation of a contract and or performance of the contract on the completion of the conditions. See In re Estate of Boyar, 592 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (holding conditions precedent are not favored, and clauses will not be construed as conditions precedent unless the plain, unambiguous meaning of the contract requires the court to do so); see also Quinlan, 932 So.2d at 428 (holding that an agreement to settle entered into upon mediation of a workers' compensation settlement never materialized into a binding contract where the expressly written conditions to enforcement were never met); Black's Law Dictionary, 312 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a condition subsequent as a condition that, if it occurs, will bring something else to an end; an...