Gunn v. Union R. Co.

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: STINESS, C. J.
• Citation: Gunn v. Union R. Co., 48 A. 1045, 22 R.I. 579 (R.I. 1901)
• Decision Date: 10 April 1901
• Parties: GUNN v. UNION R. CO.

48 A. 1045

22 R.I. 579

GUNN

v. UNION R. CO.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 10, 1901.

On motion for reargument. Denied. For former opinion, see 47 Atl. 888.

STINESS, C. J. The first reason assigned by the plaintiff for a reargument of defendant's petition for a new trial, which has been granted (47 Atl. 888), is as follows: "That the power conferred upon the court to grant new trials for 'reasons for which a new trial is granted at common law' does not include the power to grant a new trial because the verdict is against the weight of evidence, or because the great preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the jury, when there is a conflict in the evidence, as the trial by jury, guarantied in the constitution, was the one known at common law; and for an appellate court to exercise the power of granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the evidence, in a case where there is conflicting testimony, is a violation of the right of trial by jury." This amounts simply to an assertion that new trials could not be granted at common law on the ground that a verdict was against the evidence, if there was any testimony to sustain it. As to the common law, it is sufficient to quote' the following words of Blackstone (3 Bl. Comm. 392): A new trial is not "granted where the scales of evidence hang nearly equal. That which leans against the former verdict ought always very strongly to preponderate." Cases upon this point are too numerous for citation, and the subject too familiar to require it. A few of the decisions of this court show that the granting of a new trial upon a strong preponderance of testimony has been the long-established rule in this state. In Johnson v. Blanchard, 5 R. 1. 24, the court said that it was quite content with Blackstone's rule, quoted above. In Patton v. Manufacturing Co., 11 R. I. 188, the court said: "We cannot say that there was a preponderance of evidence against the verdict, and, unless there was a strong preponderance of evidence against it, we should not be justified in setting it aside." In Sweet v. Wood, 18 R. 1. 386, 28 Atl. 335, the words of the court were, "so that the verdict is strongly against the evidence." All of these are cases in which a new trial was denied, but the rule is, nevertheless, clearly recognized and stated. Cases in which a new trial has been granted for this cause do not often appear in the Reports, because the practice of the court has been to dispose of such cases by an unreported rescript, to avoid reporting a mere discussion of testimony, and also to avoid possible prejudice to a new trial thereby. There have been many such cases, however, and there are numerous cases in our Reports in which a new trial has been denied with such a remark as this: "While it appears that the evidence is quite conflicting, yet we cannot say that it is not sufficient to sustain the verdict." Lake v Weaver, 20 R. I. 46, 37 Atl. 302. Also the oft-repeated remarks that the evidence sustains the verdict, or does not appear to be clearly against the evidence; the corollary of which is that the court may say that the evidence does not sustain the verdict. In Watson v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 98, Durfee, C. J., said: "There was a conflict in the testimony upon the point whether there was such a light. The testimony to prove that there was a light was certainly very strong; but, even if conclusive, the jury may have thought that it was not properly placed, or that, in the particular circumstances, a single...