Gunter v. Mills

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: CARROLL
• Citation: Gunter v. Mills, 271 Mass. 314, 171 N.E. 486 (Mass. 1930)
• Decision Date: 27 May 1930
• Parties: GUNTER et al. v. ARLINGTON MILLS.

271 Mass. 314

171 N.E. 486

GUNTER et al.

v.ARLINGTON MILLS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

May 27, 1930.

Appeal from Superior Court, Essex County; F. T. Hammond, Judge.

Suit by Thomas Gunter and others against the Arlington Mills. From a decree sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the bill, plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Matthew A. Cregg and Hugh A. Cregg, both of Lawrence, for appellants.

George R. Nutter and William E. Hays, both of Boston, for appellee.

CARROLL, J.

The plaintiffs allege in their bill that they acquired title to certain land in Salem, New Hampshire, bordering on a pond known as Millville Lake, that the defendant acquired title ‘to the land over which Millville Lake flows' from Mary E. Brackett; that Mary E. Brackett sold the remaining interest ‘in her land appurtenant to said Millville Lake’ to Bessie M. Morrison from whom the plaintiffs took their title; that the plaintiffs obtained all the rights ‘in the reservations specified in the deed of’ Brackett to the defendant ‘to wit: the right of bathing, boating, fishing and watering of live stock in the waters of any pond which may flow any of the land conveyed to said Arlington Mills by deed of said Mary E. Brackett.’ It is further alleged that ‘in accordance with the plan contemplated in the deed of’ Brackett to the defendant ‘and in furtherance of the contract between the parties thereto,’ a dam was erected on the defendant's land, and ‘in consequence thereof the lake was created or enlarged;’ that the defendant, without right, is ‘voluntarily and maliciously’ turning the water through the gate in the dam, in order to drain the lake; that the lake ‘is nearly dry,’ that the defendant has created ‘a nuisance from smell and odor, and in consequence thereof the defendant has also created a fire hazard.’ The plaintiffs asked that the defendant be restrained from diverting the water from the lake, that it be ordered to restore the dam to its former height and to desist from interfering with the plaintiffs' rights ‘in the said body of water acquired through their deeds.’ The bill also alleges that the plaintiffs are residents of Lawrence in our county of Essex, and that the defendant has its usual place of business in that city.

In the Superior Court the defendant demurred. One of its grounds of demurrer was: ‘This court has no jurisdiction to order the performance, outside the Commonwealth, of the acts necessary to give the relief prayed for in the bill of complaint.’ The demurrer was sustained on this ground. The plaintiffs appealed.

Want of jurisdiction in equity such as is here alleged properly is raised by demurrer. Kansas & Eastern Railroad Construction Co. v. Topeka, Saline & Western Railroad, 135 Mass. 34, 46 Am. Rep. 439. It was decided in Rothstein v. Commissioner of Banks, 258 Mass. 196, 155 N. E. 7, and Weiscopf v. Commissioner of Banks, 258 Mass. 199, 154 N. E. 855, that want of jurisdiction should be raised by demurrer. See also Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 148, 128 N. E. 177;Reilly v. Selectmen of Blackstone (Mass.) 165 N. E. 660.

The Superior Court had jurisdiction of the parties. In an appropriate case it could enjoin the defendant from the performance of an act in a foreign territory. A court of equity acts in personam and can enforce its decrees against a resident of the Commonwealth or one actually present, prohibiting him from doing an act in another country. Gray, J. in Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151, 3 S. Ct. 586, 28 L. Ed. 101,Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 32 S. Ct. 340, 56 L. Ed. 570. See Brown v. Desmond, 100 Mass. 267, 269. Ordinarily our courts decline to take jurisdiction where performance of a positive act is to be carried out in another State. Smith v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 14 Allen, 336; Kansas & Eastern Railroad Construction Co. v. Topeka, Salina & Western Railroad, supra; Kimball v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway, 157 Mass. 7, 31 N. E. 697,34 Am. St. Rep. 250;Richards v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 230 Mass. 320, 119 N. E. 744;Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 233 Mass. 522, 124 N. E. 281.

Applying these principles to the case...