Gurule v. Wilson, 41590
| Decision Date | 01 December 1980 |
| Docket Number | 79-1211 and 79-1212,C,Nos. 78-2056,78-2057,No. 41590,41590,s. 78-2056 |
| Citation | 635 F.2d 782 |
| Parties | Charles GURULE, in behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Cross-Appellants, v. Alex WILSON, Warden, Colorado State Penitentiary; Jack Capelli, Associate Warden, Medium Security, Colorado State Penitentiary; Five Unknown Named Guards of Medium Security, Colorado State Penitentiary, Defendants-Appellants, and Cross-Appellees. Frank R. ALLARID, Registerolorado State Penitentiary, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alex WILSON, Warden, Colorado State Penitentiary, individually and in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellee. Henry ALVEREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alex WILSON, Warden, Colorado State Penitentiary, individually and in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Jonathon B. Chase, Boulder, Colo. (Barbara Salomon, Denver, Colo., with him on the brief), The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado, Inc., for plaintiffs-appellees and cross-appellants, and plaintiffs-appellants Allarid and Alverez.
William Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Litigation Section, Denver, Colo. , for defendants-appellants and cross-appellees.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, and MARKEY, * Judge.
This is a consolidated civil rights action brought by inmates of the Colorado State Penitentiary under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs sought to require defendant prison officials to afford due process before adversely affecting the prisoners' conditions of confinement. Defendants appeal from the district court's order requiring them to comply with the hearing procedures set forth in their Manual and Policy on Classification (Manual). Defendants argue that the order requiring compliance is invalid because the named plaintiffs had already received the relief they requested, rendering their claims moot. Plaintiffs contest the claim of mootness on the ground their suit is a class action encompassing the rights of all inmates at the penitentiary, despite the lack of a formal order certifying the class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1) prior to the entry of summary judgment. Both parties appeal the award of attorneys fees to plaintiffs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In September 1974, a fire at the Colorado State Penitentiary destroyed the gymnasium and damaged cells in the prison's maximum security section. As a result of this and other incidents, a number of inmates were transferred to cell blocks with less favorable conditions of confinement. 1 While most inmates were thereafter returned to their previous cell block, some two hundred prisoners, including many of the named plaintiffs in this case, remained in the less desirable cellhouse.
These actions were consolidated in November 1974. At that time, the Supreme Court decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), favored plaintiffs' position that they were entitled to Fourteenth Amendment due process before their conditions of confinement could be substantially altered. A footnote in Wolff suggested that because solitary confinement constitutes a major adverse change in an inmate's condition of confinement, "there should be minimum procedural safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary determination of the factual predicate for imposition of the sanction." Id. at 571-72 n. 19, 94 S.Ct. at 2982 n. 19. Plaintiffs relied on Wolff to contend that regressive classification was similarly subject to due process standards.
This was the state of the law when the parties began an extended period of settlement discussions which focused primarily on the promulgation of classification procedures for the penitentiary. In April 1976, plaintiffs' senior counsel advised the court that a final settlement would be reached within a month. That prediction proved overly optimistic.
No settlement had been effected when the Supreme Court decided Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976), and Richardson v. Lokey, 427 U.S. 902, 96 S.Ct. 3186, 49 L.Ed.2d 1196 (1976), which together effectively precluded plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs concede these cases make clear that due process is not required before an inmate is regressively classified unless the inmate "has a justifiable expectation rooted in state law that he will not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of other specified events." Montayne, 427 U.S. at 242, 96 S.Ct. at 2547.
By the time these decisions were rendered, however, the parties had drafted a Manual providing procedural fairness in regressive classifications. Although the Manual was not constitutionally mandated after Meachum, Montayne and Richardson, and despite the inclination of counsel for defendants to "advise the State not to have any of these regulations," rec., vol. V, at 5, the Manual was officially adopted on January 11, 1977.
The regulations contained in the Manual require reclassification of prisoners to be based on the occurrence of specified events. Prison officials must provide an inmate with written notice of the proposed transfer, including a statement citing the precise disciplinary violation and the evidence relied on in making this determination. Since the Manual sets forth the official statement of policy, defendants concede that it creates an expectation rooted in state law and consequently a liberty interest arises in favor of the inmates. See Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977).
In July 1977, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel defendants' compliance with the Manual, asserting defendants had failed on several occasions to follow its procedures and would continue to do so unless restrained by the court. Defendants responded with a motion for summary judgment, contending plaintiffs' claims were moot. They also argued the proposed order would improperly impair their discretion by prohibiting them and their successors from altering the Manual. The district court entered judgment on April 6, 1978, ordering defendants' compliance with the Manual. The order permits revision of the regulations so long as the amendments meet the minimal standards of due process set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
On July 10, 1978, plaintiffs filed a contempt motion citing five violations of the April 6 order, all involving a denial of pre-transfer rights guaranteed by the Manual. Because the violations concerned inmates who were not named plaintiffs, defendants argued that any remedies available to these prisoners had to be sought in an independent action. The court strongly disagreed:
Rec., vol. VII, at 15. Nonetheless, plaintiffs withdrew their contempt motion and instead requested class certification through a motion to correct the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a).
After hearing the Rule 60(a) motion, the court certified the class by an order incorporated into an amended judgment filed August 14, 1978. The order stated that class certification had been omitted unintentionally from the original judgment. The court found that the prerequisites of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) were met and concluded that a class action was proper under Rule 23(b)(2).
Defendants contested the belated class certification and moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) to amend the amended judgment by striking reference to class certification. They argued that class certification requires an express legal determination and is not a "mistake" eligible for correction under Rule 60(a). They also asserted that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to amend its judgment four months after entry of the original judgment and beyond the time for appeal. The district court granted defendants' motion and entered its second amended judgment on October 25, 1978, decertifying the plaintiff class.
The second amended judgment also awarded attorneys fees to the plaintiffs under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Although plaintiffs initially requested fees in their complaint, they did not submit their formal application for fees until June 27, 1978, two and one-half months after the original judgment was entered. The court found plaintiffs to be the prevailing party and awarded a total fee of $4,360.
The issues on appeal are 1) whether the second amended judgment is the final order in this action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 2) whether the district court erred in its ultimate conclusion that it was without authority to certify a class after its April 6 order; 3) whether summary judgment was proper; 4) whether plaintiffs were prevailing parties for purposes of an award of attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and 5) whether the amount awarded as attorneys fees was proper.
A timely appeal from a final order of the trial court is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our consideration of the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997, 95 S.Ct. 311, 42 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). Each party in this case filed a timely appeal from the district court's second amended judgment entered on October 25, 1978. The first judgment was entered on April 6, 1978. If that judgment were final for purposes of section 1291, significant issues would exist concerning the district court's power to twice amend its judgment, as well as the timeliness of this appeal. Because we hold that the...
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