Gustafson v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of Missouri-Illinois Metro. Dist.
| Decision Date | 27 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:18-cv-02074 SRC |
| Parties | SCOTT GUSTAFSON, Plaintiff(s), v. BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF THE MISSOURI-ILLINOIS METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Plaintiff Scott Gustafson has used Bi-State's transportation services since 1997, and is visually impaired. Gustafson's history with Bi-State includes many complaints, including a charge of discrimination, which resulted in an investigation by the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, and a settlement agreement that released a broad scope of claims. Later, Gustafson filed this case, originally in state court and asserting only state-law claims; three years into the state-court litigation, Gustafson filed federal claims, resulting in removal to this Court. To stave off Bi-State's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Gustafson's counsel represented to this Court both that the applicable federal regulations do not provide a private right of action and that even if they did, he did not base any of his claims on the regulations. To avoid summary judgment, Gustafson now bases most of his claims on the regulations. The Court considers the motions for summary judgment of both Gustafson [120] and Bi-State [114] and grants Bi-State's Motion and denies Gustafson's Motion.
Gustafson initially filed this lawsuit in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis in 2015, alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act. Three amended petitions later, Gustafson added claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, and Bi-State removed the matter to this Court. In 2019, Gustafson amended his complaint for the fifth time, filing his Fourth Amended Complaint. In response, Bi-State moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the Court ultimately denied, along with Gustafson's request to file yet another amended complaint.
Gustafson's Fourth Amended Complaint alleges two claims against Bi-State: denial of access to governmental services, programs, and activities in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (Count I), and failure to provide accommodations and access to information in violation of Section 504 of the Rehab Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Count II). Gustafason alleges Bi-State discriminates against him on the basis of his vision disability by failing to adhere to ADA regulations in its facilities and services including: (1) bus and train announcements, (2) fare collection equipment, (3) the website and mobile application, (4) training programs, (5) MetroLink platforms including entrance signs, placement of ticket vending machines, and platform edges, (6) the complaint process, (7) the paratransit service, and (8) bus stop signs. Gustafson also alleges Bi-State discriminated against him on the basis of his disability when its bus drivers failed to pick him up from bus stops on three or four occasions over the course of 15 years.
Both Gustafson and Bi-State now seek summary judgment. Resolution of the motions and Gustafson's claims requires the Court to consider, among others, issues regarding a private right of action under the ADA regulations, and whether a 2011 settlement agreement betweenBi-State and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights arising out of a complaint Gustafson made to the Commission bars Gustafson's present claims.
A court shall grant a motion for summary judgment only if the moving party shows "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). By definition, material facts "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a genuine dispute of material fact is one "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the non-moving party has failed to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, . . . there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
The moving party bears the initial burden of proof in establishing "the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact that is material to a judgment in his favor." City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party must then set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts demonstrating a genuine dispute on the specific issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. When the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but, by affidavit and other evidence, must set forth specific facts showing a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Stone Motor Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 293 F.3d 456, 465 (8th Cir. 2002). The non-moving party must demonstrate sufficient favorable evidence that could enable a jury to return a verdict for it. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "If the non-moving party failsto produce such evidence, summary judgment is proper." Olson v. Pennzoil Co., 943 F.2d 881, 883 (8th Cir. 1991).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court may not "weigh the evidence in the summary judgment record, decide credibility questions, or determine the truth of any factual issue." Kampouris v. St. Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2000). The Court instead "perform[s] only a gatekeeper function of determining whether there is evidence in the summary judgment record generating a genuine issue of material fact for trial on each essential element of a claim." Id. The Court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Reed v. City of St. Charles, 561 F.3d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 2009).
Before reciting the material facts in this case, the Court addresses Gustafson's four arguments that the Court should exclude Bi-State's affidavits filed in support of its statement of material facts.
First, Gustafson argues that the Court cannot rely on Bi-State's affidavits because Bi-State initially filed the unsigned versions. This argument lacks merit. When Bi-State filed its statement of material facts and exhibits, it accidentally filed unsigned affidavits. The same day, Bi-State realized its mistake and contacted the Court to have the correct, signed versions filed. With the Court's permission and assistance, Bi-State replaced the unsigned affidavits with signed ones and provided Gustafson with copies of the signed affidavits. See Doc. 115. Bi-State made a simple mistake that it quickly corrected. The Court can only hope that if Gustafson's counselever find themselves in a similar situation, opposing counsel will kindly "do unto others as you would have them do unto you." The Court will not exclude Bi-State's affidavits on this basis.
Second, Gustafson argues the affidavits are inadmissible because they are self-serving, rely on business records without a proper foundation and contain hearsay. The affidavits do not rely impermissibly on business records lacking a proper foundation. Bi-state's witnesses and their affidavits establish a proper foundation for business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) because they are qualified witnesses and the records were generated as a part of Bi-State's regular practices. See Moore v. CCB Credit Servs. Inc., No. 4:11CV2132 RWS, 2013 WL 211048 at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 18, 2013) () (quoting United States v. Kail, 804 F.2d 441, 448-49 (8th Cir. 1986)). The affidavits do not contain hearsay because a witness may rely on reports, business records, and documents to form his or her personal knowledge. See Jackson v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, No. 4:13CV617 CEJ, 2014 WL 517490 at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2014) (). Finally, "the standard is not whether the evidence at the summary judgment stage would be admissible at trial - it is whether it could be presented at trial in an admissible form." Smith v. Kilgore, 926 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original). Bi-State could present the records and reports relied on in the affidavits in an admissible form at trial.
Third, Gustafson claims that some of the witnesses provide expert testimony but Bi-State did not disclose them as experts. The affidavits used by Bi-State do not constitute expert testimony; the affidavits come from lay witnesses offering some opinion testimony. "A lay witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences need only be rationally based on perception and helpful to a determination of a fact in issue." Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 802 F.2d 994, 1004 (8th Cir. 1986). "Personal knowledge or perception acquired through review of records prepared in the ordinary course of business, or perceptions based on industry experience, is a sufficient foundation for lay opinion testimony." Id. at 1004-05. Applying this standard, the testimony provided in the affidavits constitutes admissible testimony. Because they qualify as lay witnesses, Bi-State did not need to disclose these individuals as experts in its Rule 26 disclosures. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A) (...
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