Gustafson v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1931
• Docket Number: No. 6340.,6340.
• Citation: 55 F.2d 235
• Parties: GUSTAFSON v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

55 F.2d 235 (1931)

GUSTAFSON v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.

No. 6340.

District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

February 19, 1931.

Mullin & Woods, of Kane, Pa., for plaintiff.

Guy B. Mayo, of Smethport, Pa., and Don M. Larrabee, of Williamsport, Pa., for defendant.

SCHOONMAKER, District Judge.

A jury trial was waived in this case and the parties agreed upon the facts in a written stipulation designated as a "case stated," agreeing that the same should have the same effect as a special finding of facts by verdict of a jury under provisions U. S. Code, title 28, § 773, and section 875 (28 USCA §§ 773, 875).

Findings of Fact.

We therefore find the facts to be as contained in the case stated.

Conclusions of Law.

From the facts thus found we conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant for the sum of $4,000, with interest from February 10, 1930.

Discussion.

The only question at issue is whether the plaintiff, the beneficiary in a policy of insurance issued by the defendant upon the life of plaintiff's son, Evan E. Gustafson, in the sum of $2,000, is entitled to recover $4,000 under the double indemnity clause of the policy. The defendant admits its liability under the policy for the face thereof.

The provision of the policy covering this double indemnity feature is as follows: "New York Life Insurance Company agrees to pay to Helma C. Gustafson, mother of the insured, beneficiary, two thousand dollars, upon receipt of due proof of the death of Evan E. Gustafson, the Insured, or double the face of this policy, upon receipt of due proof that the death of the Insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent, and accidental cause, and that such death occurred within sixty days after sustaining such injury."

The insured, at the time of his death, was a professional boxer, and as such had engaged in various boxing matches. At the date of his death, and for a long time prior thereto, he enjoyed exceptional strength and bodily vigor, and was in a trained and fit condition to engage successfully as a boxer in a boxing match.

His death was caused in the following manner, as recited in the sixth paragraph of the case stated: "6. That, on or about January 13, 1930, the said Evan E. Gustafson, while lawfully engaged in a boxing match of scheduled duration of four rounds, in Allegany, in the County of Cattaraugus and State of New York, with an opponent of ordinary skill, health and vigor, received from his said opponent a violent blow on the chin causing his neck to break, which shortly and within a few hours thereafter caused the death of the said Evan E. Gustafson."

Boxing was not a prohibited occupation under the terms of the policy.

All the elements that make the double indemnity payable under the policy are admittedly present except one, and that is the "accidental cause." The plaintiff contends, under the facts in the case, that the cause of death was accidental. The defendant contends that it was not accidental. That presents the only issue. We find no case involving...