Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc.

Decision Date12 August 2022
Docket Number207 WDA 2019
Citation282 A.3d 739
Parties Mark and Leah GUSTAFSON, Individually and as Administrators and Personal Representatives of the Estate of James Robert ("J.R.") Gustafson, Appellants v. SPRINGFIELD, INC. d/b/a Springfield Armory and Saloom Department Store and Saloom Dept. Store, LLC d/b/a Saloom Department Store, Appellees The United States of America, Intervenor
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Jonathan Elias Lowy, Washington, D.C., for appellants.

Christopher Renzulli, White Plains, NY, for appellees.

Laura Myron, Intervenor, Washington, D.C, for United States of America.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.; BENDER, P.J.E.; BOWES, J.; LAZARUS, J; OLSON, J.; DUBOW, J.; KUNSELMAN, J.; MURRAY, J.; and McCAFFERY, J.

PER CURIAM:

The order of the trial court sustaining preliminary objections is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

KUNSELMAN, J. files an opinion in support of the per curiam order to reverse in which PANELLA, P.J. and LAZARUS, J. join.

BENDER, P.J.E. files an opinion in support of the per curiam order to reverse.

DUBOW, J. files an opinion in support of the per curiam order to reverse.

OLSON, J. files a dissenting opinion in which BOWES and McCAFFERY, JJ. join, and MURRAY, J. concurs in the result.

MURRAY, J. files a dissenting opinion in which BOWES, OLSON and McCAFFERY, JJ. concur in the result.

OPINION IN SUPPORT OF PER CURIAM ORDER TO REVERSE BY KUNSELMAN, J.:

In this appeal, the Court must decide whether the trial court erred by finding that a federal statute, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901 - 7903 ("PLCAA"), bars a state, product-liability lawsuit arising from the shooting death of Mark and Leah Gustafson's 13-year-old son, James Robert ("J.R.") Gustafson. The Gustafsons claim PLCAA does not apply to their product-defect claims or, alternatively, PLCAA is an unconstitutional infringement upon the sovereign police powers of the fifty states.

This Court is not deciding whether PLCAA represents good policy or is wise legislation. Nor does this Court consider whether this statute would be constitutional if the General Assembly of Pennsylvania adopts it. Finally, the Court today does not render any opinion regarding an individual's right to bear arms under the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or Article I, § 21 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Based on the reasons below, I vote to reverse the Order dismissing the Gustafsons’ case and remand for the Defendants to file their Answer and New Matter.

BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2016, J.R. Gustafson and his 14-year-old friend visited the Westmoreland County home of Joshua Hudec.1 J.R.’s friend obtained Mr. Hudec's semiautomatic handgun. See Gustafsons’ Complaint at 5. The friend removed the handgun's magazine and therefore believed it "was unloaded, because ... there were no adequate indicators or warnings to inform him that a live round remained in the chamber." Id. at 6.

"Thinking the handgun was unloaded, the boy pulled the trigger." Id. The chambered bullet fired and killed J.R. The district attorney charged J.R.’s friend with general homicide, and the friend eventually pleaded delinquent to involuntary manslaughter2 in juvenile court.

Mark and Leah Gustafson, as Administrators of J.R.’s estate and in their own right as surviving kin, then sued the manufacturer and seller of the handgun (Springfield Armory, Inc. and Saloom Department Store, hereafter "Defendants").3 The Gustafsons asserted that, under the common law of Pennsylvania, the Defendants were negligent and strictly liable for manufacturing and/or selling a defective handgun that caused their son's death. See id. at 13-25. They alleged a design defect, because the gun lacked a safety feature to disable it from firing without the magazine attached. They also alleged inadequate warnings on the handgun to alert the user that a bullet could remain in the chamber after removing the magazine.

Seeking to dismiss the action under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendants filed preliminary objections.4 The Defendants asserted PLCAA immunized them from liability, even if they tortiously contributed to J.R.’s death under Pennsylvania law. See Preliminary Objections at 5.

The Gustafsons responded that PLCAA does not apply to their suit. In the alternative, they argued the Act is unconstitutional. Upon learning of the Gustafsons’ constitutional attacks against its statute, the United States of America ("the Federal Government") intervened to defend PLCAA. It claimed Congress properly enacted PLCAA under the Commerce Clause and the Bill of Rights.

The trial court concluded PLCAA barred the Gustafsons’ suit, upheld the Act as constitutional, sustained the Defendants’ preliminary objections, and dismissed the complaint. This timely appeal followed.

Initially, a panel of this Court, in a published opinion, unanimously reversed and declared PLCAA unconstitutional.5 Upon the Defendants’ request, this Court granted en banc review and withdrew the panel opinion.

The Gustafsons raise two appellate issues:

1. Does [PLCAA] bar [their] claims?
2. Does the United States Constitution permit PLCAA to bar Pennsylvania courts from applying Pennsylvania law to provide [them] civil justice?

Gustafsons’ Brief at 3.

Our scope and standard of review are the same for both issues. "When an appellate court rules on whether preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were properly sustained, the standard of review is de novo , and the scope of review is plenary." Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist. , 599 Pa. 232, 961 A.2d 96, 101 (2008). We affirm an order sustaining preliminary objections "only when, based on the facts pleaded, it is clear and free from doubt that the complainant will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a right to relief." Id. Also, this Court "must accept as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every inference that is fairly deducible from those facts." Id.

I.

First, I consider whether the language of PLCAA bars the Gustafsons’ product-defect lawsuit. When interpreting a federal statute, if its terms are unambiguous, our analysis "begins, and pretty much ends, with the text." Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez , 590 U.S. ––––, ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1724, 207 L.Ed.2d 132 (2020).

A. Qualified-Civil-Liability Action

PLCAA restricts certain suits from being filed against gun manufacturers and sellers. Under the Act, a "qualified-civil-liability action may not be brought in any federal or state court." 15 U.S.C. § 7902(a). If such an action is filed, PLCAA dictates it "shall be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought or is currently pending." 15 U.S.C. § 7902(b). Thus, if the Gustafsons’ lawsuit meets the definition of a "qualified-civil-liablity action," PLCAA requires dismissal. The trial court ruled that this case met the definition and, therefore, dismissed it.

A "qualified-civil-liability action" is any:
civil action or proceeding or administrative proceeding against a manufacturer or seller of a [firearm or ammunition that moved through interstate commerce] for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of [that firearm or ammunition] by the [plaintiff] or a third party...."

15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A).

Applying that definition here, it is undisputed that the Gustafsons filed a "civil action ... against a manufacturer [and a] seller of a [firearm] for damages ...." 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A). Moreover, the damages they seek resulted, at least in part, from the criminal or unlawful misuse of that firearm by a third party: i.e. , the shooter. Under PLCAA, the "term ‘unlawful misuse’ means conduct that violates a statute, ordinance, or regulation as it relates to the use of a [firearm or ammunition]." 15 U.S.C. § 7903(9). Any unlawful misuse will suffice, even unlawful possession of the gun itself.

For instance, in Ryan v. Hughes-Ortiz , 81 Mass.App.Ct. 90, 959 N.E.2d 1000 (2012), a man was returning a Glock to his employer's display case, when the handgun accidentally discharged and killed him. The administratrix of his estate sued Glock for defectively designing both the gun and the display case that had failed to stop the stray bullet. The plaintiff argued PLCAA did not apply, because the decedent had not "misused" the handgun in any way. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A). The appellate court disagreed. The court held that the decedent, who was a convicted felon, "misused" the gun merely by possessing it.6 See Ryan , 959 N.E.2d at 1008. Thus, PLCAA applied and immunized Glock from any liability under Massachusetts law.

Like the shooter in Ryan , J.R.’s friend committed a state crime when he fired the gun. Thus, this case also involves "criminal or unlawful misuse" of a gun that meets the general definition of "qualified-civil-liablity action." 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A). That general definition applies.

B. Product-Defect Exception

Although this case meets the general definition of "qualified-civil-liablity action," the Gustafsons claim it falls within one of PLCAA's six exceptions to that definition.

Those six exceptions are:

(i) an action brought against a transferor convicted under section 924(h) of Title 18, or a comparable or identical State felony law, by a party directly harmed by the conduct of which the transferee is so convicted;
(ii) an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment or negligence per se ;
(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the [firearm or ammunition], and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought ...;
(iv) an action for breach of contract or warranty in connection with the purchase of the
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 books & journal articles
  • Iron River Case: Blueprint for Gun Trafficking Analytics.
    • United States
    • Suffolk University Law Review Vol. 56 No. 1, January 2023
    • January 1, 2023
    ...see also supra Section IV.B.5 (providing analysis of public nuisance statutes). (209.) Complaint at 5-6, Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 282 A.3d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022) (No. 18CL01116) (explaining factual background of case and (210.) See Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., No. 1126, 2019 WL......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT