Gustavel v. State
| Decision Date | 15 June 1899 |
| Docket Number | 18,981 |
| Citation | 54 N.E. 123,153 Ind. 613 |
| Parties | Gustavel v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1899.
From the White Circuit Court.
Affirmed.
Harold Taylor, E. B. Sellers, W. E. Uhl, B. K. Elliott, W. F Elliott, F. L. Littleton and J. R. Ward, for appellant.
W. L Taylor, Attorney-General, Merrill Moores and C. C. Hadley, for State.
This was a prosecution upon affidavit and information in the White Circuit Court, for an alleged violation of section four of an act entitled, "An act to regulate the taking of fish in the waters of this State, etc.," approved February 28, 1899. Acts 1899, p. 185.
The charge is, that appellant, on the 6th day of May, 1899, at the county of White, etc., did, with a hook and line unlawfully take, catch, and kill one fish, to wit, one black bass, more than nine inches in length, in the Tippecanoe river, said river being one of the streams of said State, situated, etc."
The assignment of errors raises the question of the constitutionality of the act, and the specific grounds of objection, as stated in the brief of counsel for appellant, are, that more than one subject is embraced in the act, and that section four is void for uncertainty.
The title of the act is "An act to regulate the taking of fish in the waters of this State; to protect the waters of this State from pollution; granting certain powers to officers relative to the enforcement of the fish and game laws; providing penalties for the violation of its provisions; repealing all laws in conflict therewith; and declaring an emergency."
The only provision of the act directly involved in this appeal is the fourth section which is in these words: Acts 1899, p. 196.
The constitutional requirement referred to is the following: Const. Art. 4, § 19, § 115 Burns 1894.
The rule by which this court is governed in determining a question as to the constitutionality of a statute is, that the act will be upheld unless its repugnance to the Constitution is so obvious as to admit of no doubt. Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641; Board, etc., v. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491, 500; Brown v. Buzan, 24 Ind. 194, 196; Henderson v. State, 137 Ind. 552, 36 N.E. 257, and cases cited.
It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the act in question embraces three subjects, viz., the regulation of the taking of fish in the waters of this State; the protection of the waters of this State from pollution; and the granting of certain powers to officers relative to the enforcement of the fish and game laws.
The subject of the act is the protection of fish and game, and the several matters referred to by counsel for appellant as constituting separate subjects, are simply means to that end. This subject is properly expressed in the title, in language so plain that no one can be misled by it. It has been held by this court that the title of an act should not express the end, object, or purpose of the law, but the means by which such end, object, or purpose is to be accomplished. The subject of the act of February 28, 1899, is single, and the means by which its purpose is to be accomplished are clearly and definitely set out in the title. The taking of fish in the waters of this State; the protection of the waters of the State from such pollution as will destroy the life of fish inhabiting those waters; and the grant and definition of the powers of certain officers relative to the enforcement of the fish and game laws, are included in the subject of the protection of fish and game, or are properly connected therewith. Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; Central Union Tel. Co. v. Fehring, 146 Ind. 189, 45 N.E. 64; Henderson v. State, 137 Ind. 552, 36 N.E. 257; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N.E. 469, and cases cited; Henderson v. State, 50 Ind. 234; State v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355; Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, 9 Am. Rep. 578; State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27, 37 Am. Rep. 454; Cooley's Const. Lim. 146.
Fish are a species of game, and, in the law, are generally associated with other animals ferae naturae. Cooley on Torts (1880), 435; 4 Blackstone's Com. 144; 2 Kents Com. 347.
It is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to the validity of section eleven of the act. The prosecution is not under that section, and no question arises upon it. If it were...
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