Gutierrez v. Rwd Technologies, Inc., CIV.S-030656 WBS/JFM.

• Decision Date: 03 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.S-030656 WBS/JFM.,CIV.S-030656 WBS/JFM.
• Parties: Delores GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff, v. RWD TECHNOLOGIES, INC., and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

279 F.Supp.2d 1223

Delores GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff, v. RWD TECHNOLOGIES, INC., and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

No. CIV.S-030656 WBS/JFM.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

July 3, 2003.

Paul Chan, Biegler Ortiz and Chan, Sacramento, CA, for Delores Gutierrez, plaintiff.

Alex Hernaez, Kauff McClain and McGuire, San Francisco, CA, for RWD Technologies Inc, defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHUBB, District Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action in California state court alleging: (1) violation of California Labor Code section 230; and (2) termination in violation of public policy. Defendant removed the action to this court based on diversity jurisdiction. Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff's claim under section 230.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Delores Gutierrez was summoned for jury duty on or about September 9, 2002, and plaintiff allegedly gave defendant RWD Technologies, Inc. reasonable notice that she was required to serve. (Cmpl.¶ 7). According to plaintiff, on or about October 7, 2002, defendant engaged in actions with the intent of discriminating against plaintiff because of her need to take time off for jury service. (Id. ¶ 6). Plaintiff alleges that defendant's discriminatory conduct resulted in plaintiff's termination on November 7, 2002. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that, as a proximate result of defendant's conduct, plaintiff has suffered: (1) loss of wages, salary, and benefits; (2) the intangible loss of employment related opportunities; and (3) humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical distress. (Id. ¶¶ 8-10).

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff's cause of action under California Labor Code section 230 on the grounds that: (1) plaintiff cannot allege that she has exhausted the administrative procedures required by California Labor Code section 98.7; and (2) plaintiff's claim under section 230 is time-barred.

II. Discussion

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." "Generally, district courts have been unwilling to grant a Rule 12(c) dismissal `unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1368 at 690 (1969)).

The same standard applies to motions made under Rule 12(c) as applies to motions made under Rule 12(b)(6). See 2 James Wm. Moore et al. Moore's Federal Practice § 12.38 (3d ed.2002). Therefore, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the factual allegations of the non-moving party are taken as true. Doleman, 727 F.2d at 1482 (citing Austad v. United States, 386 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1967)). "Courts dismiss complaints under Rule 12(c) for either of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory." Young v. Car Rental Claims Inc., 255 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1153 (D.Haw. 2003).

California Labor Code section 230(a) provides that "[a]n employer may not discharge or in any manner discriminate against an employee for taking time off to serve as required by law on an inquest jury or trial jury, if the employee, prior to taking the time off, gives reasonable notice to the employer that he or she is required to serve."¹ Section 230 further provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny employee who is discharged ... by his or her employer because the employee has exercised his or her rights as set forth in subdivision (a) ... may file a complaint with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement of the Department of Industrial Relations pursuant to Section 98.7." Cal. Lab.Code § 230(f)(1).

The question of whether a plaintiff must exhaust the administrative remedies available under section 98.7 before pursuing a civil claim under section 230 appears to be one of first impression.² In California, it is well-settled that "where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act." Abelleira v. Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 292, 109 P.2d 942 (1941); cf. Palmer v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 107 Cal.App.4th 899, 904, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 (2003) ("When a statute such as FEHA [Fair Employment and Housing Act] provides an administrative process for resolution of grievances, exhaustion of those administrative remedies is a precondition to bringing a civil suit on a statutory cause of action ....").

However, section 98.7 includes a provision stating that "[t]he rights and remedies provided by this section do not preclude an employee from pursuing other rights and remedies under any other law." Cal. Lab.Code § 98.7(f). Plaintiff contends that this provision demonstrates that employees may bring civil suits to enforce their rights in lieu of utilizing the administrative remedies provided in section 98.7. Thus, the court must determine whether this statutory language requires a departure from the general rule that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required when a statute provides such a remedy.

"`The statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.'" White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal.4th 563, 572, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 19, 981 P.2d 944 (1999) (quoting Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County/UCLA Med. Ctr., 19 Cal.4th 851, 861, 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 803, 968 P.2d 514 (1998)). Section 98.7 itself does not create any substantive rights. Rather, it sets forth the procedure by which employees may seek redress for violations of rights created by other, substantive, provisions of the Labor Code. See, e.g., Cal. Lab.Code § 98.7(a) ("Any person who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against in violation of any law under the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner may file a complaint with the division ...."). Section 98.7 is silent on the issue of whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before civil suits may be brought based on the substantive sections of the Labor Code for which section 98.7 provides administrative remedies.

Because the plain language of section 98.7 is silent as to exhaustion, the court must look to other sources to determine the proper interpretation of this section. See Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Serv., Inc., 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 30 P.3d 57 (2001) ("[I]f the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute."); see also Friends of Westhaven & Trinidad v. County of Humboldt, 107 Cal.App.4th 878, 884, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 (2003) (stating that when a statute is ambiguous the court "select[s] the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature ...") (internal quotation and citation omitted). For the following reasons, the court is persuaded that plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil suit under section 230.

First, the statutory framework encompassing section 98.7 supports defendant's position that exhaustion is required. Section 98.7 itself seems to contemplate an exhaustion requirement because it includes a provision by which an employee whose complaint before the Labor Commissioner is unsuccessful may subsequently bring a civil action. See Cal. Lab.Code § 98.7(d)(1) ("The complainant may, after notification of the Labor Commissioner's determination to dismiss a complaint, bring an action in an appropriate court ....") (emphasis added).

Moreover, where the California legislature intended for an employee to be able to immediately file a civil suit under a provision of the Labor Code as an alternative to utilizing the administrative procedures set forth in section 98.7, it so indicated in explicit terms. For example, another substantive provision of the Labor Code that incorporates section 98.7 explicitly provides that a plaintiff may bring a civil suit as an alternative to going through administrative procedures. See Cal. Lab. Code § 233(e) (providing that when an employee files a complaint, "the Labor Commissioner shall enforce the provisions of this section in accordance with ... but not limited to, Sections 92, 96.7, 98, and 98.1 to 98.8, inclusive" and further providing that "[a]lternatively, an employee may bring a civil action for the remedies provided by this section") (emphasis added). Section 230 does not contain any similarly explicit language, indicating that the California legislature did not intend for employees seeking redress under that section to have the option of filing a civil suit without first going through the provided administrative procedures. Cf. Louise Gardens of Encino Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 82 Cal.App.4th 648, 657, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 378 (2000) ("When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of a term or provision from another part of the statute indicates that the Legislature intended to convey a different meaning.").

Accordingly, it appears that the language in section 98.7(f) to the effect that section 98.7 does not preclude employees from pursuing remedies under any other law merely restates the general California rule that plaintiffs are not precluded from bringing civil actions based on California statutes after they have exhausted available administrative remedies. Section 98.7(f) should not be read, as plaintiff suggests, to allow employees to immediately file civil suits based on the provisions of the Labor Code in lieu of first pursuing the provided...