Guy v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn.

• Decision Date: 21 January 2020
• Docket Number: 1:18-CV-02620 (RJD)(RLM)
• Parties: MILDRED GUY and LYNETTE GUY Plaintiffs, v. THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD CONNECTICUT A/K/A TRAVELERS INSURANCE AND US BANK HOME MORTGAGE, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

MILDRED GUY and LYNETTE GUY Plaintiffs, v. THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OFHARTFORD CONNECTICUT A/K/A TRAVELERS INSURANCEAND US BANK HOME MORTGAGE, Defendants.

1:18-CV-02620 (RJD)(RLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FILED: January 22, 2020

January 21, 2020

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DEARIE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Lynette Guy ("Plaintiff")¹ brings this suit pro se against The Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford Connecticut ("Travelers") and U.S. Bank Home Mortgage ("U.S. Bank") (collectively, "Defendants") for claims related to water damage in Plaintiff's residence. Plaintiff sues for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence, contribution and indemnification, deceptive business practices, violation of the National Flood Insurance Act ("NFIA"), civil conspiracy, failure to train and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, discrimination under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") and Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Travelers also seeks a declaration that it has no further obligation to Mildred and Lynette Guy in connection with a February 2014 property damage claim under an insurance policy issued by Travelers to Mildred Guy. Plaintiff has not filed opposition papers. Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted, and Travelers' motion for declaratory judgment is granted in part.

BACKGROUND

Travelers issued to Mildred Guy a homeowner's insurance policy ("Policy" or "Contract") for the premises located at 115-17 174^th Street in St. Albans, New York ("Property"). Travelers Mot., ECF No. 36, Mem. at 1, Ex. A. In December 2007, Mildred Guy executed a mortgage and conveyed a security interest in the Property. U.S. Bank Mot., ECF No. 38, Mem. at 2, Ex. B. The mortgage was assigned to U.S. Bank in August 2013. Id. at Ex. C. Plaintiff alleges that from February 8, 2014 onward, her residence² was "plagued with water damages, toxic mold, fungus, dust, crumbling plaster, dilapidated ceiling and walls," to the point of being uninhabitable. First Amended Compl., ECF No. 13, ¶¶ 5, 8 ("FAC" or "Complaint"). Plaintiff claims that the Property sustained over $150,000 worth of water damage, and she and Mildred Guy spent over $50,000 in repairs. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiff alleges that Travelers³ provided "partial payments for the water damage" totaling $26,000 but Defendants withheld further compensation "act[ing] under the guise that more documentations and proofs were needed." Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. Travelers responds that it investigated water damage caused by a pipe that froze on February 8, 2014 ("Loss") and issued payments in 2014 for damages and expenses stemming from the Loss. Travelers Mem. at 1, 3; Simmons Aff., ECF No. 36-2, ¶ 3. Travelers filed copies of checks issued in 2014 to Mildred Guy totaling $99,539.88. Ex. C, ECF No. 36-6.⁴

LEGAL STANDARD

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court must "accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the non-moving party's favor." LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 472 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While the nonmovant is "given a reasonable opportunity to respond to an opponent's motion, the sufficiency of a complaint is a matter of law that the court is capable of determining based on its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of the law. If a complaint is sufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the plaintiff's failure to respond to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not warrant dismissal." McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2000).

Additionally, "submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)). "However, the Court 'cannot read into pro se submissions claims that are not consistent with the pro se litigant's allegations,' and 'pro se status does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.'" GemShares, LLC v. Kinney, 2017 WL 2559232, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2017) (quoting Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477).⁵

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's claims against Travelers are contractually time barred.

The Policy between Travelers and Plaintiff states: "Suit Against Us. No action shall be brought unless there has been compliance with the policy provisions and the action is started within two years after the occurrence causing loss or damage." Ex. A-1, ECF No. 36-4, at 4. "[C]ourts interpreting New York insurance contracts routinely dismiss insureds' claims as time-barred, based on limitations clauses . . . if the action is commenced more than two years from the . . . physical event." Classic Laundry & Linen Corp. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 2017 WL 4350610, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017), aff'd, 739 F. App'x 41 (2d Cir. 2018) (collecting sources). Because Plaintiff's claims relate to a Loss sustained on February 8, 2014—nearly four years prior to her filing this suit on December 28, 2017—her claims against Travelers must be dismissed under the limitations clause.

B. Plaintiff fails to assert factual allegations supporting any claims against U.S. Bank.

Plaintiff's Complaint is devoid of factual allegations related to U.S. Bank. It relays no information about U.S. Bank's relationship with Plaintiff, U.S. Bank's allegedly improper conduct, or what claims are directed at U.S. Bank. For this reason and those described below, Plaintiff's claims against U.S. Bank are dismissed.

C. Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege breach of contract by U.S. Bank (Count I).

Plaintiff does not allege that U.S. Bank was a party to the Policy or otherwise obligated to repair the water damage. See Dee v. Rakower, 112 A.D.3d 204, 208-09 (2d Dep't 2013) ("The essential elements for pleading a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract are the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance pursuant to the contract, the defendant's breach of his or her contractual obligations, and damages resulting from the breach."). Any breach of contract claim against U.S. Bank must be dismissed.

D. Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege bad faith (Count II).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted in bad faith by "fail[ing] to honor [their] obligations to the plaintiff[] under the policy of insurance" and failing to issue an unambiguous insurance contract that provides adequate coverage. FAC ¶¶ 36, 38. "Plaintiff's claim for bad-faith conduct in handling insurance claims is not legally-cognizable under New York law." Polidoro v. Chubb Corp., 354 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Endemann v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 390 F. Supp. 3d 362, 381 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Zawahir v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 22 A.D.3d 841, 842 (2d Dep't 2005) ("In New York, '[t]here is no separate cause of action in tort for an insurer's bad faith failure to perform its obligations under an insurance contract.'"). Plaintiff also does not allege which Policy provisions are ambiguous or inadequate and how that constitutes bad faith. This claim is dismissed.

E. Plaintiff's tort claims fail as they are based on contractual duties (Counts III, IV, XIII).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were negligent in failing to maintain the premises and fully compensate Plaintiff for the damage and breached their contract causing intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. FAC ¶¶ 40, 46, 104-06. "It is a well-established principle that a simple breach of contract is not to be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been violated." Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not allege, and the Court cannot identify, any duty owed by Travelers to Plaintiff to remedy the Property independent of its contractual commitments under the Policy. There is also no indication of any duty owed by U.S. Bank to rectify the water damage.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). "IIED[] is an extremely disfavored cause of action. To prevail, plaintiff must prove extreme and outrageous conduct that transcends all bounds of decency, and that is regarded by civilizedsociety as atrocious and utterly intolerable. Nothing that is alleged against [Defendants] comes anywhere close to meeting that standard." Durant v. A.C.S. State & Local Sols. Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 492, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Marley v. Ibelli, 203 F. Supp. 2d 302, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). Plaintiff's tort claims are dismissed.

F. Plaintiff cannot state a claim for indemnification or contribution (Counts VI, VII).

Plaintiff seeks from Defendants "indemnification as a result [of] bad faith refusal to cover coverage and their resultant losses" and "contribution for all . . . expenses as a result of their failure to fully compensate [Plaintiff]." FAC ¶¶ 59, 62. "[I]ndemnification permits one who has been compelled to pay for the wrong of another to recover from the wrongdoer the damages it paid to the injured party. The party seeking indemnification must have delegated exclusive responsibility for the duties giving rise to the loss to the party from whom indemnification is sought, and must not have committed actual wrongdoing itself." Bd. of Managers of Olive...