Guy v. Crown Equipment Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-60760.,03-60760.
• Citation: 394 F.3d 320
• Parties: Michelle GUY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWN EQUIPMENT CORPORATION; et al., Defendants, Crown Equipment Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

394 F.3d 320

Michelle GUY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWN EQUIPMENT CORPORATION; et al., Defendants Crown Equipment Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-60760.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

December 15, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David G. Hill (argued), Hill & Minyard, Oxford, MS, John Graham Holaday, Holaday & Johnson, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Thomas J. Cullen (argued), Goodell, DeVries, Leech & Dann, Baltimore, MD, Stephan Land McDavid, Anne Elizabeth Pitts, McDavid & Associates, Oxford, MS, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

For her design defect claim under the Mississippi Products Liability Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 et seq. (MPLA), Michelle Guy challenges judgment as a matter of law awarded Crown Equipment Corporation, following Guy's case in chief. Guy contends the district court reversibly erred by excluding Guy's intended expert witness before trial and by excluding certain evidence offered during Guy's examination of Crown's expert, called as an adverse witness. In addition, Guy claims she presented sufficient evidence during her case in chief to avoid judgment as a matter of law against her MPLA design defect claim. AFFIRMED.

I.

In 1999, Guy was injured at work in Mississippi while operating an electric stand-up lift truck, model RR3540-45, unit R112 (forklift), which was manufactured by Crown and was shipped to Guy's employer in 1995. Pursuant to the forklift's design, the operator enters the operator compartment at the end opposite the forks and, to operate the forklift, stands facing sideways to the forks. In that operating position, the compartment opening is to the left; the forks, to the right. Except for the compartment opening, which is wide enough for a person to enter sideways, the operator compartment is enclosed by four waist-high "walls". The forks apparatus raises 198 inches, and there is an overhanging "roof" that protects the operator from above. When operating the forklift, the operator leans back against a padded back and hip rest, which wraps around the wall the operator leans against.

When injured, Guy was operating the forklift in a "forks following" manner (operator-compartment opening moving forward and forks behind); the forklift hit metal railings on a warehouse floor. In that operating mode, the operator-compartment opening was moving toward the railings when the collision occurred. The forklift's maximum speed is six miles per hour; Guy testified she was traveling at about half-speed when she hit the railings. The distance from the operator-compartment opening to the operator's left foot is approximately six inches. The impact caused Guy to lose her balance, and her left leg came out of the operator compartment through the opening. Guy's left leg was crushed between the forklift and the railings.

Guy sued Crown in Mississippi state court for, inter alia, strict liability under the MPLA, claiming: the forklift was defectively designed; and Crown failed to warn of the danger of a left-leg injury. Crown removed the action to federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. The parties agreed to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

In support of her primary MPLA claim, Guy intended to present expert testimony through John Lohman that the forklift was defectively designed because it lacked either an operator restraint (similar to a seat belt) or a door for the operator-compartment opening. Crown moved in limine to exclude Lohman as an expert witness, asserting his testimony was unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (testimony by experts) and the test provided by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The district court granted the motion, ruling, inter alia, that Lohman had not presented any definitive theory, opinion, or MPLA feasible design alternative (discussed infra) that could be tested to prove the dangerousness vel non of Crown's forklift.

At trial, Guy presented only MPLA claims for design defect and failure to warn. To do so, Guy called as an adverse witness Dan Dunlap, Crown's Manager of Product Engineering (a Crown employee since 1978). Dunlap testified that one reason the forklift was designed without an operator-compartment door was to make it easier for the operator to exit the forklift in "tip-over" accidents, where the forklift falls on its side, and in "off-the-dock" accidents, where the operator mistakenly drives the forklift off a loading dock.

During Dunlap's testimony, Guy offered as evidence reports, obtained from Crown through discovery, of prior accidents involving all models of Crown forklifts. There were approximately 2,400 reports, but only 360 concerned left-leg injuries like Guy's. The district court excluded non-left-leg injury reports.

Along this line, Guy attempted to question Dunlap about a survey showing K-Mart employees preferred using forklifts with operator-compartment doors. K-Mart had purchased Crown forklifts, similar to the one on which Guy was injured, but with such doors. The district court excluded these surveys.

Following Guy's case in chief, Crown moved for judgment as a matter of law, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), contending Guy did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide in her favor under the MPLA on either the failure to warn or design defect claims. The motion was granted.

II.

The MPLA's substantive provisions became effective on 1 July 1994 and apply to all actions filed after that date. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 note (1993); Clark v. Brass Eagle, Inc., 866 So.2d 456, 460 (Miss.2004). The injured party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that, when the product left the manufacturer: "[t]he product was defective"; that defect "rendered the product unreasonably dangerous"; and that "condition ... proximately caused the" injury. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a). A defect that renders a product unreasonably dangerous can result from several situations. In general, the product: (1) "deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications"; (2) did not "contain adequate warnings or instructions"; (3) "was designed in a defective manner"; or (4) "breached an express warranty". Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(i). Here, Guy presents only a design defect claim.

For a design defect to render a product unreasonably dangerous, the injured party must show that, when the product left the manufacturer's control: (1) the manufacturer knew, or should have known, about the danger that caused the injury; (2) "[t]he product failed to function as expected"; and (3) "there existed a feasible design alternative that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm". Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(f) (emphasis added). "A feasible design alternative is a design that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm without impairing the utility, usefulness, practicality or desirability of the product to users or consumers." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(f)(ii) (emphasis added).

A.

The three contested evidentiary rulings are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. E.g., Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Chabert, 973 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987, 113 S.Ct. 1585, 123 L.Ed.2d 152 (1993). Of course, for reversible error, the ruling must affect a substantial right. Fed.R.Civ.P. 61 (harmless error); Fed.R.Evid. 103(a), (d) (rulings on evidence); e.g., Jones v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 1397, 1400 (5th Cir.1986).

1.

The district court ruled that Guy's expert witness, Lohman, did not satisfy Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert. Because a district court has broad discretion in deciding the admissibility vel non of expert testimony, we will not find error unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997); see also, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, 121 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir.1997); Eiland v. Westinghouse Electric, 58 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir.1995). "Manifest error" is one that "is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law". Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 195 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 563 (7th ed.1999)); see also Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 490 (9th Cir.2001) (Beezer, J., concurring); LaCombe v. A-T-O, Inc., 679 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir.1982) (manifest error where district court employed wrong standard in excluding a witness); Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. F.D.I.C., 16 F.Supp.2d 698, 713 (N.D.Tex.1998) ("a manifest error is an obvious mistake or departure from the truth") (internal quotation omitted).

Rule 702, amended post-Daubert in 2000, provides that a witness "qualified as an expert ... may testify ... in the form of an opinion ... if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case". Amended Rule 702 reflects the Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert and its progeny emphasizing the district courts' broad latitude in weighing the reliability of expert testimony for admissibility. E.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Kumho Tire clarified that the Rule 702/ Daubert analysis applies to all proposed expert testimony, including nonscientific "technical analysis" and other "specialized knowledge". 526 U.S. at 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167.

It goes without saying that Daubert clarified a district court's gate-keeping function: the court must ensure the expert uses reliable methods to reach his opinions; and those...