Guye v. Home Indem. Co.

• Citation: 241 Ga. 213,244 S.E.2d 864
• Decision Date: 18 April 1978
• Docket Number: No. 33117,33117
• Parties: Ray Russell GUYE v. HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 864

244 S.E.2d 864

241 Ga. 213

Ray Russell GUYE v. HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY et al.

No. 33117.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 18, 1978.

Rudolph J. Chambless, Waycross, Jack J. Helms, Homerville, for appellant.

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, James B. Hiers, Jr., Clifford E. Hardwick, IV, Atlanta, for appellee.

HILL, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this workmen's compensation case to consider whether, without medical evidence as to causation, any inference may be drawn as to the cause of a heart attack from the fact that an employee suddenly suffers such an attack while performing strenuous manual labor, and whether such inference, if any, satisfies the evidentiary standard set forth in the 1963 amendment to Code Ann. § 114-102, Ga.L.1963, pp. 141, 142. The Court of Appeals divided four, one, four on this issue. Home Indemnity Co. v. Guye, 143 Ga.App. 494, 238 S.E.2d 549 (1977).

The undisputed evidence before the State Board of Workmen's Compensation showed that for several years the claimant, an electrician, had experienced chest pains following excessive exertion or smoking; that he had no chest pain when he left home on the day in question; that he first dug a ditch and bent pipe to install a water line; that about an hour after arriving at work he began to have chest pains; that his next job required him to assist in lifting poles weighing up to 250 pounds; that his chest pains increased; that he requested his foreman to take him to a doctor but was not taken; that during the lunch hour he was taken to a doctor; and that the doctor immediately hospitalized him. A medical report introduced into evidence established that the claimant had an arteriosclerotic heart disease with acute subendocardial infarction, class II-B, but the report was silent as to any causal relationship between the claimant's work activities and his heart injury. A subsequent medical report was also silent as to causation; it stated: "Impression 1. Recent chest pain and diagnosis of 'heart attack,' etiology uncertain." Neither side offered medical testimony as to causation.

The administrative law judge found that the claimant had sustained an accidental injury to his heart arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Board of Workmen's Compensation agreed and the superior court affirmed the award of compensation. The majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that under the 1963 amendment to Code Ann. § 114-102 there was not sufficient evidence or an allowable inference that the claimant's work activities caused his heart injury and reversed the judgment of the superior court.

Code Ann. § 114-102, as amended in Ga.L.1963, pp. 141, 142, provides that "injury" and "personal injury" under the Workmen's Compensation Act shall not include "heart disease, heart attack, the failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis, unless it is shown by preponderance of competent and creditable evidence that it was attributable to the performance of the usual work of employment."

As shown by the indexes to the decisions of the Court of Appeals, there were numerous "heart attack comp cases" in the late 1950's and early '60's being appealed upon the ground of alleged insufficiency of the evidence. At the 1961 session of the General Assembly, legislation on this subject was introduced (H.B. 228) but it was not acted upon that year and it failed after three conference committee attempts in 1962. See the Journal of the House of Representatives, 1962, pp. 599-601, 2329-2331. In U. S. Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 106 Ga.App. 441, 127 S.E.2d 169 (1962), in an opinion by the late Judge Eberhardt, the Court of Appeals reversed the director's award of workmen's compensation, after finding that the three doctors who testified agreed that the claimant's exertion did not cause his coronary occlusion. This court reversed in Thomas v. U. S. Casualty Co., 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 (1962), holding that the testimony of a nonexpert witness who observed the deceased claimant at work and then in pain created an issue of fact as to causation, that proof of such facts by competent evidence shifts the "burden of evidence" to the employer, and that the director's award would be sustained where there was a conflict in the evidence as between the inference arising from the nonexpert's eyewitness testimony and the medical witnesses who testified that although the claimant's activity may have caused his heart attack, in their opinions it did not.

At this point the 1963 amendment (S.B. 31) was introduced and passed. However, that amendment followed the "preponderance of competent and creditable evidence" language of its predecessor (H.B. 228 from the 1961-62 sessions of the General Assembly) and hence that language cannot be said to have been chosen so as to affirm or reverse either of the Thomas cases, supra.

Competent evidence is that which is admissible. Code Ann. § 38-102. Creditable evidence is that which is believed. Questions as to creditability and preponderance address themselves to the trier of facts. Code §§ 38-107, 38-1805, 38-1806. On appeal, the appellate tribunal does not determine the credibility of witnesses or the preponderance of the evidence. The appellate tribunal utilizes the "any evidence" test, a test not available to the trier of facts in deciding disputed factual issues. Thus, it is clear that, whatever the effect of the 1963 amendment, its impact was primarily if not exclusively directed to the trier of fact in workmen's compensation cases.

It is well recognized in "heart attack" cases that it is often difficult for the trier of fact to find the line between a noncompensable heart injury that is a symptom of an existing disease merely manifested during job exertion, and a compensable heart injury to which the job exertion was a contributing precipitating factor. Carter v. Kansas City Fire &c. Co., 138 Ga.App. 601, 603, 226 S.E.2d 755 (1976); Cox v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 122 Ga.App. 659, 660, 178 S.E.2d 287 (1970); McDaniel v. Employers &c. Inc. Co., 104 Ga.App. 340(2), 121 S.E.2d 801 (1961); Hartford Accident & Co. v. Waters, 87 Ga.App. 117, 73 S.E.2d 70 (1952). The generalized and complex nature of a heart injury may prevent causation from being conclusively attributed to the work performed. In determining whether claimant's job activities caused or contributed to his heart injury, it has been said that the fact finder may rely on different forms of evidence, including medical opinion or "the natural inference through human experience." Carter v. Kansas City Fire &c. Co., supra.

The basic issue in this case, the issue over which the Court of Appeals divided, is whether the "natural inference through human experience" will suffice to show causation in "heart attack comp cases." The insurance company contends that with the enactment of the 1963 amendment, the "natural inference" alone cannot be utilized to establish a causal connection between strenuous exertion and the heart injury. The natural inference...