Guye v. Home Indem. Co., No. 33117
Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Writing for the Court | HILL |
Citation | 241 Ga. 213,244 S.E.2d 864 |
Docket Number | No. 33117 |
Decision Date | 18 April 1978 |
Parties | Ray Russell GUYE v. HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY et al. |
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v.
HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY et al.
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[241 Ga. 218] Rudolph J. Chambless, Waycross, Jack J. Helms, Homerville, for appellant.
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, James B. Hiers, Jr., Clifford E. Hardwick, IV, Atlanta, for appellee.
[241 Ga. 213] HILL, Justice.
We granted certiorari in this workmen's compensation case to consider whether, without medical evidence as to causation, any inference may be drawn as to the cause of a heart attack from the fact that an employee suddenly suffers such an attack while performing strenuous manual labor, and whether such inference, if any, satisfies the evidentiary standard set forth in the 1963 amendment to Code Ann. § 114-102, Ga.L.1963, pp. 141, 142. The Court of Appeals divided four, one, four on this issue. Home Indemnity Co. v. Guye, 143 Ga.App. 494, 238 S.E.2d 549 (1977).
The undisputed evidence before the State Board of Workmen's Compensation showed that for several years the claimant, an electrician, had experienced chest pains following excessive exertion or smoking; that he had no chest pain when he left home on the day in question; that he first dug a ditch and bent pipe to install a water line; that about an hour after arriving at work he began to have chest pains; that his next job required him to assist in lifting poles weighing up to 250 pounds; that his chest pains increased; that he requested his foreman to take him to a doctor but was not taken; that during the lunch hour he was taken to a doctor; and that the doctor immediately hospitalized him. A medical report introduced into evidence established that the claimant [241 Ga. 214] had an arteriosclerotic heart disease with acute subendocardial infarction, class II-B, but the report was silent as to any causal relationship between the claimant's work activities and his heart injury. A subsequent medical report was also silent as to causation; it stated: "Impression 1. Recent chest pain and diagnosis of 'heart attack,' etiology uncertain." Neither side offered medical testimony as to causation.
The administrative law judge found that the claimant had sustained an accidental injury to his heart arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Board of Workmen's Compensation agreed and the superior court affirmed the award of compensation. The majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that under the 1963 amendment to Code Ann. § 114-102 there was not sufficient evidence or an allowable inference that the claimant's work activities caused his heart injury and reversed the judgment of the superior court.
Code Ann. § 114-102, as amended in Ga.L.1963, pp. 141, 142, provides that "injury" and "personal injury" under the Workmen's Compensation Act shall not include "heart disease, heart attack, the failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis, unless it is shown by preponderance of competent and creditable evidence that it was attributable to the performance of the usual work of employment."
As shown by the indexes to the decisions of the Court of Appeals, there were numerous "heart attack comp cases" in the late 1950's and early '60's being appealed upon the ground of alleged insufficiency of the
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evidence. At the 1961 session of the General Assembly, legislation on this subject was introduced (H.B. 228) but it was not acted upon that year and it failed after three conference committee attempts in 1962. See the Journal of the House of Representatives, 1962, pp. 599-601, 2329-2331. In U. S. Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 106 Ga.App. 441, 127 S.E.2d 169 (1962), in an opinion by the late Judge Eberhardt, the Court of Appeals reversed the director's award of workmen's compensation, after finding that the three doctors who testified agreed that the claimant's exertion did not cause his coronary occlusion. This court reversed in Thomas v. U. S. Casualty Co., 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 [241 Ga. 215] (1962), holding that the testimony of a...To continue reading
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General Motors Corp. v. Conkle, No. A96A1785
...matter. On appeal, the appellate tribunal does not determine the credibility or preponderance of evidence. See Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 215, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978). "The finder of fact, in this case the [state] court judge, is the final arbiter of the weight of the evidence and ......
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Reynolds Const. Co. v. Reynolds, No. A95A0788
...role is simply to determine if any evidence supports the ALJ's determination. If so, it is our duty to affirm. Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 215, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978). Georgia law recognizes three forms of competent evidence for establishing a causal connection between work activit......
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Barber v. Perdue, No. A89A1420
...Communications, supra, as illustrative. That is outside of our circumscribed function as an appellate court, Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978), and was so for the trial court. OCGA §§ 24-9-80, 9-11-56. As the Supreme Court reiterated in the Anderson summary judgmen......
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Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rider, No. 66354
...the "any evidence" test, a test not available to the trier of facts in deciding disputed factual issues.' Guye v. Home Indemnity Co., 241 Ga. 213, 215, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978)." Crawley v. MARTA, 147 Ga.App. 293, 294, 248 S.E.2d 555 (1978). See also, Keno v. Alside, Inc., 148 Ga.App. 549, 251......
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Reynolds Const. Co. v. Reynolds, A95A0788
...role is simply to determine if any evidence supports the ALJ's determination. If so, it is our duty to affirm. Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 215, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978). Georgia law recognizes three forms of competent evidence for establishing a causal connection between work activit......
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General Motors Corp. v. Conkle, A96A1785
...matter. On appeal, the appellate tribunal does not determine the credibility or preponderance of evidence. See Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 215, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978). "The finder of fact, in this case the [state] court judge, is the final arbiter of the weight of the evidence and ......
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Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Hous. Hosps., Inc., A22A1013, A22A1014, A22A1249, A22A1250
...found that even one of the factual findings he rejected or modified was unsupported by evidence of any kind.56 Guye v. Home Indem. Co. , 241 Ga. 213, 215, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978).57 Deal v. Coleman , 294 Ga. 170, 173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013) (punctuation omitted). Coliseum contends that......
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Barber v. Perdue, A89A1420
...Communications, supra, as illustrative. That is outside of our circumscribed function as an appellate court, Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978), and was so for the trial court. OCGA §§ 24-9-80, 9-11-56. As the Supreme Court reiterated in the Anderson summary judgmen......