Guyton v. Berryhill

Decision Date30 May 2019
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 0:18-cv-02023-JMC-JDA
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesPriscilla Michelle Guyton, Plaintiff, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. § 636.1 Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI").2 For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and an application for supplemental security income ("SSI"), both alleging an onset of disability date of April 10, 2010. [R. 241-52.] The alleged onset date was later amendedto June 2, 2011. [R. 12, 314.] The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. [R. 167-76; 180-85]. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and, on January 6, 2014, ALJ Walter C. Herin, Jr. conducted a de novo hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 33-73.]3

The ALJ issued a decision on June 10, 2014, finding Plaintiff had not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act ("the Act") from June 2, 2011, the alleged onset of disability date, through the date of the decision. [R. 9-25.] At Step 1,4 the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through September 30, 2013, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 2, 2011, the alleged onset date. [R. 14, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments of: discoid lupus erythematosus, arthralgias, borderline intellectual funciton/cognative disorder secondary to childhood meningitis, adjustment disorder secondary to general medical condition, with depressed mood, and anxiety. [R. 15, Finding 3.] The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had non-severe impairments of bilateral cataracts, status post harvesting, insomnia, and anemia. [Id.] At Step 3, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 15, Finding 4.]

Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and found as follows:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) when she is afforded the option to sit or stand with a change of position every thirty minutes, with total standing and waling of approximately 2 of 8 hours, and sitting for at least 6 of 8 hours. The claimant can lift and carry ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently. The claimant can perform simple, routine tasks that do not require on-going interaction with the general public, and will be most successful with positive supervision, which does not envision a sheltered or protected workshop. She can perform occasional stooping, balancing, crouching, kneeling and climbing of stairs and ramps. She cannot crawl or climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds. She can have no required exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous machinery, and direct sunlight. She can have no concentrated exposure to extremes of heat or cold.

[R. 17, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined at Step 4 that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a cleaner, hotel maid, book packer, or cleaner/table busser. [R. 24, Finding 6.] However, based on Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE"), the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. [R. 24, Finding 10.] Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, based on the applications for benefits filed February 16, 2011. [R. 25, Finding 11.]

Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, but the Appeals Council declined. [R. 1-5.] Plaintiff filed an action for judicial review, and, on July 14, 2016, the Commissioner filed an Uncontested Motion for Remand Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [R. 825-26.] On July 15, 2016, the Honorable R. BryanHarwell, entered an Order remanding the case for further evaluation under Sentence Four. [R. 824.]

On January 31, 2017, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ again for a hearing to address the issues identified by the Commissioner requiring further administrative evaluation. [R. 718-84.] The ALJ subsequently issued an unfavorable decision on March 15, 2017. [R. 687-717.]

At Step 1, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through September 30, 2013, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 10, 2010, the alleged onset date.5 [R. 693, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments of: systemic lupus erythematosus, rule out discoid lupus erythematosus; arthralgia; lumbar spine disorder with radiculopathy; borderline intellectual disorder; mood disorder; ADHD; adjustment disorder with depression; reading disorder; and written expression disorder. [R. 693, Finding 3.] The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had non-severe impairments of anemia, Vitamin D deficiency, GERD, chronic laryngitis, and bilateral cataracts, status post extractions. [Id.] At Step 3, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 693, Finding 4.] The ALJ expressly considered the mental health listings in his analysis. [Id.]

Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC and found as follows:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) with the following additional limitations: she can maintain concentration, persistence, or pace to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks for at least two hours at a time without special supervision; with no reading or writing above second grade level; no required ongoing interaction with the general public; lifting or carrying of 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; standing and/or walking in combination up to a total of 2 hours in an 8 hour workday; occasional stooping, balancing, crouching, kneeling, or climbing stairs or ramps; no crawling or climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights or dangerous machinery; and no concentrated exposure to temperature extremes or direct sunlight.

[R. 697, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined at Step 4 that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a bindery worker. [R. 705, Finding 6.] However, based on Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of a VE, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. [R. 706, Finding 10.] Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from April 10, 2010, through the date of the decision. [R. 706, Finding 11.]

Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, but the Appeals Council declined review. [R. 676-81.] Plaintiff filed an action for judicial review and on July 24, 2018. [Doc. 1.]

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed error and that the decision should therefore be remanded for additional administrative proceedings. [Doc. 11.] Specifically, Plaintiff argues there is a clear conflict between the Dictionary of Occupational Titles("DOT") and the VE testimony because the "4th Circuit has ruled that if a claimant is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, then the DOT says he cannot perform a GED 2 job." [Id. at 29 (citing Henderson v. Colvin, No. 15-1437, 2016 WL 1320779 at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016)).] Plaintiff contends the ALJ's failure to elicit an explanation regarding this particular conflict warrants remand for further evaluation. [Id. at 31.] Additionally, the Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to conduct a listing analysis under Listings 14.02 or 14.06 with respect to Plaintiff's systemic lupus erythematosus. [Id. at 32-33.] Plaintiff contends the "ALJ did not address this evidence related to the applicable listings which requires remand for a proper analysis." [Id. at 35.]

The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and therefore should be affirmed. [Doc. 12.] The Commissioner contends the "Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is an 'apparent unresolved conflict' between the VE's 'testimony as to a limitation to simple, routine, unskilled work and the DOT's indication that the identified unskilled positions have a reasoning level of two.'" [Id. at 7 (citing Waddell v. Berryhill, No. 0:17-cv-3030-DCN-PJG, Doc. 15 at *8 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by Doc. 20 (Jan. 15, 2019).] The Commissioner further contends that the "ALJ's duty to evaluate a listing was only triggered where there was ample evidence in the record that the listing could be met." [Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).] In this case, however, the Commissioner argues the Plaintiff has "simply...

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