Guzman v. Bloom

• Citation: 198 A.2d 499,413 Pa. 576
• Parties: Pedro L. GUZMAN v. Joseph BLOOM, Appellant. Max SHANK v. Joseph BLOOM, Appellant, and Pedro L. Guzman.
• Decision Date: 17 March 1964
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Page 499

198 A.2d 499

413 Pa. 576

Pedro L. GUZMAN v. Joseph BLOOM, Appellant.

Max SHANK v. Joseph BLOOM, Appellant, and Pedro L. Guzman.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 17, 1964.

Sheldon Tabb, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Hugh M. Odza, David Cohen, Leonard S. Wissow, Philadelphia, for appellee Max Shank.

John J. Runzer, Philadelphia, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, of counsel, for appellee Pedro Guzman.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

O'BRIEN, Justice.

On August 24, 1960, two automobiles collided at the intersection of Fifteenth and Conlyn Streets in Philadelphia. One automobile was being operated by appellant and the other by appellee Guzman; appellee Max Shank was a passenger in appellant's car.

The accident resulted in two actions of trespass: one by Max Shank against Bloom, in which Bloom joined Guzman as additional defendant; and one by Guzman against Bloom. The cases were consolidated for trial and resulted in jury verdicts of $1,500.00 for Guzman in his action against Bloom, and $7,000.00 for Max Shank against Bloom only, the jury finding for Guzman in the additional party action.

Bloom filed motions for new trial and judgment n. o. v., all of which were denied, and judgments were entered on the verdicts of the jury; this appeal followed.

Since the oral argument, a suggestion of death of Max Shank was filed, together with a Petition for leave to substitute Nathan Shank, Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate of Max Shank, as appellee; we granted the petition.

'In considering a motion for judgment N.O.V., the evidence together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, are considered in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. However, in considering the action of the lower court in granting or refusing a new trial, an appellate court will affirm, unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion, or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case or the decision of the lower court.' Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d 355 (1963) and cases cited therein.

In pressing his motion for judgment n. o. v., appellant argues that Guzman, plaintiff in one action and additional defendant in the other, was guilty of negligence and contributory negligence as a matter of law. Contributory negligence can be declared as a matter of law only in a clear case and where there is no room for fair and reasonable disagreement as to its existence. Lee v. Penn-Harris Taxi Service, 412 Pa. 287, 194 A.2d 188 (1963); Wiedemoyer v. Swartz, 407 Pa. 282, 180 A.2d 19 (1962). Without going into the facts in detail, we conclude, from an examination of this record, that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were clearly for the jury. The court below aptly summarized the problem as follows: 'In this case the plaintiff was moving on the major thoroughfare and was invited to continue moving by the absence of any restriction, coupled with the knowledge that any vehicle on the other street was commanded to come to a full stop and presumably would do so. It must be borne in mind that driving too slowly or coming to an inappropriate and unnecessary stop can be a menace to others on the road, and the driver must be permitted to use his judgment in all of the circumstances. The failure to judge correctly and to anticipate another's unlawful conduct may be negligent, but certainly it is not per se negligent. It is for the jury to judge and to say. The jury considers all of the circumstances, the meaning and weight to be given to speeds and moving objects, the importance to be attached to the balance of good judgment in keeping moving or in slowing down at intersections. In this case, Guzman testified that when he first saw the Bloom vehicle it appeared to be proceeding normally and he felt that it would stop. He slowed down. When it became apparent that the defendant was going to ignore the stop sign he applied his brakes and his vehicle was almost stopped when he was struck on the right side by the front of defendant Bloom's car. The question of negligence or contributory negligence was for the jury'. We agree and, therefore, conclude that the motions for judgment n. o. v. were properly refused.

In seeking a new trial, appellant contends that: the trial court decided the case for the jury in its charge, characterized by appellant as a 'plea * * * in support of the Plaintiff's case'; the trial court erred in refusing to permit appellant to testify as to the speed of the Guzman car; the trial court erred in refusing the testimony of one of appellant's witnesses with regard to an alleged incident between Shank's counsel and the witness at an earlier trial; ¹ the verdict for Shank was excessive. We find in none of these contentions an abuse of discretion or error of law which controlled the outcome of the case or decision of the court below.

Appellant complains that the jurors sent a valentine card and a plant to the trial judge, thereby demonstrating 'the beautiful relationship' existing between the judge and the jurors. Appellant does not complain of the fact that the jury developed an affectionate regard for the trial judge, rather, he urges that this regard caused the jury to accept...