Guzman v. Farrell Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1979
• Citation: 69 A.D.2d 802,415 N.Y.S.2d 830
• Parties: Alejo GUZMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARRELL LINES, INC., Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 830

415 N.Y.S.2d 830

69 A.D.2d 802

Alejo GUZMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARRELL LINES, INC., Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

April 19, 1979.

E. D. Lory, New York City, for plaintiff-appellant.

S. L. Barkan, New York City, for defendant-respondent.

Before SANDLER, J. P., and SULLIVAN, MARKEWICH and SILVERMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered February 17, 1978, granting defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs and disbursements, and the motion denied.

This longshoremen's personal injury action against the vessel owner for negligence was commenced thirty-seven months after the action accrued. In reliance upon McCoy v. American Israeli Shipping Co., Inc., 42 A.D.2d 12, 344 N.Y.S.2d 707, aff'd 34 N.Y.2d 569, 354 N.Y.S.2d 944, 310 N.E.2d 541, Special Term held that the action was time-barred by New York's three year statute governing personal injury actions. (CPLR § 214(5).) In amending the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Safety Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.) it is clear that Congress in eliminating unseaworthiness as a basis of liability in a longshoreman's action for personal injuries, intended that legal questions arising in such actions be determined as a matter of Federal law, and that the negligence remedy be uniformly applied irrespective of the law of the State in which the port of accident might be located. (Report of the House Education and Labor Committee, H.R.Rep.No.1441, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 4698, 4702-05.) The Committee Report did not specifically identify the timeliness of a longshoreman's personal injury action as an issue to be determined under Federal law as it did with other issues, e. g., comparative negligence, assumption of risk. Under Federal law governing maritime cases there is no statute of limitations. Laches is the sole standard by which untimeliness is measured. In the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, it has been uniformly held that whether the longshoreman's action is time-barred must be determined under the traditional admiralty doctrine of laches. Lanza v. Charente SS Co., Ltd., No. 77-697 (Dec. 8, 1977); Vasquez v. Intermaritime Carriers S.A., D.C., 439 F.Supp. 688; Lopez v. Reederei Richard Schroder, No. 76-3577 (Mar. 7, 1977); Noren v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., No. 76-1584 (Mar. 2, 1977); Yero v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., No. 76-4280 (Jan. 6, 1977); Bongiovanni v. N.V. Stoomvaart-Matts "Oostzee", 458 F.Supp. 602. Where there is a uniform Federal rule, albeit one established by lower Federal courts, we are bound in cases such as the one at hand to apply it. (Alvez v. American Export Lines, Inc., --- N.Y.2d ----, --- N.Y.S. ----, --- N.E.2d ----, slip opinion,...