Guzman v. Greene

• Citation: 425 F.Supp.2d 298
• Decision Date: 15 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. CV-05-1599 (FB)(VVP).,CV-05-1599 (FB)(VVP).
• Parties: Ricardo GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. Gary GREENE, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

425 F.Supp.2d 298

Ricardo GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. Gary GREENE, Warden, Respondent.

No. CV-05-1599 (FB)(VVP).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

March 15, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ricardo Guzman, Pro Se, Comstock, NY, for Petitioner.

Camille O'Hara Gillespie, Esq., Kings County District Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

BLOCK, Senior District Judge.

On September 19, 2000, petitioner, Ricardo Guzman ("Guzman"), following a jury trial in New York Supreme Court, Kings County, was acquitted of intentional murder but convicted of depraved-indifference murder;¹ he was sentenced on October 10, 2000, to an indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life imprisonment. He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the grounds that (A) the evidence supporting his conviction was legally insufficient; (B) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; (C) his inculpatory statements should have been suppressed as the fruits of an unlawful arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (D) the identification testimony violated his due process rights; and (E) his trial counsel was ineffective on various grounds. All claims were fully exhausted on direct appeal or in a proceeding under N.Y.Crim. Pro. Law § 440.10. See People v. Guzman, No. 5238-99 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Nov. 28, 2003) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel's failure to raise the government's violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations), leave to appeal denied, No. 04-00716 (2d Dep't Mar. 17, 2004); People v. Guzman, 8 A.D.3d 677, 778 N.Y.S.2d 893 (2d Dep't 2004) (rejecting remaining claims, including all other ineffective-assistance claims), leave to appeal denied, 3 N.Y.3d 706, 785 N.Y.S.2d 34, 818 N.E.2d 676 (2004) (table).² For the reasons set forth below, Guzman's petition is denied, but a certificate of appealability is issued on the insufficiency-of-evidence claim.

I.

Only federal issues may be raised on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), when a federal claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" by a state court, habeas relief may not be granted unless the state-court decision (1) was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state-court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth" in Supreme Court precedent, or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives" at a different conclusion. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state-court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if it unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent to the particular facts of a case. See id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. This inquiry requires a court to "ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable," not whether the application was erroneous or incorrect. Id. In that respect, the standard to be applied "falls somewhere between merely erroneous and unreasonable to all reasonable jurists." Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir.2000)). However, the "increment [of incorrectness beyond error] need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence." Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2000)).

"When the state court fails to articulate the rationale behind its ruling, [the Court] must independently review the record and the applicable law." Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 163 (4th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). The decision must be upheld "unless [the Court's] independent review of the record and the pertinent federal law persuades [it] that [the state court's] result contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly established federal law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. at 163 (emphasis added).

If, instead of reaching the merits, the state court denies a federal claim based on an "independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of [the] claim[ ] is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[ ] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The state court's reliance on such a rule, however, must be "clear from the face of the opinion." Id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (citation and quotations omitted). Thus, "when a state court uses language such as the defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit,' the validity of the claim is preserved and is subject to federal review." Fama v. Commissioner of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 810 (2d Cir.2000).

The degree of deference to be given to such a disjunctive state-court holding is "anything but clear." Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 125-26 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2003) (comparing Ryan v. Miller, 303 F.3d 231 (2d Cir.2002) (giving AEDPA deference), with Miranda v. Bennett, 322 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir.2003) (declining to give AEDPA deference)). Until it is resolved by the Second Circuit, the issue can be avoided if the claim can be denied on de novo review. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ricks, 2004 WL 1638171, at *8 n. 8 (E.D.N.Y. Jul.22, 2004) (declining to decide whether AEDPA deference applied "because [petitioner's] claim ... fails even under a de novo standard of review.").

The Court will apply AEDPA deference in reviewing Guzman's insufficiency-of-evidence claim because the Appellate Division rejected it on the merits, see Guzman, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 893; similarly, AEDPA deference is warranted in respect to Guzman's ineffective-assistance claim for failing to raise the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR") violation because the § 440.10 court denied it on the merits. See Guzman, No. 5238-99 at 2.³ The Court will not apply AEDPA deference to Guzman's remaining claims, all of which were raised on direct appeal, and will review them de novo because the Appellate Division summarily ruled that they "[we]re unpreserved for appellate review, without merit, or d[id] not warrant reversal." Guzman, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (emphasis added).

II.

A. Sufficiency of Evidence for Depraved-Indifference Murder

Guzman argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of depraved-indifference murder because the only reasonable view of the evidence was that he acted with an intent to kill—not with depraved indifference; if his argument proves successful, the result would be disturbing: Guzman could be set free; he could not be retried for intentional murder since he has been acquitted of that charge. See Policano v. Herbert, 430 F.3d 82, 93 (2d Cir.2005) (noting that such a result, although "disturbing," was a necessary consequence of "keeping government and its servants in their place").

1. Facts

Guzman was charged with the murder of Phillip Menzies ("Menzies"). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the following was established at trial:

Menzies's girlfriend testified that the following events transpired on June 30, 1999: She, her sister and Menzies were walking in McCaren Park when two men, each riding a bike, passed them. About three minutes later, the two bike-riders returned with a third bike-rider; one of the bike-riders asked Menzies, in Spanish, if he "hard] a problem?" and Menzies responded, also in Spanish, "never". Tr. at 20-21. Next, one of the bike-riders dismounted, threw his bike at Menzies and ran towards him; the other two bike-riders then also dismounted and also ran towards Menzies. The three bike-riders began to punch Menzies and a fistfight erupted, causing Menzies's girlfriend to intervene and punch one of the bike-riders; the other two bike-riders remained with Menzies. She then observed one of the men holding a knife and ultimately witnessed Menzies profusely bleeding. The medical examiner testified that Menzies died following three stab wounds—two in his chest that punctured his heart and left lung—and one in his back.

In a signed, written confession admitted at trial, Guzman substantially confirmed Menzies's girlfriend's account and admitted that he was the stabber. As stated therein, Guzman encountered Menzies when Guzman and two friends rode past him on their bikes. Guzman asked him "why [he was] staring at [him]?" and claimed that Menzies then "put his hands up to fight[,]" Tr. at 373; in response, Guzman threw his bicycle at him, Menzies threw it back and they began to fistfight. In the course of the fistfight, Guzman observed Menzies take something out of his pants pocket; Guzman's friend then handed Guzman a knife and Guzman twice stabbed Menzies; Guzman then fled on his bicycle.⁴

In rejecting Guzman's insufficiency-of-evidence claim on the merits, the Appellate Division summarily stated that "[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Guzman, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (internal citation omitted).

2. Analysis

Under clearly established ...