Guzman v. Sec'y
Decision Date | 16 September 2011 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2:08-cv-411-FtM-36SPC |
Parties | ALBERTO GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Alberto Guzman (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Guzman") initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition," Doc. #1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 27, 2008.1 The Petition challenges Petitioner's April 14, 2003, judgment of conviction for second degree murder with a firearm entered in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court, Hendry County, Florida (case number H00-184-CF) for which he is serving a life sentence. Petition at 1.2 Petitioner's sentenceand conviction were per curiam affirmed on direct appeal.3 Guzman v. State, Case No. 2D03-2344 (2d DCA 2004); Exh. 3.
The Petition raises the following fourteen grounds (restated)4for relief:
See generally Petition.
Respondent filed a Response to the Petition and addressed grounds 1-13 identified above (Doc. #13, Response). Respondent moves for summary judgment based upon Petitioner's failure to satisfy his burden under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e). Response at 1. Respondent filed exhibits (Exhs. 1-21) in support of the Response, including the two-volume record on direct appeal . Petitioner failed to file a reply to the Response, although twice directed to do so by the Court. See Docs. #9, #16. Consequently, the Court deems this matter ripe for review without the benefit of a reply from Petitioner.
Guzman filed his timely5 Petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Consequently, post-AEDPA law governs this action. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1664 (2007); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1331, n.9 (11th Cir. 2007). Under AEDPA, a federal court's standard of review "is greatly circumscribed and is highly deferential to the state courts." Stewart v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr. , 476 F.3d 1193,1208 (11th Cir. 2007)(internal quotations and citations omitted). AEDPA altered the federal court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see also Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011)(internal quotations and citations omitted)(emphasizing "[f]ederal habeas review of state conviction frustrates both the State's sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights."). Consequently, the Court applies the following principles of law in evaluating the claims set forth in the instant Petition.
A federal court may only review an issue under § 2254 if petitioner first afforded the state courts an adequate opportunity to address that issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. To provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)(internal citations and quotations omitted.) This imposes a "total exhaustion" requirement in which all the federal issues must have first been presented tothe state courts. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). "In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) ()(quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001)); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)("exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly present federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights'") . Additionally, in articulating a factual basis in support of a claim for relief, a petitioner must have also alleged the factual predicate to the state court. Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrs., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004)(petitioners may not present particular factual instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in their federal petition if they did not first raise them in the state courts) that .
"A claim is procedurally defaulted if it has not been exhausted in state court and would now be barred under state procedural rules." Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). Under the procedural default doctrine, "[i]f the petitionerhas failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, . . . . ." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). A procedural default for failing to exhaust state court remedies will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the asserted error. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006); Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d at 1190. Second, under exceptional circumstances, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, even without a showing of cause and prejudice, if such review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).
Habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Cullen v. Pinholster, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). "This is a difficult to meet, and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that the state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 ( ).
Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court broadly interpret what is meant by an "adjudication on the merits." Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 967-68 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, a state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits that warrants deference by a federal court. Id; See also, Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008) . Indeed, "unless the state court clearly states that its decision was based solely on a state procedural rule [the Court] will presume that the state court has rendered an adjudication on the merits when the petitioner's claim 'is the same claim rejected' by the court." Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d at 969 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)).
"A legal principle is 'clearly established' within the meaning of this provision only...
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