Guzman v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 16 September 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:08-cv-411-FtM-36SPC
• Parties: ALBERTO GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

ALBERTO GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents.

Case No. 2:08-cv-411-FtM-36SPC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

Dated: September 16, 2011

OPINION AND ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Alberto Guzman (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Guzman") initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition," Doc. #1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 27, 2008.¹ The Petition challenges Petitioner's April 14, 2003, judgment of conviction for second degree murder with a firearm entered in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court, Hendry County, Florida (case number H00-184-CF) for which he is serving a life sentence. Petition at 1.² Petitioner's sentenceand conviction were per curiam affirmed on direct appeal.³ Guzman v. State, Case No. 2D03-2344 (2d DCA 2004); Exh. 3.

The Petition raises the following fourteen grounds (restated)⁴for relief:

1. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek his removal from the case;

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to remove a juror who claimed he could not be fair to Petitioner;

3. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to remove a juror who said police do not lie;4. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to remove a juror who had a daughter employed in the State Attorney's Office;

5. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate a self defense theory;

6. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the jury be instructed on penalties/elements of the crime pursuant to Apprendi and Blakey;

7. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's misstatement of the law that sentencing was a consideration for the court only, not the jury;

8. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's request for a departure sentence of life under the 10-20-life statute;

9. Cumulative error;

10. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in failing to discharge court-appointed counsel based upon a clear conflict of interest;

11. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta inquiry to determine that Petitioner could represent himself at trial;

12. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue that Petitioner was denied the right to represent himself;

13. Violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), where Petitioner was sentenced to a life sentence without a jury finding that Petitioner used a firearm; and,

14. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument.

See generally Petition.

Respondent filed a Response to the Petition and addressed grounds 1-13 identified above (Doc. #13, Response). Respondent moves for summary judgment based upon Petitioner's failure to satisfy his burden under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e). Response at 1. Respondent filed exhibits (Exhs. 1-21) in support of the Response, including the two-volume record on direct appeal (Exh 21, Vols. I-II.). Petitioner failed to file a reply to the Response, although twice directed to do so by the Court. See Docs. #9, #16. Consequently, the Court deems this matter ripe for review without the benefit of a reply from Petitioner.

II. Applicable § 2254 Law

Guzman filed his timely⁵ Petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Consequently, post-AEDPA law governs this action. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1664 (2007); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1331, n.9 (11th Cir. 2007). Under AEDPA, a federal court's standard of review "is greatly circumscribed and is highly deferential to the state courts." Stewart v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr. , 476 F.3d 1193,1208 (11th Cir. 2007)(internal quotations and citations omitted). AEDPA altered the federal court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see also Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011)(internal quotations and citations omitted)(emphasizing "[f]ederal habeas review of state conviction frustrates both the State's sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights."). Consequently, the Court applies the following principles of law in evaluating the claims set forth in the instant Petition.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A federal court may only review an issue under § 2254 if petitioner first afforded the state courts an adequate opportunity to address that issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. To provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)(internal citations and quotations omitted.) This imposes a "total exhaustion" requirement in which all the federal issues must have first been presented tothe state courts. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). "In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) ("A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief cannot raise a federal constitutional claim in federal court unless he first properly raised the issue in the state courts.")(quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001)); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)(stating "exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly present federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights'"). Additionally, in articulating a factual basis in support of a claim for relief, a petitioner must have also alleged the factual predicate to the state court. Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrs., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004)(noting that petitioners may not present particular factual instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in their federal petition if they did not first raise them in the state courts).

"A claim is procedurally defaulted if it has not been exhausted in state court and would now be barred under state procedural rules." Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). Under the procedural default doctrine, "[i]f the petitionerhas failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, . . . . ." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). A procedural default for failing to exhaust state court remedies will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the asserted error. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006); Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d at 1190. Second, under exceptional circumstances, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, even without a showing of cause and prejudice, if such review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).

B. Deference to State Court Decision

Habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Cullen v. Pinholster, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). "This is a difficult to meet, and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that the state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (pointing out that "if [§ 2254(d)'s] standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.").

Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court broadly interpret what is meant by an "adjudication on the merits." Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 967-68 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, a state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits that warrants deference by a federal court. Id; See also, Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008) . Indeed, "unless the state court clearly states that its decision was based solely on a state procedural rule [the Court] will presume that the state court has rendered an adjudication on the merits when the petitioner's claim 'is the same claim rejected' by the court." Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d at 969 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)).

"A legal principle is 'clearly established' within the meaning of this provision only...