Guzman v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 02 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 8:19-cv-1337-VMC-TGW |
| Parties | DAVID GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
DAVID GUZMAN, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
No. 8:19-cv-1337-VMC-TGW
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
August 2, 2022
ORDER
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Petitioner David Guzman, a Florida prisoner, timely filed a pro se amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 5.) Having considered the petition, the response in opposition (Doc. 10), and Guzman's amended reply (Doc. 18), the Court orders that Guzman's petition is DENIED.
Procedural History
A state court jury found Guzman guilty of three counts of DUI with serious bodily injury and one count of DUI with property damage. (Doc. 11-3, Ex. 1, pp. 41314.) The jury found that Guzman had a blood alcohol level above 0.15. (Id.) The state trial court imposed an overall term of 12 years and seven months in prison. (Id., pp. 456-65.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed Guzman's convictions and sentences. (Doc. 11-5, Ex. 4.) The state appellate court also denied Guzman's petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, filed under
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141, and amended petition. (Doc. 11-5, Ex. 9; Doc. 11-6, Ex. 9a; Doc. 11-7, Exs. 10, 12.)
Facts[1]
Guzman was involved in a three-car crash in the early morning hours of August 19, 2012, in Winter Haven, Florida. While traveling southbound on Sixth Street Northwest, Guzman's vehicle, a Chevrolet Trailblazer, rear-ended a Chevrolet Tahoe driven by Andrew Estes. The Tahoe then traveled into the northbound lanes and collided head-on with a GMC Jimmy driven by Alexis Shumate.
Officer James Oftedal was the first officer to arrive. He found Guzman inside the Trailblazer lying across the driver and front passenger seats. Officer Oftedal observed a half-empty bottle of Captain Morgan rum in the back seat. Officer Eric Womack also arrived on the scene and observed Guzman inside his vehicle. EMS personnel removed Guzman from his vehicle and advised Officer Womack that they needed assistance. Officer Womack stood near Guzman, who had been placed on a stretcher. Officer Womack could smell alcohol on Guzman's breath and noticed that Guzman's eyes were bloodshot and glossy.
Guzman was taken to Lakeland Regional Medical Center. At the direction of his supervisor, Officer Womack went to the hospital to obtain a blood sample from Guzman. He did not obtain a warrant. Guzman did not respond when Officer Womack advised that he was present for a blood draw. The attending nurse complied
with Officer Womack's request that she conduct a blood draw. Guzman declined to sign a consent form. A blood sample analyzed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement showed that Guzman's blood alcohol level was .285, more than three times the legal threshold of .08. A blood sample analyzed at the hospital showed a blood alcohol level of .29.
The occupants of the third vehicle, the GMC Jimmy that Estes's vehicle hit head-on, required medical treatment. The driver, Alexis Shumate, and one of the passengers, Rusty Waddle, had to be extracted from the vehicle. Shumate broke her pelvis and also broke both of her feet and legs. Rusty Waddle suffered a broken humerus, broken knees, and six broken ribs. He also had severe nerve damage in his wrist. Ashley Lawrence, the other passenger, suffered a brain injury. The right side of her body was weakened and she was unable to use her right hand. Lawrence had trouble with her memory and had to re-learn to walk, talk, eat, and write.
At trial, Guzman asserted that he was not responsible for the injuries to the occupants of the Jimmy. He alleged that the collision between the Tahoe and the Jimmy was caused by Estes's operation of the Tahoe.
Standards of Review
The AEDPA
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec'y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides
that federal habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.
The AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was
an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”).
The state appellate court denied Guzman's petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel without discussion. This decision warrants deference under § 2254(d)(1) because “the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due.” Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). When a state appellate court issues a silent affirmance, “the federal court should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Guzman alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. Deficient performance is established if, “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. However, “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.
Guzman must show that counsel's alleged error prejudiced the defense because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, Guzman must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
The Strickland standard applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1991). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Guzman must show that appellate counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for this performance, he would have prevailed on his appeal. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285-86.
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