Guzman v. State

• Citation: 985 N.E.2d 1125
• Decision Date: 15 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 54A01–1209–CR–409.,54A01–1209–CR–409.
• Parties: Jose GUZMAN, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

985 N.E.2d 1125

Jose GUZMAN, Appellant–Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 54A01–1209–CR–409.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 15, 2013.

Marcel Katz, Law Offices of Marcel Katz, Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Richard C. Webster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BRADFORD, Judge.

On October 2, 2011, Appellant–Defendant Jose Guzman was involved in a traffic accident when his vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Charity Bland. Bland died as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident. Her passenger, Richie Austin, was also severely injured. On October 4, 2011, Guzman was charged with numerous offenses, including Class C felony reckless homicide, stemming from the October 2, 2011 accident. Guzman subsequently pled guilty to the Class C felony reckless homicide charge and, in exchange for Guzman's guilty plea, the State agreed to drop the remaining charges. The trial court subsequently accepted Guzman's plea, and on August 9, 2012, sentenced Guzman to an eight-year term of incarceration in the Department of Correction and ordered him to pay restitution to the Estate/Family of Bland and to Austin.

On appeal, Guzman argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay restitution to Austin and in sentencing him. Guzman also argues that his eight-year sentence is inappropriate. Concluding that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering Guzman to pay restitution to Austin and in sentencing Guzman, and that Guzman's sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The stipulated factual basis entered during the June 19, 2012 guilty plea hearing provides that on October 2, 2011, Guzman was involved in a traffic accident when his vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Bland. Bland died as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident. Her passenger, Austin, was also severely injured. During an investigation into the cause of the accident, the investigating officers determined that Guzman's vehicle had been traveling at a high speed just prior to the accident, but Guzman managed to slow his vehicle to approximately thirty miles-per-hour at the time of impact. Guzman submitted to a blood alcohol test, the results of which indicated that at the time of the accident, Guzman had a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of 0.20.

On October 4, 2011, the State charged Guzman with one count of Class B felony operating a vehicle with a BAC of 0.15 or greater causing death,¹ one count of Class C felony operating while intoxicated causing death,² one count of Class C felony reckless homicide,³ one count of Class D felony operating a vehicle with a BAC of 0.15 or greater causing serious bodily injury,⁴ and one count of Class D felony operating while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury.⁵ On June 19, 2012, Guzman pled guilty to one count of Class C felony reckless homicide. In exchange for Guzman's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Pursuant to the terms of the parties' plea agreement, sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court.

The trial court accepted Guzman's guilty plea and conducted a sentencing hearing on August 9, 2012, at the conclusion of which the court sentenced Guzman to an eight-year term. The trial court also ordered Guzman to pay restitution to the Estate/Family of Bland in the amount of $4,510.65 and to Austin in the amount of $20,631.76. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Restitution

Guzman contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay restitution to Austin. Specifically, Guzman claims that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard because Austin was not a victim of the crime to which he pled guilty and because the restitution order was not supported by sufficient evidence.

“The purpose of a restitution order is to impress upon the criminal defendant the magnitude of the loss he has caused and to defray costs to the victims caused by the offense.” Henderson v. State, 848 N.E.2d 341, 346 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). An “order of restitution is within the trial court's discretion” and will only be reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d 934, 943 (Ind.1998) [ on reh'g,711 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind.1999) ]. An abuse of discretion occurs if the court's decision is clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before it. See Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind.1999); Davis v. State, 772 N.E.2d 535, 540 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion also occurs “when the trial court misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Green v. State, 811 N.E.2d 874, 877 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citing Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 585 (Ind.2001)).

Indiana Code Section 35–50–5–3(a) provides that a court “may, as a condition of probation or without placing the person on probation, order the person to make restitution to the victim of the crime.... The court shall base its restitution order upon a consideration of: ... (2) medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a result of the crime [.]” (Emphasis added). It is well settled that the trial court “may consider only those expenses incurred by the victim prior to the date of sentencing in formulating its restitution order.” Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (emphasis added) (citing Kotsopoulos v. State, 654 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied ); see also T.C. v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). The amount of actual loss is a factual matter that can be determined only upon the presentation of evidence. Shane v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (citing Kellett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 975, 980 (Ind.Ct.App.1999)).Bennett v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1281, 1286–87 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (emphases in original).

A. Austin Is a Victim of Guzman's Criminal Actions

Guzman argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay restitution to Austin because Austin was not the victim of the crime to which Guzman pled guilty. In support, Guzman relies on authority suggesting that “a trial court may not order restitution in an amount greater than the sums involved in those crimes to which the defendant actually pleaded guilty.” Kinkead v. State, 791 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citing Polen v. State, 578 N.E.2d 755, 756–57 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied ), trans. denied. Kinkead and Polen, however, can be distinguished from the instant matter because in both cases, the defendants' criminal actions were financial in nature and the restitution order was not based upon repayment for medical bills stemming from physical injuries sustained because of the defendants' criminal conduct.

Again, Indiana Code section 35–50–5–3(a) provides that a court “may ... order the person to make restitution to the victim of the crime.” “The court shall base its restitution order upon a consideration of: ... (2) medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a result of the crime[.]” Ind.Code § 35–50–5–3(a). “Though ‘victim’ is undefined,” the Indiana Supreme Court has held that a person who suffers “ ‘loss as a direct and immediate result of the criminal acts of a defendant’ ” may be considered a victim under Indiana Code section 35–50–5–3(a). Roach, 695 N.E.2d at 943 (citing Reinbold v. State, 555 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Ind.1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.1995)).

Here, Austin was clearly a victim of Guzman's criminal behavior and incurred medical and hospital costs as a result. Guzman does not dispute that Austin was injured as a direct result of the collision between his and Bland's vehicles or that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision. As such, Austin indisputably qualifies as a victim of Guzman's criminal acts under Indiana Code section 35–50–5–3(a).

B. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Restitution Award

Guzman also claims that the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence was insufficient to support the restitution award. Unlike when restitution is ordered as a condition of probation or a suspended sentence, when restitution is ordered as part of an executed sentence, and therefore is not a condition of probation or a suspended sentence, an inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay is not required. Shaffer v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (citing Bitner v. State, 546 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ind.Ct.App.1989)). This is so because in such a situation, restitution is merely a money judgment and a defendant cannot be imprisoned for his failure to pay the restitution. Id.

Although the trial court could properly choose to hold a hearing on a defendant's ability to pay restitution, it is not required to do so, and may make a proper inquiry, depending on circumstances, by such actions as reviewing the pre-sentence report and questioning witnesses. Laker v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citing Polen, 578 N.E.2d at 758–59). “Evidence supporting a restitution order is sufficient ‘if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.’ ” S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 683 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (quoting T.C., 839 N.E.2d at 1227).

Here, Austin's attorney submitted a letter to the Montgomery County ProbationDepartment setting out Austin's claim for restitution for medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident, breaking down the total by amount and to whom the amount was due. This letter was made an addendum to the pre-sentence report and was submitted to the trial court for consideration as a part of said report. The letter establishes the exact amount of loss incurred by Austin. It provides a reasonable basis for determining his loss, and does not...