Gwinn v. Melvin

• Decision Date: 22 June 1903
• Citation: 9 Idaho 202,72 P. 961
• Parties: GWINN, ADMINISTRATOR, v. MELVIN
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

72 P. 961

9 Idaho 202

GWINN, ADMINISTRATOR, v. MELVIN

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 22, 1903

APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR-ACTIONS-SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ADMINISTRATION WHEN NOT NECESSARY.

1. Under the provisions of sections 4020 and 4080, Revised Statutes, a proceeding for the appointment of an administrator is an "action" within the meaning of that term as used in said section.

2. Under the provisions of section 4060, Revised Statutes, if application for administration on the estate of an intestate is not made within four years from the date the applicant's right accrues to make such application, said statute of limitations is a bar to such appointment if properly plead, in the proceeding for such appointment.

3. Under the statutes of this state it is not absolutely necessary that administration be had of an estate of an intestate, when there are no debts against such estate and the heirs have made a satisfactory distribution of the assets of such estate among themselves.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of Canyon County. Honorable George H Stewart, Judge.

Application to appoint an administrator. Action of probate court on appeal to the district court. Judgment of district court reversed.

Reversed and remanded with instructions. Costs of this appeal awarded to appellant.

Walter Griffiths and H. E. Wallace, for Appellants.

This proceeding was heard in the trial court on an agreed statement of facts, and those facts and records are all here in the record on appeal. From this record it appears that Edwin Melvin died in April, 1896, in Canyon county, leaving as his legal representatives, and surviving him, a wife and six children, in possession of an estate worth about four or five hundred dollars. The widow and children continued in possession of the estate, paid and discharged all the claims and settled and distributed the property between themselves agreeably without the intervention of any court or attorneys and without unnecessary expense. After a period of more than six years of uninterrupted and peaceful possession and enjoyment of their legal rights, and after the property had increased about two or three times in value, an entire stranger and a party without interest has sought to disturb, disrupt and devest these heirs, their vendees and successors in interest, of their titles and possessions. This proceeding and result is sought to be instituted and accomplished against the will and over the objections of all the heirs and all persons interested in the estate. The appointment of an administrator in this matter can accomplish no beneficial purpose, and will subject the heirs and persons interested in the estate to an unnecessary and unjust burden, and will disturb and possibly disrupt their vested rights; and will entitle the petitioner here to a fee which is altogether unjust and to which he has no color of right. The purposes for which administration is had upon estates of deceased persons, in the order of their importance, are: 1. To preserve the estate; 2. To discharge the liens or claims against the estate; and 3. To effect an equitable partition and distribution of the estate to the decedent's legal representatives, viz., his heirs, legatees, devisees, or to the state, as the case may be. (Woerner's American Law of Administration, last ed., sec. 201.) And if these purposes have all been accomplished, or do not exist, as in this case, then administration is unnecessary if not invalid. (Flood v. Pilgrim, 32 Wis. 376; Filbey v. Carrier, 45 Wis. 469; Foote v. Foote, 61 Mich. 181, 28 N.W. 90.) The legal title or right of property, both real and personal, of one who dies intestate in this state passes directly to and vests in the decedent's legal representatives, and not in his personal representatives, as was the rule of personal property at common law. This vested title can be devested only by the act of the legal representative, or by the enforcement of a lien in the manner prescribed by law. (Idaho Rev. Stats., secs. 5701, 5429; Brenham v. Story, 39 Cal. 179; Beckett v. Selover, 7 Cal. 239, 68 Am. Dec. 237; Bufford v. Halliman, 10 Tex. 564, 60 Am. Dec. 223.) Our legislature has provided periods of limitation, beyond which no civil action or special proceeding of a civil nature may be brought. (Idaho Rev. Stats., secs. 4030-4080.) It is intended that all proceedings, both civil and criminal, shall have a period of limitation prescribed within which they may be commenced. (Idaho Rev. Stats., secs. 4030, 7500, 7502.) As somewhat bearing on this subject see, also, sections 5468, 5469, 5715, 5718. It is not intended that proceedings may not be commenced after the period prescribed if objection be not made. Therefore, the period within which letters of administration may be demanded as a legal right in this state is limited by section 4060 of the Revised Statutes to four years after the cause accrues.

Frank J. Smith, for Respondent.

Whether the said R. M. Gwinn had any interest in the estate or not, personally, is of no importance under our statute. Section 5351 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho is as follows: "Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate must be granted to some one or more of the persons hereafter mentioned, and they are respectfully entitled thereto in the following order." Subdivision 11 of said section is as follows: "Any person legally competent." Section 1365 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is exactly like the section of our code above cited, with the eighth classification left out, to wit, "Any of the kindred." Section 5355 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho has defined those who are not competent to serve as an administrator in this instance. Section 1369 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is verbatim with our section 5355. Section 5363 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho is as follows: "Letters of administration must be granted to any applicant, though it appears that there are other persons having better right to the administration, where such persons fail to appear and claim the issuing of letters to themselves." Section 1377 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is verbatim with section 5365 of the Idaho Code. Proceedings for the administration of the estates of deceased persons are purely statutory. (Maddock v. Russel, 109 Cal. 517, 42 P. 139; In re Strong's Estate, 119 Cal. 663, 51 P. 1078.) It seems that under the statutes of Idaho giving to these states the usual statutory construction, that it would have been error on the part of the probate judge to have rejected the petition of the said R. M. Gwinn under the first objection of appellant. We have cited the foregoing statutes of our code governing the question, together with the corresponding sections of the California code, for the reason that the supreme court of California has passed on the question directly. There is no incapacity to hold this office, from the mere fact that the applicant is not of kin to the deceased. A stranger is legally competent, though others are entitled to priority. (Estate of Kirtlan, 16 Cal. 162.) The court has no discretion to exclude a person from being appointed an administrator except for some of the specified causes. (In Matter of Estate of Pacheco, 23 Cal. 476.) A petition for letters of administration is sufficient if it states facts showing that the petitioner is one of the persons entitled to administer. (Lucas v. Todd, 28 Cal. 182.) Appellant's second objection is disposed of by the agreed statement of facts wherein it appears that there was a claim against said estate at the time of the appointment of the said R. M. Gwinn as administrator, and at the time said appointment was affirmed by the district court. Appellant's third objection falls with the second, for the reason that where there are claims against the estate, as is admitted in this case by the statement of facts, the title only passes to the heirs, subject to the payment of such claims, and whenever it appears that debts or claims against the estate of deceased exist, then the probate court has jurisdiction, and it is its duty to appoint an administrator to determine and settle the rights of all parties interested. (In re Pina's Estate, 112 Cal. 14, 44 P. 332; In re Strong's Estate, 119 Cal. 663, 51 P. 1078.) Appellants in their fourth objection contend that the appointment of an administrator comes within the provisions of our statute of limitations and is therefore barred. In discussing this question in their brief, counsel for appellant seem to have based their argument on the assumption that all special proceedings of a civil nature were actions, and that the appointment of an administrator was a special proceeding of a civil nature. Section 4080 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Idaho is as follows: "The word 'action,' as used in this title, is to be construed, whenever it is necessary so to do, as including a special proceeding of a civil nature." Some special proceedings are actions, while others are not. The appointment of an administrator is not an action under our statute. (In re Moore's Estate, 72 Cal. 335, 13 P. 880-882.) There is no statutory limitations as to the time in which letters of administration may be issued. (Healey v. Buchanan, 34 Cal. 567; Cochran v. Thompson, 18 Tex. 652; Lyne v. Sanford, 82 Tex. 58, 27 Am. St. Rep. 852, 19 S.W. 847; Shirly v. Warfield, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 449, 34 S.W. 390.)

SULLIVAN, C. J. Stockslager and Ailshie, JJ., concur.

OPINION

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.

SULLIVAN, C. J.

On the fourteenth day of June, 1902, R. M. Gwinn filed a petition in the probate court of Canyon county, praying to be appointed administrator of the estate of Edmund Melvin, deceased, who died intestate in said county...