Gwinnett Cnty. Naacp v. Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Registration & Elections

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: Steven D. Grimberg, United States District Court Judge
• Citation: Gwinnett Cnty. Naacp v. Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Registration & Elections, 446 F. Supp. 3d 1111 (N.D. Ga. 2020)
• Decision Date: 03 March 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00912-SDG
• Parties: GWINNETT COUNTY NAACP, as an organization; Georgia State Conference of the NAACP, as an organization; and Georgia Coalition for the Peoples' Agenda, Inc., as an organization, Plaintiffs, v. GWINNETT COUNTY BOARD OF REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS; John Mangano, Stephen Day, Ben Satterfield, Beauty Baldwin, and Alice O'Lenick in their official capacities as members of the Board of Registration and Elections; Ben Ku, Marlene Fosque, Tommy Hunter, Charlotte Nash, and Jace Brooks, in their official capacities as Gwinnett County Commissioners, Defendants.

446 F.Supp.3d 1111

GWINNETT COUNTY NAACP, as an organization; Georgia State Conference of the NAACP, as an organization; and Georgia Coalition for the Peoples' Agenda, Inc., as an organization, Plaintiffs,

v.GWINNETT COUNTY BOARD OF REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS; John Mangano, Stephen Day, Ben Satterfield, Beauty Baldwin, and Alice O'Lenick in their official capacities as members of the Board of Registration and Elections; Ben Ku, Marlene Fosque, Tommy Hunter, Charlotte Nash, and Jace Brooks, in their official capacities as Gwinnett County Commissioners, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00912-SDG

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Filed March 3, 2020

Ezra David Rosenberg, John Michael Powers, Julie Marie Houk, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, Jennifer Burch Dempsey, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP-ATL, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

OPINION AND ORDER

Steven D. Grimberg, United States District Court Judge

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Gwinnett County NAACP ("Gwinnett NAACP"), Georgia State Conference of the NAACP ("Georgia NAACP"), and the Georgia Coalition for the Peoples' Agenda, Inc.'s ("GCPA") motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction [ECF 2]. The Court held a hearing on March 2, 2020 and DENIED Plaintiff's motion from the bench. This Opinion and Order further explains the Court's reasoning for its ruling.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Gwinnett County is one of the fastest growing counties in Georgia.² As of February 1, 2020, Gwinnett County had more than 550,000 registered voters.³ The voter turnout for the 2016 and 2018 presidential general elections was high, with well over 300,000 voters voting in each.⁴ Defendant Gwinnett County Board of Registrations and Elections ("Gwinnett BORE" or "BORE") is responsible for the administration of elections in Gwinnett County.⁵ The Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners ("Board of Commissioners"), through its individual members, controls Gwinnett BORE's budget and is responsible for providing the necessary funds and equipment to conduct elections.⁶

Each county in Georgia is required to conduct three weeks of in-person, early voting. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-385(d)(1). However, only one location for early voting in each county is required under state law. Id. In 2016, Defendants operated one voting location—the Gwinnett County Voter Registration and Elections Office ("BORE headquarters")—during the first week of the early voting period.⁷ For the second week of early voting, Defendants had two satellite offices where registered voters could vote, in addition to voting at the BORE headquarters. For the third week of early voting in 2016, Defendants operated seven satellite voting locations in addition to permitting voting at the BORE headquarters.⁸ In 2018, Gwinnett County again operated only one voting office during the first week of early voting, but operated seven additional satellite offices during each of the second and third weeks.⁹

During the first week of early voting in the 2016 general election, voters experienced long delays at the BORE headquarters.¹⁰ Some prospective voters stood in line for up to five hours.¹¹ Other prospective voters may have left before casting their ballots or were physically unable to vote.¹² Even after the BORE opened more satellite offices later that first week of early voting, voters reportedly still experienced wait times of over an hour.¹³ Voters also experienced long wait times during the early voting period for the 2018 general election.¹⁴

In August 2019, the Gwinnett BORE made a budget request to the Board of Commissioners for funds to operate eight voting locations—the BORE headquarters and seven satellite offices—for all three weeks of the early voting period during the March 2020 presidential primary.¹⁵ The Board of Commissioners approved the budget request as to the second and third weeks of the early voting period, but not the first week.¹⁶ As a result, only one polling location—the BORE headquarters—would be open during the first week of early voting, as had been the case in 2016 and 2018.¹⁷ The Gwinnett BORE announced the Board of Commissioners' decision at its meeting on January 21, 2020.¹⁸ The Board of Commissioners notified the public of this decision on February 4, 2020.¹⁹ Plaintiffs attended the January 21 BORE meeting and subsequently sent Defendants letters on January 22 and February 18 disputing the decision.²⁰

During the January 21, 2020 meeting, BORE explained that there would be 12 days of early voting at the satellite locations (instead of the 19 days proposed in the BORE's budget) because of a delay in delivery of the necessary voting-machines.²¹ Two days later, Gwinnett BORE officials reportedly stated that budget cuts were responsible for the decision.²² Plaintiffs also present evidence that the Gwinnett BORE had concerns "due to logistics with equipment, training staff and managing elections property" as rationales for reducing the locations for early voting.²³ Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs allege that, as of February 24, 2020, the Gwinnett BORE had received 2,247 of the 2,255 new voting machines.²⁴ Plaintiffs do not allege whether those machines had been tested and were ready to be put into immediate use as of that date.

On February 27, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint, asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.²⁵ They allege Defendants' decision to operate only one polling location during the first week of the early voting period violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.²⁶ That same day, Plaintiffs filed their motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and requested an expedited hearing since the first week of early voting for the March 2020 presidential primary was set to start on March 2.²⁷ The Court set a hearing for March 2 at 2 pm, and directed that Defendants file any written response by 10 am that day. Defendants' response argued that Plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief.²⁸ All parties were represented by counsel during the March 2 hearing and both sides presented live witness testimony.

II. DISCUSSION

a. Standing

As a threshold issue, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs—three associational organizations—lack standing to maintain this suit. Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to consideration of cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The doctrine of standing "is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). To invoke this Court's jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must have standing. Fla. State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning , 522 F.3d 1153, 1159 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Nat'l Alliance for the Mentally Ill, St. John's Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 376 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004) ). The standing inquiry is threefold:

First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she has suffered an "injury in fact"—an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, the plaintiff must show a causal connection between her injury and the challenged action of the defendant—i.e. , the injury must be fairly...trace[able] to the defendant's conduct, as opposed to the action of an absent third party. Finally, the plaintiff must show that it is likely, not merely speculative, that a favorable judgment will redress her injury.

Lewis v. Governor of Ala. , 944 F.3d 1287, 1296 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations and punctuation omitted)). "Where only injunctive relief is sought, only one plaintiff with standing is required." Martin v. Kemp , 341 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (citing Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd. , 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007) ).

i. Injury in Fact

For the first prong, this Court has held that "[a]n organization may demonstrate a concrete, imminent injury either through a ‘diversion-of-resources' theory or through an ‘associational-standing’ theory."²⁹ Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Crittenden , 347 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (citing Arcia v. Fla. Sec'y of State , 772 F.3d 1335, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2014) ). When injunctive relief is sought, "individual participation of the organization's members is not normally necessary. The nub is whether the members themselves would have standing." Id. (citing Browning , 522 F.3d at 1160 ). Indeed, because injunctive relief is prospective in nature, an organization need only show that its members "face[ ] a probability of harm in the near and definite future." Browning , 522 F.3d at 1160–61. Plaintiffs assert they have standing under both theories. The Court agrees.

1. Direct organizational standing

For the "diversion-of-resources" theory, "an organization has standing to sue when a defendant's illegal acts impair the organization's ability to engage in its own projects by forcing the organization to divert resources in response." Crittenden , 347 F. Supp. 3d at 1336 (citing Arcia , 772 F.3d at 1341 ). See also Common Cause Ga. v. Kemp , 347 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1288–89 (N.D. Ga. 2018) ("It is well established that an organization can establish standing to sue on its own behalf where it can show the defendant's acts resulted in an impediment to the organization's mission or diversion of its resources.").

Plaintiffs here—all of which are organizations dedicated to increasing voter participation through advocacy and educating voters on election procedures— allege they will be directly harmed by being forced to divert their resources to other projects and initiatives to ensure voters are able to participate in the election.³⁰ In particular, the Court credits the testimony of Helen Butler, the Executive Direction of the GCPA, who testified that her organization will be required to divert additional resources to transport...