GYPSY PIPELINE COMPANY v. IVANHOE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Civ. A. No. 66-C-43.

• Citation: 256 F. Supp. 567
• Decision Date: 04 August 1966
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 66-C-43.
• Parties: GYPSY PIPELINE COMPANY, a Colorado corporation, John R. Marchi, a/k/a J. R. Marchi, and B. J. Marchi, Plaintiffs, v. IVANHOE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Viola E. Oliver, Boyd J. McGee, and Donald C. Gohsman, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

256 F. Supp. 567

GYPSY PIPELINE COMPANY, a Colorado corporation, John R. Marchi, a/k/a J. R. Marchi, and B. J. Marchi, Plaintiffs, v. IVANHOE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Viola E. Oliver, Boyd J. McGee, and Donald C. Gohsman, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 66-C-43.

United States District Court D. Colorado.

August 4, 1966.

Holland & Hart, Denver, Colo., for plaintiffs.

Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colo., for defendants.

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, District Judge.

The individual defendants herein, Viola E. Oliver, Boyd J. McGee and Donald C. Gohsman, have moved to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction over their person for the reason that the complaint fails to allege where the tortious acts of defendants occurred; no acts of defendants within the State of Colorado are alleged in the second and third claims to have taken place. As to the fifth claim it is said that there is no allegation indicating when the alleged defamation occurred, if it occurred in Colorado.

The complaint herein was filed on January 21, 1966, and on the twenty-seventh of January, 1966, the plaintiffs filed a motion in which they alleged that the defendants reside in the State of Montana but are subject to service of process in Montana pursuant to the terms of the Colorado long-arm statute. A demand was made that the Court issue a summons and authorize the United States Marshal in Montana to serve process in Montana. Upon the basis of this motion, summons was issued and service was made in Montana.

Inasmuch as the allegations of the complaint were vague as to the acts, if any, committed by the individuals in Colorado, counsel for plaintiffs was requested to make a showing as to the Court's exercising personal jurisdiction under the Colorado long-arm statute. Such showing was made in the form of "Specification Re Extraterritorial Service of Process." In this document it is said:

"2. * * * (a) Second Claim — (John R. Marchi and B. J. Marchi v. the three individual defendants). The gist of this claim is that the individual defendants maliciously interfered with a contract between Ivanhoe and the above-named claimants and induced Ivanhoe to breach that contract.

"(b) Third Claim — (Gypsy v. the three individual defendants). The gist of this claim is that the defendants acting in concert with each other wrongfully frustrated and disrupted the advantageous joint corporate operations undertaken between Gypsy and Ivanhoe.

"(c) Fifth Claim — (J. R. Marchi v. the individual defendants). The gravamen of this claim is that J. R. Marchi was separately damaged (as distinguished from damages that may have been sustained by other plaintiffs) by the conspiracy of the individual defendants to bring about a breach of the aforesaid contract, to frustrate the joint operations of Gypsy and Ivanhoe and arrangements undertaken by J. R. Marchi in reliance thereon, and that the individual defendants overtly pursued said conspiracy by publishing false and malicious statements which further damaged J. R. Marchi in his business reputation. This claim also seeks the imposition of punitive damages."

The contract which the plaintiffs complain was maliciously breached, or violated, was an agreement between the Gypsy Pipeline Company and Ivanhoe Petroleum Corporation calling for the sale of shares of stock of Gypsy to Ivanhoe. Seemingly, this contract was repudiated by Ivanhoe and decisions were made at corporate meetings outside Colorado to pursue this course of action. The contentions in the second, third and fifth claims are that the individual defendants were responsible for this action. In essence, the facts which the plaintiffs rely on to establish the jurisdictional basis over the individual defendants are that the two corporations had their principal offices in Denver between the Fall of 1963 and December of 1964. On the latter date the defendant corporation moved to Billings, Montana, but during the period in question had been authorized to do business in Colorado. It is further alleged that the contract which the defendants conspired to "cause a breach of" was a Colorado contract. Further, it is said that the advantageous relationships which the defendants are alleged to have conspired to interfere with had their situs in Denver, Colorado, in that the joint corporate operation which would result from the sale of the shares would have been in Denver. A further point advanced is that during the 1963-64 period when Ivanhoe was doing business in Colorado, one of the defendants, Boyd J. McGee, resided in Colorado. It is finally stated that the other two defendants pursued their activities as shareholders, directors, or officers of the defendant Ivanhoe while that corporation had its principal business in Colorado.

In summary, it would appear that the basis for invoking the long-arm st...