H. Channon Co. v. Hahn
| Decision Date | 20 February 1901 |
| Citation | 59 N.E. 522,189 Ill. 28 |
| Parties | H. CHANNON CO. v. HAHN. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from appellate court, First district.
Action by August Hahn against the H. Channon Company. From a judgment of the appellate court (90 Ill. App. 256) affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
O. W. Dynes, for appellant.
Brandt & Hoffmann, for appellee.
This appeal from the judgment of the appellate court for the First district affirming the judgment entered in the circuit court of Cook county in favor of the appellee in an action on the case instituted by him to recover damages for personal injuries sustained, as he alleged, through the negligence of the appellant company, presents but a single question: Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to grant the motion, entered by the appellant company at the close of all the testimony, to exclude the evidence, and peremptorily instruct the jury to return as their verdict that the appellant company was not guilty. Appellee, an employé of the appellant company, was injured by falling down the shaft of the elevator from the fifth floor of the building occupied by the appellant company in the transaction of the warehouse and storage business in which it was engaged, to the uncovered floor of the elevator cab, which was descending the shaft, below the second story of the building. Appellant insists the peremptory instruction should have been given, because, as it alleges: (1) The evidence did not prove that appellee was in the exercise of ordinary care for his safety; (2) that it appeared from the testimony the appellee was guilty of negligence which contributed directly and materially to his injury; (3) that the evidence did not tend to show the appellant company was chargeable with negligence which caused or contributed to the injury to the appellee; and (4) that the negligence of the appellant company's agents, if any was proven, was that of a fellow servant of the appellee.
As to the first and second of these contentions (for both may be considered and disposed of together) counsel for the appellant contends that it appeared from the testimony of the appellee that he was an adult, nearly 30 years of age; had worked under the conditions existing at the time of his injury for several days immediately preceding; had ridden on the elevator in question, and helped to unload it; had passed through the doors at the fifth floor on many occasions in unloading the elevator; had been up there both forenoons and afternoons in the bright light, and seen the elevator shaft; had come up on the elevator a few minutes before the accident, and helped to unload the load that he brought up with him; had, in leaving the elevator, walked out through the open doors, walked directly west, and a few minutes later took hold of the sail cover which he was directed to unfold and spread out, and backed up directly east, retracing, as it were, his steps in leaving the elevator, until he had reached the door, when, without looking behind him, or taking any other precaution, he heedlessly and recklessly backed in, fell to the bottom of the shaft, and was injured. This summing up leaves out of consideration much testimony produced at the hearing bearing upon the question of the exercise of ordinary care by the appellee. It appeared that he was 30 years old at the time of the trial, but only 23 at the time of the injury; that he had been in the employ of the appellant but three days, including the day on which he was injured; that his work, in the main, was in the basement or lower stories of the building; that the evidence tended to show he had ridden in the elevator but one time; that the two doors of the elevator shaft in the different floors were provided with spring hinges for the purpose of swinging the doors shut; that these doors opened out into the rooms, and were two in number at each opening; that the lower hinge on one of the doors of the shaft on the fifth floor had been broken or unscrewed from the door for probably three weeks before the appellee was injured, or for practically the same length of time before he was employed by the appellant; that on the day in question this door, which was hanging by the upper hinge only, had been opened back, and some rope or other like material had been piled up against it to hold it and support it, thus leaving it standing open; that the appellant had actual...
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...L. R. A. (N. S.) 472;Ubelmann v. Am. Ice Co., 209 Pa. 398, 58 Atl. 849;Fane v. Phil. R. T. Co., 228 Pa. 471, 77 Atl. 806;Channon Co. v. Hahn, 189 Ill. 28, 59 N. E. 522;True & True Co. v. Woda, 201 Ill. 315, 66 N. E. 369. It would be supererogation to vindicate at this time our adoption of t......
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Dunlap v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works
...creates a liability "if the violation of the municipal law caused or contributed to the personal injury," but not otherwise. Channon Co. v. Hahn, 189 Ill. 32. In Missouri, is a familiar and elemental rule in the law of this subject. Kelley v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 138; Holman v. Railroad, 62 Mo.......
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...violation caused the injury, which resulted in the death of the deceased. Consequently its admission was not error. In Channon Co. v. Hahn, 189 Ill. 28, 59 N. E. 522, it was held that, in an action by an employé for injuries received from falling down an open elevator shaft, proof of the de......
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