H.F. L.P. v. City of Twin Falls, 41277.
| Decision Date | 08 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 41277.,41277. |
| Citation | 339 P.3d 557 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | H.F.L.P., LLC, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The CITY OF TWIN FALLS, Defendant–Respondent. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Affirmed. Steven A. Wuthrich, PA, Montepelier, argued for appellant.
Wonderlich & Wakefield, Twin Falls, for respondent. Fritz A. Wonderlich argued.
This appeal arises from the Twin Falls County district court's decisions regarding the existence of an easement over property the City of Twin Falls (“the City”) owns in the Snake River Canyon. At trial, H.F.L.P., LLC, (“H.F.L.P.”) claimed it had a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity over the property, but the district court ultimately entered judgment in favor of the City. H.F.L.P. argues on appeal that the district court: (1) did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case; (2) erred when it held that H.F.L.P. failed to prove a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity; and (3) erred when it admitted photographic overlays over H.F.L.P.'s objections at trial. We affirm.
This case involves a proposed easement over a rough, relatively unimproved, single-vehicle dirt road that travels over property the City owns in the Snake River Canyon, south of the Snake River. H.F.L.P. owns three parcels in the Snake River Canyon, west of Rock Creek: “Harmsen Parcel 1,” “Harmsen Parcel 2,” and “Harmsen Parcel 3.” 1 The City owns roughly twenty-seven parcels in the Snake River Canyon, beginning at the waste water treatment plant (“treatment plant”) east of Rock Creek, and extending west of Rock Creek, just west of “Harmsen Parcel 2.”
The road begins at the treatment plant and runs west/northwest, parallel to the Snake River and across property now owned almost entirely by the City. That property was previously owned by either the BLM, several unidentified owners, Carl Urie, Carl Urie's father and uncles, or several other of H.F.L.P.'s predecessors. Once the road reaches Rock Creek, it crosses the Rock Creek Bridge and travels across “Harmsen Parcel 3,” through a parcel the City owns, to “Harmsen Parcel 2.” The entire road is approximately five miles long. H.F.L.P. seeks to establish an easement over the length of the road because it owns property west of Rock Creek Bridge that is landlocked and useless without an easement; the Snake River borders H.F.L.P.'s land to the north, and canyon cliffs border the south and west.
H.F.L.P. acquired its parcels following a series of conveyances that trace back to Carl Urie and his siblings. Carl Urie's father owned property south of the Snake River and west of Rock Creek beginning in about the 1930's. Carl moved onto the property with his family in 1946, when he was two years old. The Uries had a trout farm on part of their property around the 1950's, and then a cattle business up to 1976. They also grew corn for silage on the property, although it is unclear which lot(s) were used for these activities. The Uries apparently used the road involved in this lawsuit as their exclusive access to their property.
At times, other people protested the Uries' right to use the road, but the Uries would talk them out of it, insisting they had to use the road and were allowed to do so. However, at trial it was unclear as to which part of the road was involved or which land owners participated in those conversations. At one point in the 1960's after the City took over the treatment plant, the Uries encountered a gate—which was on the southeast part of the treatment plant property—and they attempted to dismantle it. Thereafter, a man from the treatment plant stopped the Uries from dismantling the gate and provided them with a key to the gate. The Uries and their successors have had a key ever since then.
The Uries sold “Harmsen Parcel 1,” “Harmsen Parcel 2,” and “Harmsen Parcel 3” to Northern Hydro around 1992, and H.F.L.P. is a successor of Northern Hydro. Stephen Harmsen has an interest in H.F.L.P. and also had an interest in Northern Hydro. Harmsen and his employees used the subject road monthly, primarily for recreational purposes, ever since Northern Hydro acquired its properties from the Uries, but it is unclear which parts of which properties have been used. Harmsen has never been denied access to the road, and the City gave him keys when it put up a new gate at the treatment plant. At some point, Harmsen attempted to get a permit to start construction on H.F.L.P.'s property, but was informed he could not obtain a permit without a recorded easement due to the property's landlocked nature. Harmsen subsequently requested an easement over the City's properties, which the City refused.
Consequently, H.F.L.P. filed a complaint with the district court on October 27, 2011, seeking a declaration of easement over the City's properties east of Rock Creek. In that complaint, H.F.L.P. sought an easement by necessity, and, alternatively, a prescriptive easement. At trial however, H.F.L.P. conceded it could not prove unity of title with respect to the property east of Rock Creek, and as such, was no longer seeking an easement by necessity over that land. Instead, H.F.L.P. sought an easement by prescription over the land east of Rock Creek and an easement by necessity over land the City owns west of Rock Creek between “Harmsen Parcel 3” and “Harmsen Parcel 2.” H.F.L.P. also pled a twenty-year statutory period for its prescriptive easement claim, but subsequently submitted a pre-trial memorandum asserting that in light of a recent decision from this Court, a five-year statutory period applied. H.F.L.P. also argued the five-year statutory period at trial.
Following a bench trial, the district court entered its June 18, 2013 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Preceding the findings, however, the court provided a special commentary on the lack of definitive proof presented at trial, where the court noted that its findings of fact were limited due to the manner in which H.F.L.P. presented its evidence. Specifically, the court noted that H.F.L.P. only had three witnesses testify at trial and that the testimony generally was not tied to any deeds, exhibits, or the chain of title summaries that were admitted into evidence. The court also discussed several evidentiary flaws. These flaws included that: (1) certain maps were scaled differently and inadequately labeled; (2) the legal description of the easement lacked particularized detail; and (3) the chain of title summaries were not in chronological order and did not follow one piece of property at a time. Essentially, the court stated, H.F.L.P.'s evidence was so fragmented that the court had limited proof and therefore could not determine what the facts established. The court acknowledged that the evidence H.F.L.P. submitted may have contained information supporting its claims, but that “the court was in no position to ferret-out: (1) what that information is and (2) how it supported H.F.L.P.'s claims.” Most significantly, the court emphasized that H.F.L.P.'s burden to prove its claims included an obligation to present evidence clearly and that it was not the court's “duty to sift through maps and unsystematic exhibits to organize and figure out the plaintiff's case.”
The court then set forth its findings of fact and ultimately concluded that H.F.L.P. did not prove its prescriptive easement claim or its easement by necessity claim by clear and convincing evidence. As to the prescriptive easement claim, the district court found that H.F.L.P. failed to show that: (1) the use of the road was adverse and under a claim of right; (2) the use of the road was continuous and uninterrupted; and (3) the prescriptive elements were satisfied for the statutory period. With respect to the easement by necessity claim, the district court held that H.F.L.P. failed to prove unity of title of the parcels west of Rock Creek. The district court also determined it properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the case because H.F.L.P. did not show the United States claimed an interest in the subject property that would give the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over the case. H.F.L.P. timely appealed the district court's judgment.
1. Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide easement rights over land the City of Twin Falls acquired from the BLM before this suit.
2. Whether substantial and competent evidence supports the district court's finding that H.F.L.P. did not establish all the elements of its prescriptive easement claim.
3. Whether substantial and competent evidence supports the district court's finding that H.F.L.P. did not establish an easement by necessity.
4. Whether the district court erred when it admitted aerial photographs of the property.
H.F.L.P. appeals a number of the district court's decisions made during and after trial. These decisions include the district court determining it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case; finding H.F.L.P. failed to present sufficient evidence to establish its easement by necessity and prescriptive easement claims; and admitting certain evidence over H.F.L.P.'s hearsay objections at trial. Because the jurisdictional issue could be dispositive, we will address it first.
H.F.L.P. argues the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over easement claims relating to land the BLM once owned. H.F.L.P. asserts that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f) gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over quiet title actions over land the United States claims an interest in. In other words, H.F.L.P. argues that because the BLM owned some of the land during the prescriptive period, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the easement dispute, even though the BLM does not currently own or “claim an interest in” any of the land involved in...
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