O. H. Lanier, Inc. v. Bexar County Nat. Bank of San Antonio
| Decision Date | 19 February 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 14229,14229 |
| Citation | 376 S.W.2d 42 |
| Parties | O. H. LANIER, INC., et al., Appellants, v. BEXAR COUNTY NATIONAL BANK OF SAN ANTONIO, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Strickland, San Antonio, for appellants.
Moursund, Ball & Bergstrom, San Antonio, for appellee.
This suit was instituted by Bexar County National Bank of San Antonio against O. H. Lanier, Inc., and O. H. Lanier, seeking to recover the balance of $16,290.27 alleged to be due upon a certain promissory note in the principal sum of $28,125.00, after crediting the note with the sum of $13,000.00 alleged to be the amount for which the equipment placed as security had been sold at a trustee's sale.
The cause was submitted to a jury on four special issues, in reply to which the jury found:
(1) That the sale was made in good faith.
(2) That the reasonable cash market value of the equipment was $28,500.00.
(3) That appellee did not sell the equipment for the best available price, and
(4) That the best available price was $21,375.00.
Based upon this verdict the trial court entered judgment in the Bank's favor against the defendants in the principal sum of $16,225.00, from which judgment O. H. Lanier, Inc., and O. H. Lanier have prosecuted this appeal.
Appellants present eight points of error reading as follows '1. The Trial Court erred in defining or attempting to define, the term 'good faith' in connection with Question Number 1 of the Court's Charge, for the reason that such term is one of common sense and good judgment and has a well established meaning to the ordinary prudent person.
'2. The Trial Court erred in defining or attempting to define, the term 'good faith' in connection with Question Number 1 of the Court's Charge, for the reason that such term in one of common sense and good judgment and has a well established meaning to the ordinary prudent person; that the Court's attempt to give a legal definition to a term having a well established meaning to the ordinary prudent person only served to mislead and confuse the Jury.
'3. The Trial Court erred in submitting to the Jury, in connection with Question Number 1 of the Court's Charge, any definition of the term 'good faith'.
'4. The Trial Court erred in submitting the following definition in connection with Question Number 1 of the Court's Charge:
"By the term 'good faith' is meant with sincerity or honesty.'
for the following reasons:
'(1) It places a greater burden of proof upon defendant than required by law in that before the Jury could find that the sale was not made in good faith they would have to find that the Plaintiff bank acted with 'insincerity' or 'dishonesty'; that there were no pleadings that the Bank acted with 'dishonesty' and therefore said definition also required a Jury finding of a fact not pled by Defendant before it could find that the sale was not a good faith sale.
'(2) It is submitted in the disjunctive.
'(3) It is capable of having two different meanings.
'(4) It is vague, indefinite, ambiguous, multifarious and duplicitous.
'5. The Trial Court erred in failing to submit the following definition of the term 'good faith' in connection with question Number 1 of the Court's Charge, as requested by Appellant:
"By the term 'good faith', is meant an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all endeavor or belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscionable.'
'6. The Trial Court erred in submitting to the Jury Questions 3 and 4 as they were wholly unnecessary and surplusage; this for the reason that said Questions No. 3 and 4 could not have been a basis of any judgment to be rendered under any circumstances in this case and that to submit such issues to the...
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