E.H. v. Matin
| Decision Date | 25 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | I,AFL-CI,No. 21467,21467 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | E.H., et al., Petitioners Below, Appellees, v. Khan MATIN, et al., Respondents Below, W. Donald Weston, M.D., Acting Director, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Respondent Below, Appellant, District 1199, The Health Care and Social Service Union-SEIU,ntervenor. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where the legislature, through the budget process, expressly provides for funding to build a new public facility, absent some constitutional challenge or an express statutory provision to the contrary, the courts are not authorized to interfere with the legislative mandate.
2. " ' " Syllabus Point 2, Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 186 W.Va. 720, 414 S.E.2d 877 (1991).
3. Syllabus Point 2, Dillon v. Board of Education, 171 W.Va. 631, 301 S.E.2d 588 (1983).
Mario Palumbo, Atty. Gen., Jeffrey K. Matherly, Deputy Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellees.
Daniel F. Hedges, Charleston, for appellant.
Larry Harless, Evans, for intervenor Dist. 1199, The Health Care and Social Service Union-SEIU, AFL-CIO.
This is an appeal by the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources from a September 1, 1992 order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, which enjoined its plan to build a 150-bed mental health facility near Weston, West Virginia. This controversy stems from our earlier decision in E.H. v. Matin, 168 W.Va. 248, 284 S.E.2d 232 (1981), where we held that the State must comply with the detailed provisions of W.Va.Code, 27-5-9 (1977), which concerns the treatment of mental patients. 1 To accomplish this legislative mandate, we remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to oversee the development of a comprehensive mental health plan.
After a number of hearings, the parties agreed and the circuit court accepted in October of 1983 what is termed the West Virginia Behavioral Health System Plan (BHSP). 2 As originally approved by the circuit court, the existing Weston Hospital was to provide no more than 250 beds for the chronically mentally ill and additional bed space for substance abuse and forensic services.
Subsequently, in July of 1986, the appellants, with the agreement of the appellees, obtained a modification of the 1983 circuit court order. In this order, the appellants agreed to construct a new psychiatric hospital containing no more than 250 beds for the mentally ill and also to provide for forensic services for no more than fifty adults. The completion date for the construction of this new facility was set at June 30, 1989.
The circuit court issued a restraining order in July of 1988 against the appellants requiring them to justify how the proposed new psychiatric facility would be built without endangering the overall funding of the BHSP. The appellants responded by outlining a financing plan which involved the issuance of revenue bonds by the West Virginia Hospital Finance Authority, pursuant to its authority under W.Va.Code, 16-29A-1, et seq., and in accordance with its Bond Resolution of July 19, 1989. The legislature had approved and authorized this financing in its 1988-89 budget in Account No. 8500 of the Hospital Services Revenue Account of the State Department of Health. 3
The question of financing the new hospital was apparently resolved by the parties and another agreed order was approved by the lower court on December 14, 1989. Under this order, the bed number was reduced to 150 for psychiatric care and forty for the forensic unit. It appears that the completion construction date was extended into calendar year 1992. Thereafter, another agreed order was entered on July 18, 1990, doing away with the 40-bed forensic unit and leaving 150 beds for the treatment of the mentally ill.
Thereafter, the State Hospital Authority issued the revenue bonds and site preparation was begun for the construction of the hospital. However, on June 3, 1991, the appellees filed a motion asking the circuit court to prevent the construction of the hospital by amending its July 18, 1990 order. The reasons advanced were that the State should not spend the money on a new hospital facility because there were community mental health facilities that could be utilized. Moreover, it was claimed that Medicaid funds which could be obtained through community mental health facilities could not be obtained at the new hospital. Finally, the appellees asserted that it would be cheaper to build several regional facilities than to build the larger new hospital.
The circuit court ordered that a hearing on this issue be held before its court monitor on August 9, 1991. Subsequently, the monitor filed formal recommendations with the circuit court on September 6, 1991. Almost one year later, on August 31, 1992, the circuit court issued an opinion letter which concluded that the State should not construct the 150-bed hospital facility. 4 An order prohibiting the construction of the hospital was entered on September 18, 1992. It required the appellants to develop a plan "based on a regionalized concept for individuals needing acute and extended inpatient psychiatric treatment."
Prior to the entry of the circuit court order, the appellants on September 3, 1992, filed a motion for stay of the circuit court order pending an appeal. We granted a sixty-day stay and subsequently the appellants filed their petition for appeal, which we granted on November 9, 1992. We set an expedited final hearing on the appeal for January 19, 1993.
II.
A number of parties were granted amicus curiae status and have filed briefs. Most of these briefs address the merits of the circuit court's ruling blocking the construction of the new hospital and ordering the appellants to submit a plan for regional facilities. As discussed more fully below, we decline to address this issue as we conclude that the appellees and the circuit court were without authority to challenge the project.
It appears that both the appellees and the circuit court may have misconstrued the nature of our mandate in the remand of E.H. v. Matin, supra. It was not our intention to have the circuit court operate as some type of a judicial super-secretary over the actions of the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources. In fact, in Matin, we cautioned:
"Where there is a good faith difference of opinion among equally competent professional experts concerning appropriate methods of treatment and custody, such differences should be resolved by the director of the West Virginia Department of Health and not by the courts." 168 W.Va. at 259-60, 284 S.E.2d at 238.
More to the point of this case, we have recognized that ordinarily it rests with the legislature to make the determination to close a statutorily created facility. As we explained in the Syllabus of DeVault v. Nicholson, 170 W.Va. 719, 296 S.E.2d 682 (1982): "Where a women's prison has been created by a legislative act, W.Va.Code, 28-5C-1 [1947] et seq., a legislative act is required to close it." See also Jones v. Rockefeller, 172 W.Va. 30, 303 S.E.2d 668 (1983).
We believe that a corollary rule applies where the legislature, through the budget process, expressly provides for funding to build a new public facility, as was done here. Absent some constitutional challenge or an express statutory provision to the contrary, the courts are not authorized to interfere with the legislative mandate. This principle rests on two grounds. The first ground is our traditional recognition of the plenary powers of the legislature which are subject only to constitutional constraints. The second ground for judicial noninterference is equally venerable; it is our constitutional doctrine of separation of powers contained in Article V, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution. 5 Thus, with regard to constitutional challenges against legislative action, we exercise due restraint before finding unconstitutionality. These two principles are found in Syllabus Point 1 of State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965):
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