Haafke v. Mitchell
Decision Date | 11 April 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 69483,69483 |
Citation | 347 N.W.2d 381 |
Parties | Richard Allen HAAFKE and Ruth Marie Haafke, Individually and As Administrators Of The Estate of Robert Gordon Haafke, Deceased, Appellants, v. Ray V. MITCHELL, a/k/a Ray V. Mitchell, Sr., Individually And d/b/a "the Sugar Bowl"; Merchants Mutual Bonding Co., Des Moines, Iowa; Dennis B. Garvis; Merle Kingsbury; Lucille Kingsbury; Connie Backman; Lee Quade; Bob Saunders a/k/a Robert L. Saunders; and Chuck Miller a/k/a Chuck E. Miller, Appellees. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
J. Allen Orr, Sioux City, for appellants.
Gerry M. Rinden and Raymond Conklin, of Klockau, McCarthy, Ellison, Rinden & Hartsock, Rock Island, Ill., for appellees.
Considered en banc.
Robert Haafke was killed in an automobile accident allegedly resulting from the intoxication of his host driver caused, or contributed to, by these defendants. This suit was based upon Iowa's dram shop act, Iowa Code section 123.92, and traditional principles of common-law liability. Joined as defendants were Ray V. Mitchell, a liquor licensee, as well as Garvis, Backman, Quade, and Saunders, his employees, the Kingsburys as owners of the tavern property, and Merchants Mutual Bonding Company, surety on the licensee's dram shop bond. Actual and exemplary damages were demanded from all defendants.
The district court, concluding that Iowa's dram shop statute preempts the field of civil liability, dismissed all the claims based upon common law and held that the dram shop act, directed at "any licensee or permittee," precludes a direct suit against a surety on a licensee's bond. It also struck all claims for exemplary damages and struck the plaintiffs' claim for "grief, mental anguish, remorse and humiliation." We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The plaintiffs alleged that their son, Robert Haafke, and a companion, defendant Chuck Miller, went to the Sugar Bowl Tavern on the evening of the accident. Miller was under the "legal age" of 19 (Iowa Code section 123.3(33)) and was intoxicated at the time, facts that the plaintiffs allege were known to the employees who nevertheless served liquor to Miller. They also allege that the defendants knew or should have known that Miller had a propensity to "behave irrationally" when drunk, that he had a high-speed car and would likely be driving it when he left the Sugar Bowl that night. They also alleged that the defendant Mitchell, operator of the Sugar Bowl Tavern, was a Class C Beer Permit holder and was bonded by the defendant Merchants Mutual Bonding Company as surety.
The Sugar Bowl, they allege, had catered to youthful patrons on the night of the accident, by running a "dollar pitcher" special and permitted participation in a "quarter game" in which the losers were required to become intoxicated. The Sugar Bowl was well known by all of the defendants to be a "hang-out" for underage patrons and that it catered in particular to a trade by underage customers, according to the petition.
Following their stay at the Sugar Bowl, Miller and Haafke left in Miller's car. Miller was driving. The car struck a tree, killing Haafke. Miller lived, and although he is a party to the suit, the issues pertaining to him are not involved in this interlocutory appeal.
At the outset, we have difficulty in determining just what the issues are on appeal. The plaintiffs' brief is of little help. Their brief states the two issues relating to liability as follows: (1) "The trial court erred in holding that anyone may serve liquor to a minor except licensees and permittees under the Iowa dram shop act, [section] 123.92" and (2) that it erred "in holding that anyone may serve liquor to a minor under the Sioux City Municipal Code [section] 4.32.180."
The district court did not rule "anyone" may serve liquor; it ruled only that, as a matter of law, certain defendants could not be held liable for doing so. From examination of the appellants' brief, on the issues of liability, this appears to be their argument: That violations of state statutes and a Sioux City ordinance, which prohibit sales to minors and to intoxicated persons, give rise to common-law liability of all of the defendants (including the bonding company and the owners of the premises) "without the aid or interference of the dram shop act." The thrust of the argument seems to be that, contrary to the district court's ruling, common-law liability may be predicated upon a violation of the criminal statute and is not preempted as to any of the defendants by the dram shop statute.
We first turn to the claim against Merchants Mutual Bonding Company, surety on the license bond required of Mitchell. See Iowa Code § 123.92. The district court order dismissing as to Merchants gave no specific reasons for its ruling. We note, however, that it cited the case of Cochran v. Lovelace, 209 N.W.2d 130 (Iowa 1973), which had held that a surety could not be sued directly under the dram shop act, because it was not a "licensee or permittee" within its terms. The plaintiffs do not ask us to overrule Cochran or to distinguish it. Even under the broad reading which we have accorded the appellants' brief in order to identify the issues, we cannot find that they have preserved any issues as to the dismissal of Merchants. We deem the issue waived. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(3). As to defendants Merle Kingsbury and Lucille Kingsbury, a fair reading of the petition as amended indicates the claim against them is based solely upon their ownership of the premises involved. No argument or authority is submitted on appeal to support such a claim, and we deem this issue waived as well. Id.
We turn then to the issues remaining in this appeal. In addition to the issue of the common-law liability discussed above, two issues are raised as to damages: May exemplary damages be recovered from the defendants under either the dram shop statute or common law; and may damages for "grief, mental anguish, remorse and humiliation" be recovered under either our statute on wrongful death damages, Iowa Code section 613.15, or the dram shop act itself. We address the liability issue first.
Plaintiffs allege that all of the defendants are liable under common law because the sale of beer here was "careless, heedless, wanton and malicious" and was illegal under two statutes, Iowa Code section 123.49(1) ( ) and section 123.47 (sale to minors). The defendants respond that, as to a licensee, the dram shop act is the exclusive remedy. Further, they claim that as to all of the other defendants, there is no remedy at all because the dram shop act preempts the entire field of tort liability for illegal or negligent sale of intoxicating beverages.
The dram shop act, Iowa Code section 123.92 provides in part:
123.92 Civil liability applicable to sale or gift of beer or intoxicants by licensees. Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person who shall be injured in person or property or means of support by any intoxicated person or resulting from the intoxication of any such person, shall have a right of action, severally or jointly, against any licensee or permittee, who shall sell or give any beer or intoxicating liquor to any such person while he or she is intoxicated, or serve any such person to a point where such person is intoxicated, for all damages actually sustained. If the injury was caused by an intoxicated person, a permittee or licensee may establish as an affirmative defense that the intoxication did not contribute to the injurious action of the person.
Initially, dram shop statutes were enacted to provide a recourse in an area where courts had refused to recognize a cause of action arising out of the furnishing of intoxicating beverages. The basis of the courts' refusal to recognize a common-law claim was that, as a matter of law, the furnishing of intoxicating beverages could not be the proximate cause of the ultimate damages. See 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 428, at 134 (1981); 45 Am.Jur.2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553, at 853 (1969). Iowa case law was in accord. See Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 373, 92 N.W.2d 682, 690 (1958). Cowman was followed in several later cases, e.g., Robinson v. Bognanno, 213 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Iowa 1973); Dairyland Insurance Company v. Mumert, 212 N.W.2d 436, 441 (Iowa 1973); Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 617 (Iowa 1972); Federated Mutual v. Dunkelberger, 172 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Iowa 1969).
This remained the state of the law in Iowa until our decision in Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977), which involved an illegal sale of liquor to a minor by an employee of a state liquor store. Lewis held that proximate cause in liquor cases, as in others, was an issue to be resolved by the fact-finder, not by a rule of law denying recovery in all cases. It therefore expressly overruled the Cowman line of cases. Id. at 191-92.
In Lewis we discussed the effect of a violation of a criminal statute, sale to a minor, and determined that the criminal statute prescribed a standard of conduct applicable to civil cases as well. We also pointed to the express purpose of the liquor control act which was "the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc., 98-574
...533 (1980); Fischer v. Cooper, 116 Idaho 374, 775 P.2d 1216 (1989); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky.Ct.App.1968); Garcia v. Jennings, 427 So.2d 1329 (La.Ct.App.1983); Klingerman v. SOL C......
-
Waitt v. Speed Control, Inc., Nos. C-00-4060-MWB, C-00-4087-MWB (N.D. Iowa 6/28/2002), s. C-00-4060-MWB, C-00-4087-MWB.
...of Smith v. Shaffer, 395 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Iowa 1986) (en banc); Bockelman v. State, 366 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 1985); Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Iowa 1984). Negligence is generally defined as conduct that falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others ......
-
Ling v. Jan's Liquors
...217 N.E.2d 847 (1966). 16. IOWA Dram shop act (Iowa Code Ann. § 123.92 [West 1984 Supp.]. Common-law vendor liability. Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984). 17. KANSAS No statutory vendor liability. No common-law liability. 18. KENTUCKY No statutory vendor liability. Common-law li......
-
Eddy v. Casey's General Store, Inc.
...371 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1985); Golden v. O'Neill, 366 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1985); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985); Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984); Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). We have repeatedly said that t......