Haag v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.
| Decision Date | 02 April 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 14776.,14776. |
| Citation | 342 F.2d 566 |
| Parties | Vernon L. HAAG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORPORATION, a Maryland corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
J. A. Bruggeman, Otto E. Grant, Jr., Barrett, Barrett & McNagny, Fort Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas W. Yoder, of Campbell, Livingston, Dildine & Haynie, Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendant-appellee.
Before DUFFY, SCHNACKENBERG and KNOCH, Circuit Judges.
This case is here for the second time. Plaintiff, Vernon L. Haag, brought suit originally in the state court (subsequently the cause was removed to the U. S. District Court) to recover damages arising out of the refusal of the defendant, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, to honor his attempted exercise of a stock option. The District Court granted summary judgment for defendant and plaintiff has taken this appeal.
On or about August 11, 1957, defendant had engaged plaintiff as an employee. On September 11, 1957, defendant gave plaintiff an option to buy certain shares of its common stock "only after two years of the Optionee's continued employment with the corporation or one of its subsidiaries."
In his initial suit, plaintiff contended that defendant's determination that plaintiff's employment terminated before the passage of the necessary two years failed to consider an alleged oral contract of employment for a period of 90 days, made on or about June 22, 1959.
In this Court's opinion on the original appeal, No. 14134, filed November 12, 1963, 324 F.2d 205, we stated (p. 208):
"We do, however, agree with the plaintiff that if, in fact, on and after June 22, 1959, he had a contract of employment with the defendant for a fixed and definite term embracing the ninety day period ending September 20, 1959, as he alleges and claims he did, and if his discharge on July 28, 1959, was without just cause and for the purpose of depriving him of attaining the right to exercise his stock purchase option, the defendant is liable for such damages as may have been occasioned thereby."
The cause was remanded to the United States District Court where it was tried to a jury. The jury found for the plaintiff and answered "yes" to the following special interrogatory:
"QUESTION: Did the plaintiff
Haag, and the defendant
International
Telephone
and Telegraph, on
June 22, 1959, enter
into an oral contract
of employment
for a fixed and
definite term embracing
the ninety-day
period ending
September 20
1959?"
Defendant had filed motions for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, asserting that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that plaintiff had a contract of employment for a fixed and definite term. The District Judge reserved his ruling on these motions, following the good practice recommended by this Court in Reitan v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 1959, 267 F.2d 66, 68. Pursuant to the defendant's motion, the District Court set aside the jury's verdict and entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict, which the District Court found to be clearly against the greater weight of the evidence and not such as might have been reasonably reached.
The District Judge for that reason also granted (conditionally) the defendant's motion for a new trial.
It was not contested that plaintiff's original hiring was at will. Plaintiff asserted that a change in his employment occurred at a meeting with Delbert L. Mills, an executive vice-president of one of defendant's divisions at Clifton, New Jersey, on June 22, 1959. He agreed that he was then removed from his prior assignment at defendant's Fort Wayne location, so that someone else could take over that job. He said that he was instead placed on a special assignment for 90 days which would permit him to complete the two years' employment necessary to exercise his stock option. He states that the arrangement was such that if he found another position he was free to leave; that it was at his option whether or not to remain in the defendant's employ for the whole of the 90 days, but that defendant was bound. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Mills did not ask him to hold himself available in any capacity after June 22, 1959, but that he himself had stated that he would be available. He testified that defendant had plaintiff's home address and telephone number and that he could be reached from there. Nobody described the duties of the "special assignment" to him and plaintiff never asked Mr. Mills what the special assignment was, or ever reported to Mr. Mills on this special assignment after the aforesaid meeting of June 22, 1959. Plaintiff also testified that at the meeting on June 22, Mr. Mills told plaintiff to start looking for other employment immediately.
After cleaning out his desk at Fort Wayne on June 23, 1959, plaintiff never performed any services for defendant and, to his knowledge, never went back to the defendant's premises except when he attempted to exercise his stock option. It was understood that he was to be allowed to devote as much time as he wished to his search for new employment. Plaintiff testified further that he did shortly thereafter seek new employment, travelling extensively throughout the United States through June, July and August, 1959.
The defendant's witnesses, Mr. Mills and another vice-president, Robert Chasen, testified that at the meeting they had with plaintiff on June 22, 1959, he was relieved of all responsibility but that Mr. Mills agreed to keep him on the payroll for a period not to exceed 90 days while he sought other employment; that there was no "special assignment," that phrase being used only to create the impression that plaintiff was currently employed for its effect on plaintiff's efforts to secure new employment. Plaintiff did not deny that this explanation was given to him, but testified that he did not recall its being said.
Plaintiff testified that there was no mention of the option at the meeting June 22, 1959.
Under date of July 28, 1959, plaintiff received a letter from Mr. Mills reading as follows:
to which he replied that he had continuously remained available to the company as an employee and would remain available until September 21, 1959. He did not in fact accept any other employment during the 90-day period.
The District Court applied the standards of ...
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Ryan v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc.
...in addition to the services contracted to be rendered.' " Id. 45 N.E.2d at 341 (quoting 35 Am.Jur. 460). Accord, Haag v. Int'l Tele. & Tele. Corp., 342 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1965) (setting aside a jury verdict because no proof of a valid contract for a fixed and definite term); Pearson v. Youn......
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Fredericks v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation
...our view and have held that an employee's rights will terminate upon the termination of employment. Haag v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 342 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1965); Fontius Shoe Co. v. Lamberton, 78 Colo. 250, 241 P. 542 (1925); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Guignet, 112 Ind. App......