Haag v. State, No. 77132

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: KOGAN; SHAW
• Citation: 591 So.2d 614
• Decision Date: 02 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 77132
• Parties: James J. HAAG, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

Page 614

591 So.2d 614 James J. HAAG, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent. No. 77132. Supreme Court of Florida. Jan. 2, 1992.

Page 615

James J. Haag, in pro. per.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Joan Fowler, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Crim. Law, and Patricia G. Lampert, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.

Richard A. Belz, Executive Director, Gainesville, amicus curiae, for Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc.

KOGAN, Justice.

We have for review Haag v. State, 570 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), in which the district court certified the following question of great public importance:

Does the rule 3.850 provision which states that with certain exceptions "no other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than two years after the judgment and sentence become final" prevent consideration of such a motion which was turned over to prison authorities for mailing within the prescribed time limit but was stamped in by the court clerk after that time period had run?

Id. at 1145. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(4), Fla.Const. We answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision below.

While incarcerated in Union Correctional facility, James J. Haag deposited in the outgoing prisoner mail a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida

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Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. ¹ He did so five days prior to the expiration of the two-year time limit imposed by the rule--a date reliably documented in the prison's mail log. Although there is no direct evidence of the date on which petitioner's motion was received at the court, it was not stamped "filed" by the clerk of court until four days after the time limit had run. Later, the trial court denied the motion as untimely. The district court affirmed and then certified the above question. Haag, 570 So.2d at 1145.

A basic guarantee of Florida law is that the right to relief through the writ of habeas corpus must be "grantable of right, freely and without cost." Art. I, Sec. 13, Fla.Const. In the case of State v. Bolyea, 520 So.2d 562, 563 (Fla.1988), we recognized that Rule 3.850 is a "procedural vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of habeas corpus." Accordingly, in approaching the present case, we must be mindful that the right to habeas relief protected by article I, section 13 of the Florida Constitution is implicated here.

It is true that the right to habeas relief, like any other constitutional right, is subject to certain reasonable limitations consistent with the full and fair exercise of the right. For example, we have noted that the two-year time limitation imposed by Rule 3.850 serves to promote the fairness and finality required of our criminal justice system:

It serves to reduce piecemeal litigation and the assertion of stale claims while at the same time preserves the right to unlimited access to the courts where there is newly discovered evidence or where there have been fundamental constitutional changes in the law with retroactive application.

Johnson v. State, 536 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla.1988). Accord art. I, Sec. 21, Fla.Const. (right of access to courts). However, nothing in our law suggests that the two-year limitation must be applied harshly or contrary to fundamental principles of fairness. As the Rules of Criminal Procedure themselves note, the Rules are

intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration.

Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.020 (West 1991).

Indeed, both simplicity and fairness are equally promoted by the right to habeas relief that emanates from the Florida Constitution and has been partially embodied within Rule 3.850. Art. I, Sec. 13, Fla.Const.; Bolyea, 520 So.2d at 563; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. The fundamental guarantees enumerated in Florida's Declaration of Rights should be available to all through simple and direct means, without needless complication or impediment, and should be fairly administered in favor of justice and not bound by technicality. Art. I, Fla.Const.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the method by which the United States Supreme Court has addressed the problem of the timeliness of pro se habeas petitions or appeals by federal inmates. The high Court has noted:

[P]risoners cannot take the steps other litigants can take to monitor the processing of their notices of appeal ... before the 30-day deadline. Unlike other litigants, pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the courthouse to see that the notice is stamped "filed" or to...