Haas v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:08-cv-001-RLY-WGH.,3:08-cv-001-RLY-WGH. |
| Citation | 672 F.Supp.2d 849 |
| Parties | Anthony HAAS and Wanda Haas, individually and as surviving parents of Phillip A. Haas, a deceased minor, Plaintiffs, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Stephen Hensleigh Thomas, Gerling Law Offices, Evansville, IN, for Plaintiffs.
J. Todd Spurgeon, Kightlinger & Gray, LLP, New Albany, IN, for Defendant.
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Phillip Haas was killed in a single-vehicle accident in a vehicle allegedly driven by Amber Myers. Following his death, Phillip Haas' parents, Anthony and Wanda Haas, filed a wrongful death claim in state court against Amber Myers and her parents. After Auto-Owners refused to waive subrogation in the underlying state court action, Anthony and Wanda Haas filed the present lawsuit. In this action, Anthony and Wanda Haas, individually and as the surviving parents of Phillip Haas (collectively "Plaintiffs"), allege that Auto-Owners' refusal to waive subrogation "was done for purposes other than subrogation." Plaintiffs also seek underinsured motorist benefits for the death of Phillip Haas under the Auto-Owners policies issued to Anthony Haas.
Auto-Owners filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint on January 30, 2009. The Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of underinsured motorist coverage under the Auto-Owners policies issued to Anthony Haas. To aid the court in understanding the issues presented, the court heard oral argument from the parties on July 21, 2009. Having read and reviewed the supporting and opposing briefs and the applicable law, and having heard the oral argument of the parties, the court hereby GRANTS in part, and DENIES in part, Auto-Owners' Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES the Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, affidavits, and other materials on file demonstrate that there exists "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.Civ.P. 56(c). Jurisdiction of this case is based upon diversity of citizenship, and, as all material events occurred in Indiana, the parties agree that Indiana substantive law applies. "Indiana courts have recognized that "[c]onstruction of an insurance policy is a question of law for which summary judgment is particularly appropriate.'" Myles v. General Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 197 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Piers v. American United Life Ins. Co., 714 N.E.2d 1289, 1290 (Ind.Ct. App.1999)).
The interpretation of an insurance policy is subject to the same rules of construction and interpretation as any other contract. Amerisure, Inc. v. Wurster Constr. Co., Inc., 818 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Myles, 197 F.3d at 868 (applying Indiana law). Thus, the goal in interpreting an insurance policy is to ascertain and enforce the parties' intentions as expressed in the written contract, reading the "four corners" of the document as a whole. Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 774 N.E.2d 932, 935 (Ind.Ct. App.2002). If the terms of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, the court gives that language its plain and ordinary meaning and enforces the policy according to its terms. Castillo v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 834 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); Rice v. Meridian Ins. Co., 751 N.E.2d 685, 688 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). If, however, the language of the policy is ambiguous, the court construes the policy against the insurer. Rice, 751 N.E.2d at 688. Here, as shown below, there is no dispute as to the meaning of the underinsured motorist provisions at issue in this case.
This matter arises out of an incident which occurred on January 14, 2006, near Jasper, Indiana. On that date, Phillip Haas was a passenger1 in a vehicle operated by Amber Nicole Myers ("Amber Myers"). The vehicle was involved in an accident, resulting in Phillip Haas' death. The vehicle in question was owned by Amber Myers' parents, Ken and Kathy Myers, and insured by Progressive Insurance ("Progressive").
Anthony Haas, the father of Phillip Haas, maintained a policy of automobile insurance with Auto-Owners, policy number 46-276-842-00. (Defendant's Ex. A, Indiana Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage, form 79304 (10-96) ( )). He also maintained an executive umbrella insurance policy with Auto-Owners, policy number 96-593-737-04. (Defendant's Ex. B, Indiana Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage, form 26428 (12-01) ("Defendant's Ex. B")). Progressive tendered the underlying limits, $50,000, of its policy on the Myers' vehicle, and on October 26, 2007, counsel for Plaintiffs forwarded notification of that offer to Auto-Owners. In that notification, counsel for Plaintiffs notified Auto-Owners that it had thirty (30) days to advance payment of those limits to retain its subrogation rights. Plaintiffs' counsel requested to be notified whether Auto-Owners wished to advance that amount or waive its subrogation rights. On November 13, 2007, Auto-Owners advanced those limits in order to protect any subrogation interests in this matter. On January 2, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint under Indiana's Injury or Death of a Child Statute (the "Child Wrongful Death Statute") to recover damages for, inter alia, their loss of love and companionship. See Ind.Code § 34-23-2-1(e)(2) (); see also Ellenwine v. Fairley, D.O., 846 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind.2006) ().
Anthony Haas and Wanda Haas are the natural father and mother of Phillip Haas. Anthony Haas and Wanda Haas divorced in March 2000 and shared joint custody of Phillip Haas. At the time of the accident, Phillip Haas was residing with his father, Anthony Haas, in Jasper, Indiana.
The Automobile Insurance Policy provides:
6. INDIVIDUAL NAMED INSURED
If the first named insured in the Declarations is an individual, the coverage provided by this endorsement is extended as follows:
a. We will pay compensatory damages you are legally entitled to recover:
(1) from the owner or operator of any uninsured automobile or an underinsured automobile;
(2) for bodily injury you accidentally sustain and which arises out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured automobile or underinsured automobile when you are a pedestrian or while occupying an automobile you do not own which is not covered by SECTION II—LIABILITY COVERAGE of the policy.
b. The coverage extended in 6.a. above is also afforded to a relative who does not own an automobile.
2. Bodily injury means physical injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person including resulting death of that person.
(Id. Insuring Agreement, at 1).
* * *
9. Relative means a person who resides with you and who is related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption. Relative includes a ward or foster child who resides with you.
(Id. at 1-2).
* * *
12. You and your means the first individual named insured shown in the Declarations and if an individual, your spouse who resides in the same household.
(Id. at 2).
Anthony Haas is the named insured shown in the Declarations. (Id. at 1).
The parties agree that the Myers' automobile meets the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle under the terms of the Automobile Insurance Policy.
Anthony Haas also owned an Executive Umbrella Policy which provided that Auto-Owners would pay "compensatory damage to an injured person afforded coverage by an underlying policy. . . ." The underlying policy is the Automobile Policy above. (Defendant's Ex. B at 1-2).
Both the Automobile and the Executive Umbrella Policy contain subrogation provisions which essentially mirror Indiana's Subrogation Statute, Indiana Code § 27-7-5-6. (Defendant's Ex. A at 6; Defendant's Ex. B at 3-4).
The Plaintiffs seek underinsured motorist benefits under the Auto-Owners Automobile Liability and Executive Umbrella policies (collectively "the policies") for the death of their minor son, Phillip Haas. The Plaintiffs contend that Phillip Haas was a "relative" of Anthony Haas who suffered bodily injury as a result of the accident involving the Myers' underinsured automobile, and that therefore, he is an "insured" entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the policies at issue in this case.
Auto-Owners' position is that the policy only covers bodily injury "you" sustain, and Phillip Haas' death is not "bodily injury" sustained by either Anthony or Wanda Haas. Moreover, Anthony and Wanda Haas are not legally entitled to recover damages under the Child Wrongful Death Statute because wrongful death claims in Indiana are independent claims of the survivors. As such, Plaintiffs' emotional injuries are not encompassed within the definition of "bodily injury." Therefore, Auto-Owners argues, the Plaintiffs may not recover the underinsured motorist benefits at issue in this case.
The issue raised by Auto-Owners— whether the parents of a deceased minor child may recover underinsured motorist benefits under the Child Wrongful Death Statute where the minor child meets the definition of an "insured" under the underinsured motorist provision of the automobile liability policy at issue—is one of...
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