Haas v. Peake

Decision Date08 May 2008
Docket NumberNo. 2007-7037.,2007-7037.
PartiesJonathan L. HAAS, Claimant-Appellee, v. James B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

Barton F. Stichman, National Veterans Legal Services Program, of Washington, DC, argued for claimant-appellee. With him on the brief was Louis J. George.

Todd M. Hughes, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellant. With him on the brief was Jeanne E. Davidson, Director. Of counsel on the brief were David J. Barrans, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and Ethan G. Kalett, Staff Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC.

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, BRYSON, Circuit Judge, and FOGEL, District Judge.*

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BRYSON; Dissenting opinion filed by District Judge FOGEL.

BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

Beginning in 1962, the United States used herbicides such as Agent Orange in Vietnam for the purpose of "defoliation, crop destruction, and on a smaller scale, clearing vegetation around U.S. fire bases and other installations, around landing zones, and along lines of communication." S.Rep. No. 100-439, at 64-65 (1988). Agent Orange consisted of an equal mixture by weight of two chemicals, 2, 4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid. It also contained trace amounts of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin, also known as dioxin. Id. at 64. The use of Agent Orange in Vietnam increased substantially between 1967 and 1969. Agent Orange came under scrutiny after a report from the National Institutes of Health indicated that 2,4,5,-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid was associated with birth defects in animals, although later research indicated that those birth defects were more likely caused by dioxin. Id. at 65; see also David A. Butler, Connections: The Early History of Scientific and Medical Research on "Agent Orange", 13 J.L. & Policy 527, 545-48 (2005); Inst. Of Med., Veterans and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam 30 (1994) ("Veterans and Agent Orange") (discussing later research). The use of Agent Orange was phased out by 1971. Veterans and Agent Orange at 27.

The impact of Agent Orange on humans has subsequently been the subject of much research and controversy. Congress has enacted several statutes mandating that research be conducted regarding the impact of Agent Orange on human health and providing that veterans be compensated for illnesses resulting from exposure to the chemical. This case concerns the Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11, which provided a special mechanism of disability compensation for veterans exposed to herbicides such as Agent Orange.

To receive disability compensation, a veteran must establish that the disability was service connected, which means that it must have been "incurred or aggravated ... in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service." 38 U.S.C. § 101(16). The Agent Orange Act provided that for certain veterans and certain diseases, both exposure and service connection are presumed to be established. 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a)(1).

The statutory list of diseases as to which exposure and service connection are presumed includes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, certain soft-tissue sarcomas, chloracne, Hodgkin's disease, porphyria cutanea tarda, certain respiratory cancers, multiple myeloma, and diabetes mellitus (type 2). See 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a)(2). If a veteran can prove that he or she has one of the listed diseases and "served in the Republic of Vietnam" between January 9, 1962, and May 7, 1975, the disease will ordinarily "be considered to have been incurred in or aggravated by such service." 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a)(1)(A). Consequently, proving service "in the Republic of Vietnam" is important to any veteran who seeks compensation for one of the listed diseases.

This case calls on us to address whether veterans who served on ships off the coast of Vietnam during the Vietnam War served "in the Republic of Vietnam" and thus are entitled to the presumption of service connection if they suffer from one of the listed diseases. The government argues that the phrase "served in the Republic of Vietnam" requires that a servicemember have at some point set foot within the land borders of Vietnam. Mr. Haas contends that the phrase extends to those who served on board ships in the waters off the Vietnamese coast but never went ashore.

By regulation, the Department of Veterans Affairs ("DVA") has interpreted the phrase "served in the Republic of Vietnam" to mean that the veteran's service must have involved "duty or visitation" in the Republic of Vietnam in order for the veteran to be entitled to the statutory presumption of service connection. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). That regulation, as interpreted by the DVA, made the statutory presumption of service connection unavailable to veterans such as appellant Jonathan Haas, who served on a naval vessel that traveled in the waters near Vietnam but who never went ashore. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("the Veterans Court") set aside the DVA's interpretation as unduly restrictive. Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 257 (2006). We hold that the agency's requirement that a claimant have been present within the land borders of Vietnam at some point in the course of his duty constitutes a permissible interpretation of the statute and its implementing regulation, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the Veterans Court.

I

In August 2001, Mr. Haas applied to the Phoenix, Arizona, regional office of the DVA seeking disability compensation for type 2 diabetes, peripheral neuropathy, and loss of eyesight. He claimed that he had been exposed to herbicides while serving in Vietnam and that based on that exposure he was entitled to a finding of service connection for his conditions.

Mr. Haas served on active duty in the United States Navy from September 1959 to September 1960 and subsequently from May 1963 to June 1970. Service records indicate that from August 1967 to April 1969, Mr. Haas served on the U.S.S. Mount Katmai, which he described as an ammunition supply ship that operated in the West Pacific off the coast of Vietnam. It is undisputed that that Mr. Haas never went ashore, and thus never set foot on the physical landmass of the Republic of Vietnam. Mr. Haas explained that his ship did not visit any ports because it carried highly explosive ammunition and would have posed a threat if docked in a port. Mr. Haas subsequently left active duty and was transferred to the Retired Reserves on July 1, 1982.

Mr. Haas's claim to service connection for his condition is based on his naval service and the presumptive service connection afforded for type 2 diabetes based upon a showing that the veteran "served in the Republic of Vietnam." See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1116(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(H); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). In denying his claim, the regional office explained that in order to qualify for a presumption of service connection, Mr. Haas must have "physically served or visited in the Republic of Vietnam." For a sailor serving in the waters offshore, the regional office explained that "the ship must have come to port in the [Republic of Vietnam] and you disembarked." Mr. Haas disagreed with the regional office and contended that "service in the Republic of Vietnam," as defined by 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii), should be interpreted to include service in the offshore waters regardless of whether the servicemember's ship came to port and the servicemember disembarked.

On appeal, the Board of Veterans' Appeals affirmed the regional office's decision denying Mr. Haas the presumption of service connection. The Board applied the DVA's regulation, as interpreted by the agency, and ruled that Mr. Haas was not entitled to the statutory presumption for those who served "in the Republic of Vietnam" because he had never "set foot on land in the Republic of Vietnam." As for Mr. Haas's contention that he was actually exposed to herbicides while his ship operated near the coast of Vietnam, the Board rejected his claim on the ground that his allegation was "unsupported by any evidence demonstrating that his ship was located in waters sprayed by herbicides."

Mr. Haas then appealed to the Veterans Court. A three-judge panel of that court reversed the Board's decision. The court first found the phrase "served in the Republic of Vietnam" in 38 U.S.C. § 1116 to be ambiguous. The court explained that "[t]here are many ways in which to interpret the boundaries of a sovereign nation such as the former Republic of Vietnam" and that the "legislative history of the 1991 act ... is silent concerning what constitutes `service in the Republic of Vietnam.'" 20 Vet.App. at 263, 268. Turning to the DVA's interpretation of the statutory language, the court first examined the pertinent regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). That regulation defines "service in the Republic of Vietnam" as including "service in the waters offshore and service in other locations if the conditions of service involved duty or visitation in the Republic of Vietnam." The court determined that the regulation "do[es] not clearly preclude application of the presumption [of service connection] to a member of the Armed Forces who served aboard a ship in close proximity to the landmass of the Republic of Vietnam." 20 Vet.App. at 259.

Finding that the regulation "merely has replaced statutory ambiguity with regulatory ambiguity," the Veterans Court then analyzed the DVA's interpretation of the regulation and concluded that the agency's current interpretation of its regulation conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation of the same regulation. The court noted that the agency's original instructions to its adjudicators in the Adjudication Manual of the Veterans...

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