Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., No. 1071S309

• Docket Nº: No. 1071S309
• Citation: 289 N.E.2d 495, 259 Ind. 515
• Case Date: November 27, 1972
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 495

289 N.E.2d 495 259 Ind. 515 Johnell HAAS, Appellant,
v.
SOUTH BEND COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION and Indiana High
School Athletic Association, Appellees. No. 1071S309. Supreme Court of Indiana. Nov. 27, 1972.

[259 Ind. 516]

Page 496

Thomas H. Singer, South Bend, for appellant.

Harold J. Bell and Mark E. Bell, Indianapolis, Frederick E. Rakestraw, Rochester, for appellees.

HUNTER, Justice.

This is an appeal by Johnell Haas, plaintiff below, from an adverse ruling in the Marshall Circuit Court. Appellant, who qualified as a member of the 'B' team on South Bend Riley High School's golf team, was denied the [259 Ind. 517] opportunity to participate in interscholastic team competition because of a rule adopted by the Indiana High School Athletic Association which prohibits male and female students enrolled in member schools from competing on the same team or against each other. Miss Haas is seeking injunctive relief on her own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, who are girl students in high schools belonging to the Indiana High School Athletic Association and who seek to participate in non-contact interscholastic athletic competition, if otherwise eligible. The Indiana High School Athletic Association (hereinafter referred to as the IHSAA) and the South Bend Community School Corporation were named as defendants. The defendant school corporation was sued not only as an individual community school corporation organized under the laws of the State of Indiana, but also as a representative of all community school corporations, united school corporations, and school corporations in Indiana who have schools belonging to the IHSAA, whose students are boys and girls, and who conduct a program of non-contact inter-school sports in which girls are not permitted to participate because of the rules of the IHSAA or any other rule.

Evidence was heard on April 26 and 27, 1971, and judgment was entered on April 29, 1971. Appellant's prayer for a permanent injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the alleged discriminatory rule was denied and this appeal followed.

The primary issues presented for review are as follows:

1. Do the acts of the defendant-appellees in administering a program of interscholastic athletics for Indiana high schools constitute 'state action' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution? $2. Does the rule which is promulgated and enforced by the defendant-appellees operate to deny female high school students equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution?'

[259 Ind. 518] 3. Similarly, does the above-mentioned rule violate Art. 1, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution which provides that the 'General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens'?

The following facts are revealed by the record: The IHSAA is a voluntary organization which administers a program of high school interscholastic athletics. At the time of trial, approximately 438 Indiana high schools had full-time memberships in the IHSAA. The vast majority of those schools are public high schools which are financed and supported out of tax funds. Any schools that is certified by the State Department of Public Instruction and agrees to abide by the rules of the IHSAA is eligible for membership. The coaches of the teams of the member schools must be regularly licensed and employed as qualified teachers in the school system.

The IHSAA receives no direct payment of tax dollars for its support. The income of the IHSAA is derived from various high school athletic programs that the Association administers. Approximately ninety percent of its revenue is gained from the

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state high school basketball tournament alone. After the necessary expenses have been paid, including the rental of facilities, the money is returned to the participating members.

It is the contention of the IHSAA that since membership in the association is voluntary and since it does not exist by virtue of any act of the Indiana General Assembly, its administration of interscholastic athletics in the State of Indiana does not amount to 'state action' in the constitutional sense. In support of its position, the IHSAA refers us to State ex rel. IHSA Ass'n v. Lawrence Circuit Court (1959), 240 Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250, wherein it was determined that the courts will not interfere with the enforcement or administration of the constitution or by-laws of voluntary associations such as the IHSAA. It was further held that a student has [259 Ind. 519] no constitutional right to participate in interscholastic athletic competition.

Before addressing our attention to the issue of 'state action', we deem it necessary to dispose of the apparent obstacle presented by the Lawrence case. Lawrence involved two male high school students who were seeking to enjoin the enforcement of an IHSAA rule which prohibited them from participating in interscholastic athletics for the reason that they had recently moved into Indiana from out of state. The IHSAA brought an original action in this Court seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the Lawrence Circuit Court from exercising jurisdiction. In granting the writ, the Court quite correctly recognized that a student does not possess an absolute right to participate in interscholastic athletics. However, the Court did not consider whether a student can be arbitrarily denied the opportunity to qualify to participate in interscholastic athletic competition. Furthermore, it appears that the Court erroneously characterized the issue as being one solely concerning a voluntary member's discontent with the parent organization's ruling. Such was clearly not the case. In fact, the member school, Shields High School of Seymour, Indiana, was defending against the plaintiff's action rather than challenging the validity of the association's rule. Therefore, we are of the opinion that State ex rel. IHSA Ass'n v. Lawrence Circuit Court, supra, should be overruled insofar as it holds that the actions of the IHSAA are not judicially reviewable.

As stated beforehand, the IHSAA is a voluntary association of high schools, a majority of which are tax supported institutions. Membership in the association is contingent upon strict adherence to the rules and regulations promulgated by the IHSAA. The following rules are found in the IHSAA By-Laws for Boys Interscholastic Athletics: 'The principal of each member school shall be the authorized representative of his school and is responsible to the IHSAA for the conduct [259 Ind. 520] of the athletic program.' (Rule 3, § 1); 'Paid coaches, other than those regularly employed as full time teachers by the trustees of the school, are prohibited. . . .' (Rule 7, § 1); 'No games, meets, or tourneys, shall be played by a member school without the sanction of the Principal.' (Rule 9, § 1); 'All inter-school athletic contests shall be subject to the rules of the IHSAA and the Board of Control.' (Rule 9, § 2); 'There shall be no inter-school athletic contests played or practices held on Sunday. . . .' (Rule 9, § 10); 'The major officials in all inter-school contests shall be on the approved list of officials in the IHSAA.' (Rule 15, § 1). This Court is in no way attempting to question the wisdom of the above rules. It is readily apparent, however, that the IHSAA imposes on its member schools and their respective principals and coaches certain rules, duties and responsibilities, including the supervision of student eligibility for participation in interschool athletic contests, when such contests may take place, under what rules such contests shall be governed, and who is eligible to officiate the contests. In the majority of cases, the salaries of the respective principals and coaches are derived from tax funds.

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Equally true is the fact that most of the athletic contests are held in, or on, athletic facilities which have been constructed and maintained with tax funds. Regardless of how the IHSAA denominates itself as an organization, or how it characterizes its relationship with its member schools, it is abundantly clear that the association's very existence is entirely dependent upon the absolute cooperation and support of the public school systems of the State of Indiana. The enforcement of the rules promulgated by the IHSAA and adopted by the member schools may have a substantial impact upon the rights of students enrolled in these tax supported institutions, and we conclude, therefore, that the administration of interscholastic athletics by the IHSAA should be considered to be 'state action' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, Wellsand v. Valparaiso Community Schools Corporation and the Indiana [259 Ind. 521] High School Athletic Association, et al., (1971), No. 71H122(2), United States District Court, Northern District of Indiana (unpublished opinion); Louisiana High School Ath. Ass'n v. St. Augustine High Sch. (5 Cir. 1968), 396 F.2d 224; Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742 (D.C.Minn.1972), 342 F.Supp. 1224; Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Assoc. (D.C.Neb.1972), 341 F.Supp. 258; Lee v. Macon County Board of Education (M.D.Ala.1968), 283 F.Supp. 194.

There is no contention by the defendant-appellee school corporation that its actions are not state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has previously been determined that actions by public school corporations constitute state action in the...