Haas v. State

Decision Date19 March 1992
Docket NumberNo. 76767,76767
Citation597 So.2d 770
PartiesCarl Andrew HAAS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. 597 So.2d 770, 17 Fla. L. Week. S181
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Daniel J. Schafer, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Doran, Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.

GRIMES, Justice.

We review Haas v. State, 567 So.2d 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), in which the court certified to be of great public importance the question of whether a blood-alcohol level test result must be related back to the time of the offense in order to convict of driving under the influence (DUI) in either an impairment or an unlawful blood-alcohol level (DUBAL) case. 1 We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.

Carl A. Haas was involved in a motor vehicle accident on State Road 50 in Orange County at about 10 p.m. on March 12, 1988. As a consequence, he was charged with DUI manslaughter (count I), vehicular homicide (count II), and DUI causing serious bodily injury (count III). Prior to the accident, Haas was driving at a normal speed and maintaining a single lane but on the wrong side of the divided four-lane highway. He was familiar with the area. He had driven nearly two miles and passed six median crossovers since entering State Road 50 on the wrong side before the accident occurred. At least one car approaching him had swerved to get out of the way and another had blown the horn to get Haas's attention. Without applying his brakes, Haas collided head-on with an automobile driven by Jennifer Trotter. Ms. Trotter was killed and her three-year-old son was injured.

Haas was combative at the scene of the accident and smelled of alcohol. Three cold cans of beer with one open can were found in a six-pack in Haas's truck. Two empty beer cans were found outside the truck.

Over Haas's objection, a toxicologist testified that a blood sample taken from Haas about one hour and twenty minutes following the accident contained a blood-alcohol level of 0.11 percent. However, she said she could not testify that Haas's blood-alcohol level was in excess of 0.10 percent at the time he was driving. Haas's motion for judgment of acquittal on each count was denied.

With respect to the charges under counts I and III, the jury was given a special verdict in which it was asked to determine three questions: (1) whether Haas was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired; (2) whether Haas had a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher at the time he was driving; or (3) whether Haas was not guilty. On these counts the jury found Haas guilty of driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher at the time he was driving and made no determination of the other alternatives. Because Haas was also convicted of count II, judgments of guilt were entered against him on all three counts.

The issue on appeal was whether the court erred in not granting Haas's motion for judgment of acquittal of counts I and III because there was no direct evidence to establish his blood-alcohol level at the time of the accident. The district court of appeal held that under Florida's statutory scheme, the evidence of the blood-alcohol reading constituted circumstantial evidence which was sufficient to uphold the convictions predicated on driving with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.10 percent.

In Miller v. State, 597 So.2d 767 (Fla.1991), this Court recently held that an expert witness could testify concerning the results of the defendant's blood-alcohol level test even though the witness was unable to state what the blood-alcohol level was at the time the defendant was operating the vehicle. We reasoned that because the test was conducted within a reasonable period of time following the incident in question, the probative value of its results outweighed the potential for prejudice or confusion. However, our opinion in Miller did not decide the question of whether the admission of the test results was sufficient either by itself or in conjunction with other evidence to sustain a conviction in a DUBAL case.

Haas argues that based on scientific principles, it cannot be certain that his blood-alcohol level at the time he was driving was the same as it was when he was tested. The premise of his argument is that a person's blood-alcohol content increases for a period of time after consumption and then begins to decrease as the alcohol is eliminated, principally through metabolism. See 2 Donald H. Nichols, Drinking/Driving Litigation Sec. 23:03 (1985). Therefore, if a driver ingested alcohol shortly before he was arrested, it is at least possible that his blood-alcohol level might not yet have reached the prohibited level even though it registered above that level when tested some time thereafter. Thus, Haas contends that even if the results of the test were properly admitted, it cannot be the basis for convicting him under the DUBAL alternative of the statute in the absence of expert testimony extrapolating the results of the test to the time at which he was driving.

Many states have addressed this issue in various contexts. In State v. Taylor, 132 N.H. 314, 566 A.2d 172 (1989), the court held that where the police obtain a blood-alcohol sample within a reasonable period of time after driving occurs, the results of the test may be admitted as prima facie evidence of intoxication without the necessity of extrapolation and that the jury may give the test results whatever weight it wishes. The court concluded that to require extrapolation would place an impossible burden upon the state because (1) evidence with respect to when and in what amounts the defendant consumed alcohol, which is necessary for extrapolation, would rarely be available; and (2) the rate of alcohol absorption varies considerably between individuals, and extrapolation evidence is also complicated by the amount of food consumed at the time the alcohol was ingested. The court reasoned that the legislature could not have intended to place such impossible roadblocks in the way of drunk driving prosecutions. While the defendant was convicted under an impairment statute, the court pointed out that the same reasoning would apply in prosecutions under New Hampshire's DUBAL statute.

The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the results of a valid breath test given within a reasonable time after the accused was stopped was probative of a violation of a statute containing a DUBAL alternative much like Florida's statutory scheme. State v. Kubik, 235 Neb. 612, 456 N.W.2d 487 (1990). The court stated that "matters of delay between driving and testing are properly viewed as going to the weight of the breath test results," and that extrapolation was unnecessary. Id. 456 N.W.2d at 501. Idaho appears to take a similar view. See State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 718 P.2d 589 (Idaho Ct.App.), review denied, 116 Idaho 466, 776 P.2d 828 (Idaho 1986).

In State v. Ulrich, 17 Ohio App.3d 182, 478 N.E.2d 812 (1984), the court held that the results of an intoxilyzer test which demonstrated that the defendant's blood-alcohol level was above the prohibited level was sufficient to convict of driving with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.10 percent without the necessity of extrapolation. Referring to a statute which permitted the introduction of the results of tests taken within two hours of the alleged violation, the court stated:

It is clear from the presence of this express language that the legislature intended the results of an intoxilyzer test to be admitted as evidence of the defendant's concentration of alcohol in his breath at the time of the defendant's alleged violation, provided that the intoxilyzer test was administered according to R.C. 4511.19(B). Accordingly, the gravamen of the offense (R.C. 4511.19[A] ) is the operation of a vehicle within the state after ingestion of a sufficient amount of alcohol to produce an intoxilyzer test result which evidences an alcohol concentration level proscribed by statute within two hours of the time that the alleged offense occurred.

Ulrich, 478 N.E.2d at 821.

Employing a similar analysis, the court in State v. Wetzel, 7 Haw.App. 532, 782 P.2d 891 (1989), upheld a conviction under Hawaii's DUBAL statute based solely upon the results of a blood-alcohol test introduced without extrapolation. The test results create a permissible inference that the accused driver had the same blood-alcohol level when he was stopped.

In Ransford v. District of Columbia, 583 A.2d 186 (D.C.1990), the court held that evidence of a blood-alcohol test administered within a reasonable time after the operation of the vehicle was sufficient, without more, to establish a conviction under the DUBAL statute of the District of Columbia. Analyzing legislative history, the court concluded that Congress could not have intended to require the onerous burden of extrapolating the test results.

In Davis v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 291, 381 S.E.2d 11 (1989), the court recognized that by its literal terms, Virginia's DUBAL statute did not prohibit driving after consuming sufficient alcohol to register a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.10 percent as indicated by a subsequently administered test. Notwithstanding, the court held that because the blood-alcohol concentration reflected by the test necessarily resulted from alcohol consumed prior to or during driving, the test results were presumptive evidence of the blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the driving without the necessity of extrapolation. The court stated that unless rebutted, the test results were sufficient to establish the blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the driving.

The New Jersey Supreme Court construed its DUBAL statute to proscribe an offense "that is demonstrated solely by a...

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24 cases
  • State v. Christmas
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • December 28, 2001
    ...limit beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury was not permitted to make such an inference); Haas v. State, 597 So.2d 770, 775-76 (Fla.1992) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (holding that it would amount to a due process violation to allow the state to presume defendant's BAC ......
  • Garcia v. State, 14-02-00737-CR.
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    • August 7, 2003
    ...See, e.g., State v. Barber, 42 Conn.App. 589, 681 A.2d 348 (1996); Commonwealth v. Wirth, 936 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1996); Haas v. State, 597 So.2d 770 (Fla. 1992) (compiling cases); State v. Kubik, 235 Neb. 612, 456 N.W.2d 487 (1990); Desmond v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 522, 779 P.2d 1261 (1989)......
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    • February 26, 1998
    ...analysis as far as it goes, I do so subject to the reservations expressed in my partial dissent in Haas v. State, 597 So.2d 770 (Fla.1992) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). I agree that tests conducted on a blood sample taken within a reasonable time are admissible eviden......
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    ...Conn. 819, 576 A.2d 547 (Conn. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1019, 111 S.Ct. 663, 112 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1991); with Haas v. State, 597 So.2d 770 (Fla. 1992) (evidence sufficient without retrograde extrapolation); Sullivan v. State, 517 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (same); Peopl......
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Florida Small-Firm Practice Tools - Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • April 1, 2023
    ...The Florida Supreme Court has held that retrograde extrapolation testimony by the State is not required to prove DUI. [ Haas v. State , 597 So. 2d 770, 774 (Fla. 1992).] §16:73 Admissibility of Test Records and the Confrontation Clause The prosecution usually will attempt to admit testing r......

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