Haas v. Warden, Civil Action No. 10–CV–183.

• Decision Date: 07 December 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10–CV–183.
• Citation: 760 F.Supp.2d 484
• Parties: Gerald J. HAAS, Petitioner,v.WARDEN, SCI SOMERSET, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

760 F.Supp.2d 484

Gerald J. HAAS, Petitioner,

v.WARDEN, SCI SOMERSET, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 10–CV–183.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Dec. 7, 2010.

Cheryl J. Sturm, Cheryl J. Sturm, Attorney at Law, Chadds Ford, PA, for Petitioner.Peter Hobart, West Chester, PA, for Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

Gerald J. Haas (“Haas”) petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Having considered Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski's Report and Recommendations (the “R & R”) (Doc. 10), and Haas's Objections to the R & R (the “Objections”) (Doc. 12), I will DISMISS Haas's Petition.

I. Background

On September 19, 2003, Haas was tried before Judge Juan R. Sanchez of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas on charges of indecent assault, corruption of the morals of a minor, solicitation to commit indecent assault, and solicitation to commit corruption of the morals of a minor.¹ A jury found Haas guilty of two counts of each charge. Judge Sanchez sentenced Haas to five to ten years imprisonment, followed by ten years probation. Haas filed a direct appeal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and on January 14, 2005 the Superior Court affirmed the judgment. Commonwealth v. Haas, 872 A.2d 1270 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005). On April 4, 2007, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Haas's petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Haas, 591 Pa. 723, 920 A.2d 831 (2007).

Represented by new counsel, Haas sought collateral review of his conviction, fully exhausting under Pennsylvania's Post–Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) the claims he presents here. Commonwealth v. Haas, No. CR–02810–2003 (Ct. Com. Pl., Chester County, Dec. 26, 2008). On January 15, 2010, Haas filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). Haas raises five grounds for relief:

(1) Haas was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when Judge Sanchez held the second day of trial in the West Goshen Fire House (the “Fire House”).

(2) Trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object when Judge Sanchez moved the trial to the Fire House.

(3) Appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to appeal the denial of Haas's right to a public trial.

(4) Trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to present evidence supporting Haas's defense that Haas was on medication that rendered him incapable of maintaining an erection.

(5) The PCRA Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law resulted in an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law in considering his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

On January 29, 2010, I referred the case to Magistrate Judge Sitarski. On May 28, 2010, Judge Sitarski issued the R & R. The R & R recommended that I deny Haas's claims on the merits. On June 7, 2010, Haas filed his Objections.

II. Standard of Review

A district court reviews de novo “those portions of the [Magistrate Judge's] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(h): see also Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n. 3 (3d Cir.1989). In doing so, the district court may “in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, rely on the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommendations.” Butterfield v. Astrue, 2010 WL 4027768, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 12, 2010) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). A district court, however, “may not reject a finding of fact by a magistrate judge without an evidentiary hearing, where the finding is based on the credibility of a witness testifying before the magistrate judge.” Hill v. Beyer, 62 F.3d 474, 482 (3d Cir.1995).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) limits the district court's ability to look beyond a petitioner's federal petition and review state court determinations during collateral review. Under AEDPA, any factual determination made by a state court is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). State courts are also entitled to deference with respect to their legal conclusions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Specifically, “the state court's decision must stand unless it is ‘contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ ” Lam v. Kelchner, 304 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law” or “if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at” a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). An unreasonable application of law occurs when the state court “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case.” Id. at 407–08, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

III. Discussion

Although Haas makes eleven separate objections to the R & R, they roughly fall into three categories: (1) relating to Haas's public trial claim (Objections 1–6); (2) relating to Haas's beta blockers defense (Objection 7–9); and (3) relating to the PCRA Court's application of federal law (Objections 10–11).

A. Haas's Public Trial Claim (Objections 1–6)

Haas makes several objections to the section of the R & R addressing his public trial claim. Haas argues that he was denied his right to a public trial when Judge Sanchez conducted one day of his trial at a public Fire House rather than the Chester County Courthouse, due to a power outage after Hurricane Isabel. As a result, Haas objects to the R & R's conclusions that: (1) Haas was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue; and (3) direct appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue. Because “counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim,” if I agree that Haas was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, I must also deny his ineffective assistance arguments premised on raising that claim. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 202 (3d Cir.2000). I therefore consider de novo whether Haas was denied his right to a public trial.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial....” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]rial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.” Presley v. Georgia, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010). This “requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed.” Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978); see also United States v. Lnu, 575 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir.2009) (holding that the Sixth Amendment was not violated where “any member of the public desiring to attend [the] trial had the opportunity to do so.”); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 532–33 (11th Cir.1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment was not violated where “the press and family members of the defendant, witness, and decedent were allowed to remain.”).

The PCRA Court made the following factual findings: (1) one of Haas's close friends, in addition to “one or two other persons” attended the trial at the Fire House on his behalf; (2) members of the victims' families, representatives of the “victim witness program” and “at least one newspaper reporter” attended the trial at the Fire House; (3) Judge Sanchez personally informed the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Daily Local News that the Courthouse was closed and that the trial would continue at the Fire House; (4) Judge Sanchez expressly repeated that the proceedings constituted a public trial; (5) Judge Sanchez informed counsel that a sign would be posted at the courthouse directing the public to the Fire House; (6) Judge Sanchez informed counsel that courthouse sheriffs and security officers would be asked to direct any inquiring party to the Fire House; and (7) defense counsel and the prosecutor informed their offices that the new location of the trial should be provided to anyone who requested it. Commonwealth v. Haas, No. CR–02810–2003, at 24–26 (Ct Com. Pl., Chester County, Dec. 26, 2008). Based on these facts, the PCRA Court concluded that Haas's trial was public.

Haas has presented nothing to undermine the presumption of correctness that must be afforded to these state court factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). Given these facts, the PCRA Court was correct in concluding that Haas was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Judge Sanchez took pains to ensure that any interested party could attend the trial, informing courtroom personnel, asking that a sign be posted, asking the parties to respond to any requests, and directly informing members of the press. In light of these facts, the PCRA's conclusion that Haas received a public trial was hardly unreasonable.

Haas objects that his trial was not public because his friend Dr. Donald Carter was not able to attend the trial at its new location. He does not suggest, however, that Carter was excluded from the proceedings, or that Carter made a reasonable attempt to determine to where the trial had been moved. The fact that one party did not attend Haas's second day of trial does not imply that the trial was not public. Rather, the right to a public trial requires “the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed.” Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (...