Haase v. Schaeffer

• Decision Date: 06 May 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 57249
• Citation: Haase v. Schaeffer, 332 N.W.2d 423, 122 Mich.App. 301 (Mich. App. 1983)
• Parties: Leslie JONES, Plaintiff, and Patricia HAASE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ted SCHAEFFER, Defendant-Appellant, and Jovanka Stevanovich and Dusan Stevanovich, Defendants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

Page 423

332 N.W.2d 423

122 Mich.App. 301

Leslie JONES, Plaintiff and Patricia HAASE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ted SCHAEFFER, Defendant-Appellant and Jovanka Stevanovich and Dusan Stevanovich, Defendants.

Docket No. 57249.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 9, 1982.

Decided Dec. 10, 1982.

Released for Publication May 6, 1983.

Rock, Bove, Butler & McKnight by Richard D. McKnight, East Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Alan H. Broad, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellant.

Before J.H. GILLIS, P.J., and WAHLS and BELL, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This matter is an action for slander. In 1978, the Michigan Bureau of State Lottery Bureau received a complaint regarding the operation of bingo games conducted by the plaintiffs for the Michigan Democratic Party. The games were held in a hall owned by defendants Jovanka Stevanovich and Dusan Stevanovich. In response to the complaint, the bureau sent a field representative, defendant Ted Schaeffer, to conduct an audit. Schaeffer appeared at the hall on February 10, 1978, and, during the course of the evening, plaintiff Patricia Haase requested Schaeffer to address the bingo players to explain what he was doing at the game. Schaeffer agreed and addressed the group over a loud speaker system. After making the announcement, Schaeffer turned off the speaker system and began conversing with several of the bingo players. During this conversation, Schaeffer allegedly stated that "the audit was for the protection of the people there and to see if the organization gets the money or someone is making payments on someone's Cadillac". Thereafter, Ms. Haase commenced the present action in the circuit court, alleging that she owns a Cadillac, that the people who heard Schaeffer's remark knew she owned such a vehicle and that the clear meaning of the remark was that she was stealing the bingo money to make payments on her Cadillac.

The circuit court ordered the suit removed to district court where Schaeffer was granted summary judgment pursuant to DCR 1969, 117.2, subds. (1) and (3). Plaintiffs appealed to circuit court. The circuit court reversed the district court's order and reinstated plaintiff's suit. Defendant Ted Schaeffer then sought and was granted leave to appeal to this Court.

It should first be noted that the language contained in DCR 1969, 117.2, subds. (1) and (3) is identical to that contained in GCR 1963, 117.2, subds. (1) and (3). Therefore, the purposes of this appeal, this Court shall analyze the matter as though the motions were brought under the general court rules.

Motions for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) challenge the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and are to be determined by an examination of the pleadings alone. This Court's role as a reviewing court is to accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint. This Court must determine whether plaintiff's claims are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery. See Borman's Inc. v. Lake State Development Co., 60 Mich.App. 175, 230 N.W.2d 363 (1975); Tumbarella v. The Kroger Co., 85 Mich.App. 482, 271 N.W.2d 284 (1978).

Summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3) is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. A motion for summary judgment under this section tests whether there is factual support for the claim. Affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence must be considered by the court. Further, courts are to be liberal in finding a genuine issue exists in order not to infringe upon a party's right to a trial of the...