Haberer v. Amick

Decision Date11 March 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-2551,98-2551
Citation188 F.3d 957
Parties(8th Cir. 1999) Howard F. Haberer, Appellant, v. David Amick, Appellees. Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa Woodbury County;

Before McMILLIAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, andNANGLE,1 District Judge.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Howard F. Haberer appeals from an order entered in the United States District Court2 for the Northern District of Iowa, granting partial summary judgment in favor. of Woodbury County, Iowa, and David Amick, on his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights claim for constructive discharge. Haberer v. Woodbury County, No. C96-4048 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 15, 1998) (order granting partial summary judgment). For reversal, appellant contends that the district court erred in dismissing his constructive discharge claim on the ground of issue preclusion. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1343. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). As noted above, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's constructive discharge claim only, leaving unresolved appellant's retaliation claims. Appellant later voluntarily dismissed his retaliation claims and the district court entered judgment in favor of appellees.

Background

The background facts are not disputed. The following statement of facts is taken in large part from the opinion of the state supreme court. Haberer v. Woodbury County, 560 N.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Iowa 1997). For fourteen years appellant served as a deputy sheriff in Woodbury County, Iowa. When appellant resigned on July 16, 1995, the sheriff was appellee Amick. In mid-1993, appellant was divorced and he was ordered to pay child support. At about the same time, or immediately thereafter, a female friend of appellant filed criminal complaints against him because of a personal dispute. Amick referred the complaints to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). After the DCI had completed its investigation, it filed five criminal charges against appellant. These charges were in no way related to the criminal complaints filed by appellant's female friend. Subsequently, the state court dismissed the criminal charges and its dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the state supreme court. State v. Haberer, 532 N.W.2d 757, 758 (Iowa 1995).

While the criminal charges were pending, Amick placed appellant on a paid suspension and prohibited him from engaging in any off-duty law enforcement work. After appellant had been on a paid suspension for eighteen months and while his appeal was still pending before the state supreme court, Amick allowed him to return to work, provided that appellant would agree to a thirty-day unpaid suspension and enter into a "Last Chance Agreement." The agreement was to last for one year.

On July 16, 1995, the state Child Support Recovery Unit notified appellant that his wages would be garnished because of unpaid child support. According to appellant, the garnishment notice was "the straw that broke the camel's back." The next day appellant orally submitted his resignation to the assistant chief, stating "I can't do this anymore." Appellant turned in his badge, identification, name plate, and the keys to his office and car. Four days later, appellant sought to withdraw his resignation; however, Amick refused to permit him to withdraw his resignation.

Pursuant to Iowa Code 341A.12, pertaining to the removal, suspension, and demotion of deputy sheriffs, appellant wrote the Woodbury County Civil Service Commission (CSC) requesting a hearing regarding the circumstances surrounding his termination and resignation from the sheriff's department. The CSC held the hearing on August 4, 1995, and allowed each party to present its respective position.

Appellant argued before the CSC that he had been constructively discharged, claiming that the following chain of events caused him to resign: (1) Amick initiated a criminal investigation against him; (2) the investigation led to the filing of criminal charges against him; (3) the criminal proceedings cost him thousands of dollars to defend; (4) during a portion of the proceedings, Amick placed him on paid suspension, during which time he was not allowed to engage in off-duty law enforcement work; (5) as a condition of returning to work after the criminal proceedings, he agreed to a 30- day unpaid suspension; (6) when he returned to work, he was assigned to an administrative position for which he had no experience; (7) all these incidents led to. increased stress and financial problems; and (8) in time, these incidents caused him to fail to pay his child support and to resign after he was notified that his wages would be garnished.

Appellant also contended that he had attempted to withdraw his resignation, but Amick had refused to allow him to do so, even though Amick had allowed other personnel to withdraw their resignations and to keep their jobs.

The CSC found that appellant had "voluntarily resigned his deputy sheriff's position solely as a result of his wages having been garnished and that no action on the part of the Sheriff's Department constituted harassment or placed any undue pressure or stress upon . . . Haberer to resign so as to constitute a termination or removal." Haberer v. Amick, slip op. at 4 (Woodbury County Civil Service Comm'n Aug. 15, 1995). The CSC did not address the withdrawal of resignation issue. Pursuant to Iowa Code 341A.12, appellant appealed to the state district court, again raising the constructive discharge and withdrawal of resignation issues. The state district court affirmed the decision of the CSC, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding of no constructive discharge. See Haberer v. Woodbury County, Nos. 111483C & 111484C, slip op. at 5 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995). Thereafter, appellant appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court, again raising the same constructive discharge and withdrawal of resignation issues. The Iowa Supreme Court, after an exhaustive examination of each of the eight contentions argued before the CSC and the state district court, affirmed the state district court's decision, holding that appellant had produced no evidence to show or prove any of his alleged charges. See Haberer v. Woodbury County, 560 N.W.2d at 575-78.

Appellant then filed the present 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint in federal district court, alleging that he was retaliated against in his position as a deputy sheriff because of his opposition to Amick in the sheriff's election of 1992. He also alleged that he was constructively discharged by Amick on July 17, 1995. Appellant asserted the same. eight arguments on the constructive discharge issue that he had raised before the CSC, the state district court, and the Iowa Supreme Court.

The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of appellees on the constructive discharge issue, holding that the claim must be resolved against appellant as a matter of law because of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. See slip op. at 6. In a well-reasoned analysis, the district court applied Iowa law and rejected appellant's arguments that issue preclusion or collateral estoppel should not apply because he did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the constructive discharge issue in the prior action before the civil service commission, see slip op. at 3-4, and because the procedures available in the prior action were inadequate. See id. at 4-5. The district court concluded that issue preclusion or collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the constructive discharge issue because the issue was specifically and directly raised and litigated in the prior action before the CSC and decided on the merits in the state courts, was material and relevant to the disposition of the state court proceedings, and was not only necessary and essential to the resulting state court judgment, it was the sole issue necessary to the disposition of the case. See id. at 6. The district court noted that the ruling did not dispose of the retaliation claims. See id. at 7. On April 28, 1998, however, appellant dismissed the remaining retaliation claims, and the district court entered judgment in favor of appellees. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. The question before the district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). Where the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly. appropriate. E.g., Crain v. Board of Police Commissioners, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir. 1990).

Discussion

Pursuant to federal law, judicial proceedings in one state will have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States as they have by law in the courts of such state from which they are taken. 28 U.S.C. 1738. Federal courts are obligated to give preclusive effect to issues decided by state courts even where the subsequent federal case is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), or under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986). "' When an issue of law or fact is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Ray v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • November 14, 2013
    ...made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment. Haberer v. Woodbury Cnty., 188 F.3d 957, 961–62 (8th Cir.1999) (citing Dolan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 573 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Iowa 1998)). The PLB was tasked with determining whether s......
  • Hahn ex rel. Barta v. Linn County, Ia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • February 2, 2001
    ...1217, 1220 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Crain v. Board of Police Commissioners, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir.1990)); Haberer v. Woodbury County, 188 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir.1999) (also citing Crain); Cearley v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 186 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir.1999) B. Federal Disability C......
  • Timmerman v. Eich
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • September 12, 2011
    ...Co., Inc., 128 F.3d 1267, 1273 (8th Cir.1997)); accord Ginters, 614 F.3d at 826 (quoting Robinette ); see also Haberer v. Woodbury Cnty., 188 F.3d 957, 961–62 (8th Cir.1999) (identifying essentially the same issues for issue preclusion under Iowa law). Here, there is no dispute that the par......
  • Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury County, Iowa
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • October 30, 2000
    ...1217, 1220 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Crain v. Board of Police Commissioners, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir.1990)); Haberer v. Woodbury County, 188 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir.1999) (also citing Crain); Cearley v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 186 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir.1999) With these standards in......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT