Hackett v. Gale
| Decision Date | 10 April 1962 |
| Citation | 179 A.2d 451,104 N.H. 90 |
| Parties | Lawrence C. HACKETT et al. v. Floyd I. GALE. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
William W. Treat, Hampton, by brief and orally, for plaintiffs.
Richard P. Dunfey, Hampton, Shute & Engel, David C. Engel, Exeter, for defendant.
The privotal issue in this case is the interpretation of Article III, s. 1 of the zoning ordinance of the town of Hampton. Its pertinent language is the following:
The first question transferred is whether the above excepted accessory use of a single family residence as an office applies to real estate agents and brokers.
Defendant's brief states that he maintains within his home, in an 'A' district 'an office for the purpose of carrying on negotiations and conferences with prospective sellers and purchasers of real estate who for one reason or another, may not have been able to consult with him during normal business hours at his principal real estate office which is located in the business district of Hampton.' He maintains no employees at the office in his residence.
The defendant has erected and maintained for about two and one half years one sign in front of his residence which does not exceed 'six square feet in total area.' Art. IV-A(1). According to plaintiffs' brief this sign 'contained the name of defendant's employer, a local real estate broker with central offices in the business district featured in large display letters, while the defendant's name as an 'associate' appeared in small letters at the bottom.' The complaint brought against him was for a violation of the zoning ordinance of the town resulting from the erection and maintenance of this sign.
Plaintiffs maintain that the authorized accessory use of residences in an 'A' district 'such as offices for doctors, engineers, architects, lawyers or others' (Article III, s. 1) is restricted to the so-called 'learned professions' and that real estate brokers do not come within that classification. Defendant contends that the intent of the ordinance, was to permit the owner or tenant of a single family residence in such a district to maintain therein an office for the transaction of his business provided the property retained its primary use as a home.
The solution of the above differences between the parties lies in the interpretation to be given to the word 'others' in that section. This in turn depends on the intent of the body responsible for the ordinance as fairly expressed in it. City of Manchester v. Webster, 100 N.H. 409, 410, 128 A.2d 924. When the words used are susceptible of a double construction, as is the case here, that sense is to be adopted which best harmonizes with the context and the apparent policy and objects of the legislation. Davis v. W. T. Grant Company, 88 N.H. 204, 207, 185 A. 889. Consequently unless the act as a whole indicates a different purpose, a general word which follows specific words in an enumeration, like that in Article III, s. 1 of the Hampton ordinance, is usually construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those enumerated by the preceding specific words. State v. Small, 99 N.H. 349, 350, 111 A.2d 201.
It is a matter of common knowledge that professional persons such as doctors, engineers, architects, lawyers, dentists and musicians very frequently maintain their offices in their residences. State ex rel. Kaegel v. Holekamp (St. Louis C.A., Mo.App.), 151 S.W.2d 685, 689. Zoning ordinances recognizing that fact frequently permit such a professional person to...
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Tylle v. Zoucha
...been similarly addressed in other states, with the unanimous conclusion that real estate brokers are not professionals. Hackett v. Gale, 104 N.H. 90, 179 A.2d 451 (1962); Hancock v. Concord, 111 N.H. 413, 285 A.2d 791 (1971); Seaman v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Holliston, 340 Mass. 488, 16......
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...v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 153 Iowa 579, 134 N.W. 79; Seaman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 340 Mass. 488, 165 N.E.2d 97; Hackett v. Gale, 104 N.H. 90, 179 A.2d 451; Ridley v. Pronesti, 431 Pa. 34, 244 A.2d 719. See 3 Yokely, Zoning (3d Ed.) § 28-52 and 1 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning § 31, pp. ......
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Town of Gilsum v. Monadnock Regional School Dist., 91-322
...agreement" in RSA 193:29, I(b) must be construed to embrace agreements like in character to AREA agreements. See Hackett v. Gale, 104 N.H. 90, 92, 179 A.2d 451, 453 (1962) (general words following specific words in statute construed to include only objects similar in nature to objects speci......
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Appeal of Hoyt Rental and Leasing Co., Inc., 86-410
...that sense is to be adopted which best harmonizes with the context and with the apparent policy of the legislature. Hackett v. Gale, 104 N.H. 90, 92, 179 A.2d 451, 453 (1962); Davis v. W.T. Grant Company, 88 N.H. 204, 207, 185 A. 889, 891 (1936). We see no reason to apply a different standa......