Hackett v. Price

• Decision Date: 26 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. 01-9008.,01-9008.
• Citation: 381 F.3d 281
• Parties: Richard HACKETT v. James PRICE, Superintendent of SCI Greene; the District Attorney of Philadelphia County; the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania James S. Price, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution, Greene County; The District Attorney of Philadelphia County; Michael Fisher, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

381 F.3d 281

Richard HACKETT v. James PRICE, Superintendent of SCI Greene; the District Attorney of Philadelphia County; the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania James S. Price, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution, Greene County; The District Attorney of Philadelphia County; Michael Fisher, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Appellants.

No. 01-9008.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued July 8, 2002.

Filed August 26, 2004.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, John R. Padova, J.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Curtis Glebe (Argued), Assistant District Attorney, Thomas W. Dolgenos, Chief, Federal Litigation, Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney, Law Division, Arnold H. Gordon, First Assistant District Attorney, Lynne Abraham, District Attorney, Office of District Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellants.

Norris E. Gelman, (Argued), Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee.

Before BECKER, Chief Judge,^* AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

AMBRO, Circuit Judge.

Richard Hackett was convicted by a Pennsylvania jury of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. His direct appeals and post-conviction claims in state court were unsuccessful. Hackett then filed in federal court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the District Court granted after determining there is a reasonable likelihood the jury interpreted the trial court's instructions and verdict form to preclude it from considering mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Commonwealth has appealed, and we reverse. The jury found unanimously that no mitigating circumstance exists. Because of that finding, we conclude that Hackett fails to show a reasonable likelihood that the jurors, individually or collectively, applied the challenged instruction and verdict form in a way that prevented the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.¹

I. Facts & Procedural History

As did the District Court, we recite only briefly the facts of this case as set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Hackett v. Price, 212 F.Supp.2d 382, 386 (E.D.Pa.2001) (Hackett) (citing Commonwealth v. Hackett, 534 Pa. 210, 627 A.2d 719 (Pa.1993)). Hackett and a friend, Marvin Spence, conspired to kill Gregory Ogrod. Hackett lived in Ogrod's house, though their living situation had become hostile. Spence and Ogrod were partners in the sale of illegal drugs, but their business relationship deteriorated after Spence stole money that Ogrod had given him to purchase drugs for resale. On July 31, 1986, at 3:30 a.m., three men armed with knives and a crowbar entered the basement of Ogrod's home, where he and his girlfriend, Maureen Dunne, were sleeping. The assailants repeatedly struck the couple. Dunne, stabbed through the heart, was killed. Ogrod managed to resist, and the attackers fled. Testimony at trial established the assailants as Hackett, Spence, James Gray, and Keith Barrett. Id.

Hackett was charged with murder in the first degree, criminal conspiracy, possession of instruments of crime, and aggravated assault. In 1988 he was tried jointly with Spence, Gray, and Barrett in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. All four defendants were convicted of first degree murder. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233, 627 A.2d 1176 (1993); Commonwealth v. Gray, 415 Pa.Super. 77, 608 A.2d 534 (1992).

Pennsylvania law requires that

[b]efore the jury retires to consider the sentencing verdict, the court shall instruct the jury ... [that] the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance ... and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life imprisonment in all other cases.

42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). At the capital sentencing hearing the Commonwealth argued two aggravating circumstances: Hackett conspired to pay another person to kill the victim, and he created a grave risk to another during the murder of the victim. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 627 A.2d at 723 (citing 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 9711(d)(2), (7)). Hackett offered countervailing evidence of mitigating circumstances—including a history of learning and social disabilities, a low level of maturity, signs of depression and suicidal problems, limited interpersonal resources, and alcohol abuse. See Hackett, 212 F.Supp.2d at 407 n. 20; see also 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 9711(e)(1)-(8) (listing statutory mitigating circumstances).

The jury sentenced Hackett to death, finding both of the aggravating circumstances argued by the Commonwealth and no mitigating circumstance. Spence also was sentenced to death, the jury in his case finding aggravating circumstances that outweighed any mitigating circumstance.² Gray and Barrett were sentenced to life imprisonment.³

On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Hackett's conviction and sentence. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 627 A.2d at 721. The Court rejected, inter alia, his argument "that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury during the penalty phase by failing to instruct the jury they need not be unanimous in finding mitigating circumstances in accord with Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988)." Id. at 725.

Hackett next filed a petition for relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. The Court of Common Pleas denied Hackett's petition for relief and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 558 Pa. 78, 735 A.2d 688 (1999). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Hackett v. Pennsylvania, 528 U.S. 1163, 120 S.Ct. 1178, 145 L.Ed.2d 1086 (2000).

Hackett then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Hackett, 212 F.Supp.2d at 385. He challenged the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial on six grounds. The District Court denied five of these claims, but concluded that Hackett's allegations of Mills error entitled him to relief. The District Court "determine[d] that the state court's failure to apply the legal standard from Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990), in adjudicating [Hackett's] Mills claim was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by Supreme Court of the United States." Id. at 400. The District Court "further conclude[d] on plenary review that the instructions and verdict form created a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions in such a way that it was improperly prevented from considering mitigating evidence." Id. Hackett's sentence was vacated without prejudice to the Commonwealth to sentence him to life imprisonment or to conduct such further proceedings as may be appropriate under Pennsylvania law, including a new sentencing hearing, within 180 days. Id. at 413. The Commonwealth appealed, and the District Court's ruling on Hackett's Mills claim is the sole issue before us. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.

II. Standard of Review

Congress in 1996 passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which "altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court." Stevens v. Delaware Corr. Ctr., 295 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir.2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). See also Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 456-57 (3d Cir.2001) (explaining Williams). More specifically, AEDPA "placed a new restriction on the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners." Dunn, 247 F.3d at 456-57 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 399, 120 S.Ct. 1495)). Because Hackett filed his habeas petition after AEDPA became effective, we follow Congress' directive and give greater deference to state courts' factual findings and legal determinations. See id. at 457. According to the relevant provision of AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States....

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Prior decisions of our Court explain thoroughly the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of" clauses of § 2254(d)(1). For instance, in Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d Cir.2000), we noted that Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in Williams as to AEDPA's amended standard of review and described the operation of both clauses as follows:

Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied—the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal...