Hackett v. Storey, No. 3:03cv395 (JBA) (D. Conn. 12/30/2003)
| Decision Date | 30 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:03cv395 (JBA).,3:03cv395 (JBA). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Kevin HACKETT, plaintiff, v. Eileen STOREY, Edward BLANCHETTE, Anne FLITCRAFT, Jacqueline HARRIS, Timothy SILVIS, and Robert TRESTMAN, defendants. |
On March 6, 2003, plaintiff Kevin J. Hackett instituted the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants, members of the State of Connecticut's Medical Examining Board ("MEB"), alleging violation of his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in connection with the MEB's denial of three applications for disability benefits and subsequent reaffirmations of those denials.1 Hackett sues the defendant doctors only in their official capacities, seeking a permanent injunction requiring defendants to declare him eligible for disability benefits or ordering benefits payments to him. Because Hackett's cause of action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, defendants' motion to dismiss [Doc. #23] pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.
There has been an eleven year course of administrative and judicial proceedings predating the institution of this lawsuit, including two decisions of this court: Hackett v. State of Connecticut, Medical Examining Board, Retirement Division of the Office of the Comptroller, 3:96CV2422 (GLG)(D. Conn. Mar. 26, 1997)("Hackett I") and Hackett v. State of Connecticut, Medical Examining Board, Retirement Division, Office of the Comptroller, 3:02CV895 (AVC)(D. Conn. Feb. 27, 2003), and five decisions of the MEB: three denials of Hackett's applications for disability benefits (October 30, 1992, May 27, 1994, and December 1, 1995), and two reaffirmations of those denials (July 26, 1996, and December 4, 2000). While Hackett's pro se complaint in Hackett I, was "far from a model of clarity," Hackett I, slip. op. at 1, it was construed liberally to assert claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), in addition to a claim for breach of contract, noting that the "gravamen of the plaintiff's claims is that the State of Connecticut must adhere to the Social Security Administration's determination [which found Hackett to be totally disabled] and that its failure to do so constitutes discrimination," id. at 6.2 The ruling sets out the factual background from the first four MEB decisions as well as Hackett's employment history from his adminisstrative complaints to the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See id. at 3-6. Judge Goettel dismissed the statutory claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and the breach of contract claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). See id. at 7-9.3
Here, the Second Amended Complaint [Doc. #26] alleges that defendants' denials of his applications for disability retirement benefits in 1992, 1994, and 1995, and reaffirmations of those denials in 1996 and 2000 violated his constitutional right to equal protection because defendants denied Hackett benefits while contemporaneously granting them to similarly-situated state employees, notwithstanding the Social Security Administration's findings of disability. Hackett further alleges that defendants' conduct was intentional, arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, and malicious.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is an appropriate procedural vehicle for testing a complaint with the defense of res judicata. See Waldman v. Village of Kiryas Joel, 207 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2000); Conepco, Inc. v. Roll Intern., 231 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000); Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992). Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Determining the sufficiency of a plaintiff's claim for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes is not limited to the factual allegations in the complaint but may include consideration of "documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in it by reference, to matters of which judicial notice may be taken [under Fed.R.Evid. 201], or to documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Brass v. Am. Film. Techs. Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991); Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1991). Judicial notice is permitted of a fact "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). The Court may thus judicially notice prior pleadings, orders, judgments, and other items appearing in the Court's records of prior litigation that is closely related to the case sub ludice, especially where a res judicata defense is predicated on facts not disputed in the earlier litigation. See Day, 955 F.2d at 811; Liberty Mut. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388-1389 (2d Cir. 1992); see also 1 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 201.12[3] at 201-29 to 201-34, 201-40 (2d ed. 2003). Accordingly, without converting defendants' motion into one for summary judgment, the Court will take judicial notice of the record in Hackett I, including plaintiff's complaint and related judicial rulings detailing the undisputed factual background to Hackett's failed applications for disability benefits, including the first four MEB decisions.
"Res judicata . . . makes a final, valid judgment conclusive on the parties, and those in privity with them, as to all matters, fact and law, [that] were or should have been adjudicated in the proceeding." Waldman, 207 F.3d at 108 (quotation omitted); see also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).
"In deciding whether a suit is barred by res judicata, it must first be determined that the second suit involves the same claim — or nucleus of operative fact — as the first suit." Waldman, 207 F.3d at 108 (quotations omitted). "[T]hree indicia[are] crucial to this determination . . . whether the underlying facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectation." Id. (quotations omitted).
Defendants argue that dismissal under the doctrine of res judicata is appropriate because Hackett should have brought his equal protection claim as part of Hackett I.4 In response, plaintiff argues that he could not have brought his class of one equal protection claim in the earlier action because the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)(per curiam) created a new cause of action not available in 1996 and not formerly recognized by the Second Circuit. See Pl.'s Opp'n [Doc. #25] at 4 (unnumbered). The Court disagrees.
The instant action involves the same nucleus of operative facts as Hackett I. Hackett complains of the MEB intentionally treating him differently than other similarly-situated state employees in denying him disability retirement benefits, and seeks judicial declaration of eligibility for disability benefits to be paid by defendants. He points to the following alleged facts, all but one of which occurred prior to December 3, 1996, when Hackett I was filed5:
1. Hackett was employed by the State of Connecticut, Department of Administrative Services, as a purchasing services officer, beginning in 1982 after having previously worked for the State of Connecticut in other capacities.
2. In 1985, Hackett was involved in a motorcycle accident resulting in an above-the-knee amputation of his left leg.
3. In approximately 1986, Hackett returned to work and thereafter performed his duties satisfactorily.
4. Hackett's employment with the State of Connecticut was involuntarily terminated on approximately May 24, 1991.
5. Hackett continued to suffer severe pain in the stump of his amputated leg and from amblyopia.
6. In December 1992, Hackett was struck by a motor vehicle and incurred serious injuries to his right leg and his shoulder.
7. In approximately February 1993, Hackett was diagnosed as suffering from a cyst on his spine which since then has compressed the nerve roots and caused severe and disabling pain.
8. Beginning in August 1992, Hackett regularly applied for both service-connected and non-service-connected disability benefits. Defendants denied such applications on October 30, 1992, May 27, 1994, December 1, 1995, July 26, 1996, and December 4, 2000.
9. At some point in time, the SSA determined, after full evidentiary hearings, that the plaintiff is totally disabled from working and has been so disabled since at least May 24, 1991.
In Hackett I, plaintiff alleged violations of Title VII and ADA, and a common law breach of contract claim, focusing on the MEB's alleged discrimination against him in relation to other state employees and seeking the same injunctive relief as in this case. The virtual complete identity of facts between the present case and Hackett I demonstrates that they are not only related in time, space, origin, and motivation, but in fact...
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