Hackfeld Company v. United States

• Decision Date: 03 April 1905
• Docket Number: No. 164,164
• Parties: H. HACKFELD & COMPANY, Limited, Petitioner , v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

197 U.S. 442

25 S.Ct. 456

49 L.Ed. 826

H. HACKFELD & COMPANY, Limited, Petitioner,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 164.

Argued March 6, 1905.

Decided April 3, 1905.

This case is here on writ of certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit, to review a judgment of that court affirming a judgment of the district court for the district of Hawaii, in which the petitioner, Hackfeld & Company, was adjudged guilty of a violation of § 10 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 1084, chap. 551, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1299), and to pay a fine of $600, for neglecting to return to the port from whence they came, Yokohama, Japan, two certain Japanese immigrants unlawfully in the United States, in violation of the act of Congress. The conviction was upon information filed and trial had to the court, a jury having been waived, and upon a stipulated finding of facts, agreed upon by the attorney for the United States and the petitioner. After statements as to the corporate character of the defendant company, and that it was the agent of the steamship Korea, a vessel plying between the state of California and the Empire of Japan, it is stipulated that the vessel brought into the port of San Francisco, in the United States, two certain Japanese immigrants from Yokohama, Japan, on October 28, 1902; that on the following day, October 29, 1902, the said Japanese were denied admission into the United States by the board of special inquiry at the port of San Francisco, and the said board, being duly appointed and authorized in the premises, ordered the deportation of the said Japanese immigrants. That on the 7th day of November, 1902, the said Japanese were received on board the vessel Korea for transportation to Japan. The stipulation then recites the following facts:

'That on the 12th day of November, A. D. 1902, the said steamship Korea did arrive at the port of Honolulu, in the district and territory of Hawaii; that at the time of the arrival of said steamship Korea at said port of Honolulu the said immigrants were still on board of said vessel; that said Japanese immigrants, together with certain deported Chinese, were placed in a room on board said vessel and locked up by the steerage steward of said vessel; at 12 o'clock midnight of said 12th day of November, A. D. 1902, said Japanese were still on board said vessel in said room; that between that time and 5 o'clock on the morning of the 13th day of November, A. D. 1902, said Japanese had effected their escape; that the only method of egress was through portholes, which were nearly 25 feet above the water; that this method of escape could not have been reasonably anticipated by the master, or officers, or agents of said steamship Korea; that said escape did not occur by vis major, or inevitable accident; and that said escape did not occur by reason of any negligence or lack of proper care on the part of the officers of the vessel or said defendant.

'That the said defendant made search for said escaped immigrants, but up to the present time have not apprehended the said immigrants, and said immigrants have not been returned to Japan.'

From the conviction in the lower court upon these stipulated facts a writ of error was taken to the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit. In that court, without passing upon the question whether the statute justified conviction without proof of negligence, it was held that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed because the facts recited left room for the inference that the petitioner was found guilty of negligence in putting the Japanese in the room without taking the necessary precautions against escape through the portholes. The stipulation that the escape did not occur by reason of negligence or lack of proper care on the part of the officers of the vessel it was held did not bind the court, nor prevent it from placing upon the facts stipulated the construction which, in its judgment, they should properly receive. 60 C. C. A. 428, 125 Fed. 596.

Mr. Maxwell Evarts for petitioner

[Argument of Counsel from pages 444-445 intentionally omitted].

Assistant Attorney General Robb for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 445-446 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Day, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of appeals disposed of this case upon the view that the judgment of conviction would have been warranted upon the evidentiary facts stipulated, and that the stipulation, in so far as it stated that the escape of the immigrants could not have been reasonably anticipated by the master or officers of the steamship, and did not occur by reason of any negligence or want of proper care upon their part, was the statement of a mere conclusion not binding upon the court, and would not prevent it from rendering an independent judgment upon the facts stated. We cannot take this view of the case. It may be conceded that where the facts are all stated the court cannot be concluded by a stipulation of the parties as to the legal conclusions to be drawn therefrom, but we know no rule of public policy which will prevent the United States attorney from stipulating with the defendant in a case of this character as to the ultimate facts in the controversy. It is to be presumed that such an officer will do his duty to the government, and not stipulate away the rights of the prosecution. The question of negligence in a given case is not usually reduced to one of law, and, as is the case here, its presence or absence is the ultimate question to be decided between the parties. Ordinarily, the issue of negligence is one of fact to be deter- mined by the jury. This proposition has been so often adjudicated in this court that it is only necessary to refer to the cases in passing. It has been held that, where there is no reasonable doubt as to the facts or the inference to be drawn from them, the question becomes one of law. Where the state of facts is such that reasonable minds may fairly differ upon the question as to whether there was negligence or not, its determination is a matter of fact for the jury to decide. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408-417, 36 L. ed. 485-489, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 679;Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Griffith, 159 U. S. 603-611, 40 L. ed. 274-278, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 105; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U. S. 353-368, 41 L. ed. 186-193, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1104; Warner v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 168 U. S. 339, 42 L. ed. 491, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68.

The evidentiary facts in the stipulation upon which this case was tried are not very fully set forth, and the government and the defendant were content to stipulate that the method of escape through the portholes (assuming that it was by this means the immigrants escaped) could not have been reasonably anticipated by those in charge of the Korea, and that the escape did not occur by reason of any negligence or lack of proper care upon the part of the officers of the vessel or the defendant.

We think the parties were entitled to have this case tried upon the assumption that these ultimate facts, stipulated into the record, were established, no less than the specific facts recited.

We come, then, to the important question in this case, as to the construction of the statute under which the petitioner was convicted and fined. The conviction was under § 10 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 1084, chap. 551, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1299), which is as follows:

'Sec. 10. That all aliens who may unlawfully come to the United States shall, if practicable, be immediately sent back on the vessel by which they were brought in. The cost of their maintenance while on land, as well as the expense of the return of such aliens, shall be borne by the owner or owners of the vesesls on which such aliens came; and if any master, agent, consignee, or owner of such vessel shall refuse to receive back on board the vessel such aliens, or shall neglect to detain them thereon, or shall refuse or neglect to return them to the port from which they came, or to pay the cost of their maintenance while on land, such master, agent, consignee, or owner shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred dollars for each and every offense; and any such vessel shall not have clearance from any port of the United States while any such fine is unpaid.'

The question is as to the effect of this requirement upon shipowners who have wrongfully brought aliens into this country, and who, having received them on board the vessel for the purpose of returning them to the place from whence they came, shall neglect to detain them thereon, or neglect to return them. In this case the court found the defendants guilty as charged in the information, in that they refused and neglected to return to the port from whence they came the two Japanese immigrants. It is the contention of the government that this...