Hackley v. Headley
| Citation | 8 N.W. 511,45 Mich. 569 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Decision Date | 13 April 1881 |
| Parties | HACKLEY and another v. HEADLEY. |
A contract for certain logs provided that they should be measured or scaled in accordance with the standard rules or scale in general use on Muskegon lake and river. Held, that the scale in general use at the time the scaling was required to be done, and not that in use at the time of making the contract, was the one intended. Defendants being indebted to plaintiff in a considerable amount, and taking advantage of his financial circumstances, refused to pay him unless he would receive in full a less sum than he claimed; and he being in pressing need of the money, received the sum offered and gave the receipt. Held, distinguishing Vyne v Glenn, 41 Mich, 112, not duress of goods. Duress of person and goods defined.
Error to Kent.
Smith, Nims, Hoyt & Erwin, for plaintiffs in error.
John C Fitzgerald, for defendant in error.
Headley sued Hackley & McGordon to recover compensation for cutting hauling and delivering in the Muskegon river a quantity of logs. The performance of the labor was not disputed, but the parties were not agreed as to the construction of the contract in some important particulars, and the amount to which Headley was entitled depended largely upou the determination of these differences. The defendants also claimed to have had a full and complete settlement with Headley, and produced his receipt in evidence thereof. Headley admitted the receipt, but insisted that it was given by him under duress, and the verdict which he obtained in the circuit court was in accordance with this claim.
1. The questions in dispute respecting the construction of the contract concerned the scaling of the logs. The contract was in writing, and bore date August 20, 1874. Headley agreed thereby to cut on specified lands and deliver in the main Muskegon river the next spring 8,000,000 feet of logs. The logs were to be measured or scaled by a competent person to be selected by Hackley & McGordon, "and in accordance with the standard rules or scales in general use on Muskegon lake and river," and the expense of scaling was to be eventually borne by the parties. The dispute respecting the expense of scaling related only to the board of the scaler. Headley boarded him and claimed to recover one-half what it was worth. Defendants offered evidence that it was customary on the Muskegon river for jobbers to board the scalers at their own expense, but we are of opinion this was inadmissible. If under the contract with the scaler he was to be furnished his board, then the cost of the board was a part of the expense of scaling, and by the express terms of the contract was to be shared by the parties. If that was not the agreement with him Headley could only look to the scaler himself for his pay.
This is a small matter; but the question what scale was to be the standard in one of considerable importance. The evidence tended to show that at the time the contract was entered into scaling upon the river and lake was in accordance with the "Scribner rule," so called; but that the "Doyle rule" was in general use when the logs were cut and delivered, and Hackley & McGordon had the logs scaled by that. By the new rule the quantity would be so much less than by the one in prior use that the amount Headley would be entitled to receive would be less by some $2,000; and it was earnestly contended on behalf of Headley that the scale intended, as the one in general use, was the one in general use when the contract was entered into. We are of opinion however, that this is not the proper construction. The contract was for the performance of labor in the future, and as the scaling was to be done by third persons, and presumptively by those who were trained to the business, it would be expected they would perform their duties under such rules and according to such standards as were generally accepted at the time their services were called for. Indeed such contracts might contemplate performance at times when it would scarcely be expected that scalers would be familiar with scales in use when they were made. It is true the time that was to elapse between the making of this contract and its performance would be but short, but if it had been many years the question of construction would have been the same; and if we could not suppose under such circumstances that the parties contemplated the scalers should govern their measurements by obsolete and perhaps now unknown rules, neither can we here. It is fair to infer that the existing scale was well known to the parties, and that if they intended to be governed by it at a time when it might have ceased to be used, they would have said so in explicit terms. In the absence of an agreement to that effect, we must suppose they intended their logs to be scaled as the logs of others would be at the place and time of scaling.
2. The question of duress on the part of Hackley & McGordon in obtaining the discharge remains. The paper reads as follows:
Headley's account of the circumstances under which this receipt was given is in substance as follows: On August 3, 1875, he went to Muskegon, the place of business of Hackley & McGordon, from his home in Kent county, for the purpose of collecting the balance which he claimed was due him under the contract. The amount he claimed was upwards of $6,200, estimating the logs by the Scribner scale. He had an interview with Hackley in the morning, who insisted that the estimate should be according to the Doyle scale, and who also claimed that he had made payments to others amounting to some $1,400 which Headley should allow. Headley did not admit these payments, and denied his liability for them if they had been made. Hackley told Headley to come in again in the afternoon, and when he did so Hackley said to him: To this Headley replied: Hackley replied: "That is the best I will do with you." Headley said: "I cannot take that, Mr. Hackley," and Hackley replied, Headley then said, Finally he took the note and gave the receipt, because at the time he could do nothing better, and in the belief that he would be financially ruined unless he had immediately the money that was offered him, or paper by means of which the money might be obtained.
If this statement is correct, the defendants not only took a most unjust advantage of Headley, but they obtained a receipt which, to the extent that it assumed to discharge anything not honestly in dispute between the parties and known by them to be owing to Headley beyond the sum received, was without consideration and ineffectual. But was it a receipt obtained by duress? That is the question which the record presents. The circuit judge was of opinion that if the jury believed the statement of Headley they would be justified in finding that duress existed; basing his opinion largely upon the opinion of this court in Vyne v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112.
Duress exists when one by the unlawful act of another is induced to make a contract or perform some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will. It is commonly said to be of either the person...
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