Hackney v. Welsh
| Citation | 8 N.E. 141,107 Ind. 253 |
| Decision Date | 26 June 1886 |
| Docket Number | 13,131 |
| Parties | Hackney v. Welsh |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Decatur Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
J. D Miller and F. E. Gavin, for appellant.
J. K Ewing, C. Ewing, W. A. Moore and J. O. Marshall, for appellee.
The appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, in his petition, that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the appellee; that the cause of his restraint was an arrest under a warrant issued by the Governor of Indiana upon a requisition from the Governor of Michigan; that the restraint is illegal in this, that he is a resident of the State of Ohio, and in September, 1885, was arrested by authority of a warrant issued by the Governor of that State upon a requisition from the Governor of Indiana that this requisition was issued upon an indictment returned by the grand jury of Decatur county, in this State, charging him with a felony; that he was surrendered to the agent of this State to be tried on that indictment, and that he has been continuously in the jail of Decatur county on that charge from the time the indictment was returned until April, 1886, when a nolle prosequi was entered.
The return of the appellee alleges that the petitioner is held in custody under a warrant issued by the Governor of Indiana upon a requisition from the Governor of Michigan; that the petitioner committed the crime of larceny in the State of Michigan, and, fleeing from justice in that State, voluntarily came into Indiana; that, by virtue of the indictment returned against him by the grand jury of Decatur county, he was confined in the jail of that county on the 12th day of December, 1884, and there remained until the 12th day of September, 1885, when he escaped and fled to the State of Ohio; that, upon a warrant issued by the Governor of that State pursuant to a requisition of the Governor of Indiana, he was arrested and brought back to the jail of Decatur county from which he had escaped; that the warrant issued on the requisition of the Governor of Michigan came to the hands of the appellee on the 29th day of December, 1884; that the petitioner is not a resident of Ohio, but is a travelling pickpocket, and that neither the State of Michigan nor its agents had any connection with the petitioner's arrest in Ohio.
There is some conflict in the authorities as to whether a person who is brought from one State to another to answer a particular charge can be tried on any other charge than that upon which he was extradited. State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587 (50 Am. R. 388, 19 N.W. 429); Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N.Y. 110 (17 Am. R. 317); In re Noyes, 17 Albany L. J. 407; U.S. v. Caldwell, 8 Blatchf. 131, 25 F. Cas. 237; U.S. v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchf. 295, 26 F. Cas. 879; Williams v. Bacon, 10 Wend. 636; Browning v. Abrams, 51 How. Pr. 172; Com. v. Hawes, 13 Bush 697 (26 Am. R. 242); State v. Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273 (48 Am. R. 431); Compton v. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130; In re Cannon, 47 Mich. 481, 11 N.W. 280. Instructive and interesting discussions of this subject will be found in 14 Albany L. J. 96; Princeton Review, January, 1879; North American Review, May, 1883; 20 Albany L. J. 425; Spear Extradition, 558; Church on Habeas Corpus, section 462.
We can not accept as authority the cases in which treaty stipulations exerted a controlling influence, for here there are no such stipulations, and in our opinion there is an essential difference between the two classes of cases. The case before us is entirely unaffected by treaty stipulations and is a purely inter-state one. There is a class of cases, we may remark in passing, which strongly support the doctrine of the cases which hold that a person brought into a State to answer a particular charge may be tried upon another. We refer to those cases which hold that no matter how the criminal comes within the jurisdiction of the State he may be tried. State v. Wenzel, 77 Ind. 428; Ex Parte Krans, 1 B. & C. 258; Ex Parte Scott, 9 B. & C. 446; Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627 (51 Am. R. 706); Ham v. State, 4 Tex. Ct. App. 645; Dows' Case, 18 Pa. 37. But we are not required to enter this field of controversy, for we regard the case before us as essentially different from those to which we have referred.
The difference between this case and the cases lying in the field of controversy is this: Here the State, upon whose request the accused was extradited, is not seeking to try him for any offence, nor to subject him to its jurisdiction. The authorities of Indiana are not seeking to do more than to allow the requisition from the State of Michigan to operate upon a fugitive from justice who had voluntarily come within our territory. They do not seek to try him for any offence under our laws, but all they are seeking to do is to give effect to the demand of a sister State. It is really Michigan and not Indiana that detains the petitioner. Indiana, therefore, is not guilty of any bad faith, nor of any breach of comity.
There is still another important difference between this case and those referred to, for here the fugitive was voluntarily in Indiana before December 29th, 1884, when the warrant on the requisition from Michigan was received by the appellee as sheriff of Decatur county, and he was, therefore, subject to arrest on that warrant before he escaped from jail and fled to Ohio. Prior to his imprisonment he was voluntarily in Indiana, and it was by his escape from the jail of Decatur county that he succeeded in leaving our territorial limits. If he had not escaped, it is quite clear that he could have been rightfully surrendered under the warrant issued by the Governor of this State. When that warrant came to the hands of the appellee, the appellant was in this State, and might, we repeat, have been held under it, so that, when he was brought back to Indiana after his escape from jail, he was in no worse plight than when he fled. It was the fault of our officers, if fault there was, not of those of Michigan, that he did escape, and they are not answerable for his absence from Indiana. It would be an unsubstantial refinement to hold that the escape from jail and flight to Ohio deprived the Governor's warrant of force and required our officers to permit the appellant to again flee to that or some other State. We are not dealing with a case in which Indiana seeks to try a man for a violation of an Indiana law, nor are we dealing with a case where the officers of the State have brought a man within our territory for the purpose of subjecting him to the demand of another State. On the contrary, we have before us a case where the accused had voluntarily come into our State, was arrested for a violation of our laws, was imprisoned in one of the jails of the State when the demand reached our officers, and had succeeded in getting out of our territory by his escape from jail and flight to another jurisdiction. The fugitive was voluntarily in Indiana when our Governor issued the warrant; he was not brought here to make that warrant operative, for he had come here by his own voluntary act. The Michigan authorities now demand him, and all that Indiana does in surrendering him is to yield to the demand of a sister State a fugitive who was voluntarily in our State before that demand reached its officers.
A case is referred to by Mr. Spear as reported in Binn's Justice, where it was held, "where a defendant is brought...
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