Hadacheck v. Sebastian, No. 32

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtMcKenna
Citation239 U.S. 394,36 S.Ct. 143,60 L.Ed. 348
Docket NumberNo. 32
Decision Date20 December 1915
PartiesJ. C. HADACHECK, Plff. in Err., v. C. E. SEBASTIAN, Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles

239 U.S. 394
36 S.Ct. 143
60 L.Ed. 348
J. C. HADACHECK, Plff. in Err.,


C. E. SEBASTIAN, Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles

No. 32.
Submitted October 22, 1915.
Decided December 20, 1915.

Page 395

Messrs. Emmet H. Wilson and G. C. De Garmo for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 395-399 intentionally omitted]

Page 400

Messrs. Alber Lee Stephens, Charles S. Burnell, and Warren L. Williams for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 400-404 intentionally omitted]

Page 404

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

Habeas corpus prosecuted in the supreme court of the state of California for the discharge of plaintiff in error from the custody of defendant in error, chief of police of the city of Los Angeles.

Plaintiff in error, to whom we shall refer as petitioner, was convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of an ordinance of the city of Los Angeles which makes it unlawful for any person to establish or operate a brickyard or brickkiln, or any establishment, factory, or place for the manufacture or burning of brick within described limits in the city. Sentence was pronounced against him

Page 405

and he was committed to the custody of defendant in error as chief of police of the city of Los Angeles.

Being so in custody he filed a petition in the supreme court of the state for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was issued. Subsequently defendant in error made a return thereto, supported by affidavits, to which petitioner made sworn reply. The court rendered judgment discharging the writ and remanding petitioner to custody. The chief justice of the court then granted this writ of error.

The petition sets forth the reason for resorting to habeas corpus and that petitioner is the owner of a tract of land within the limits described in the ordinance, upon which tract of land there is a very valuable bed of clay, of great value for the manufacture of brick of a fine quality, worth to him not less than $100,000 per acre, or about $800,000 for the entire tract for brickmaking purposes, and not exceeding $60,000 for residential purposes, or for any purpose other than the manufacture of brick. That he has made excavations of considerable depth and covering a very large area of the property, and that on account thereof the land cannot be utilized for residential purposes or any purpose other than that for which it is now used. That he purchased the land because of such bed of clay and for the purpose of manufacturing brick; that it was, at the time of purchase, outside of the limits of the city, and distant from dwellings and other habitations, and that he did not expect or believe, nor did other owners of property in the vicinity expect or believe, that the territory would be annexed to the city. That he has erected expensive machinery for the manufacture of bricks of fine quality which have been and are being used for building purposes in and about the city.

That if the ordinance be declared valid, he will be compelled to entirely abandon his business and will be deprived of the use of his property.

Page 406

That the manufacture of brick must necessarily be carried on where suitable clay is found, and the clay cannot be transported to some other location; and, besides, the clay upon his property is particularly fine, and clay of as good quality cannot be found in any other place within the city where the same can be utilized for the manufacture of brick. That within the prohibited district there is one other brickyard besides that of plaintiff in error.

That there is no reason for the prohibition of the business; that its maintenance cannot be and is not in the nature of a nuisance as defined in § 3479 of the Civil Code of the state, and cannot be dangerous or detrimental to health or the morals or safety or peace or welfare or convenience of the people of the district or city.

That the business is so conducted as not to be in any way or degree a nuisance; no noises arise therefrom, and no noxious odors, and that by the use of certain means (which are described) provided and the situation of the brickyard an extremely small amount of smoke is emitted from any kiln, and what is emitted is so dissipated that it is not a nuisance nor in any manner detrimental to health or comfort. That during the seven years which the brickyard has been conducted no complaint has been made of it, and no attempt has ever been made to regulate it.

That the city embraces 107.62 square miles in area and 75 per cent of it is devoted to residential purposes; that the district described in the ordinance includes only about 3 square miles, is sparsely settled, and contains large tracts of unsubdivided and unoccupied land; and that the boundaries of the district were determined for the sole and specific purpose of prohibiting and suppressing the business of petitioner and that of the other brickyard.

That there are and were, at the time of the adoption of the ordinance, in other districts of the city thickly built up with residences brickyards maintained more detrimental to the inhabitants of the city. That a petition was filed,

Page 407

signed by several hundred persons, representing such brickyards to be a nuisance, and no ordinance or regulation was passed in regard to such petition, and the brickyards are operated without hindrance or molestation. That other brickyards are permitted to be maintained without prohibition or regulation.

That no ordinance or regulation of any kind has been passed at any time regulating or attempting to regulate brickyards, or inquiry made whether they could be maintained without being a nuisance or detrimental to health.

That the ordinance does not state a public offense, and is in violation of the Constitution of the state and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

That the business of petitioner is a lawful one, none of the materials used in it are combustible, the machinery is of the most approved pattern, and its conduct will not create a nuisance.

There is an allegation that the ordinance, if enforced, fosters and will foster a monopoly, and protects and will protect other persons engaged in the manufacture of brick in the city, and discriminates and will discriminate against petitioner in favor of such other persons, who are his competitors, and will prevent him from entering into competition with them.

The petition, after almost every paragraph, charges a deprivation of property, the taking of property without compensation, and that the ordinance is in consequence invalid.

We have given this outline of the petition, as it presents petitioner's contentions, with the circumstances (which we deem most material) that give color and...

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    ...to enact safety regulations. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 First English, 482 U.S. at 313, 107 S.Ct. at 2......
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14 books & journal articles
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    • October 1, 2021
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    ...of the State’s authority to enact safety regulations. See, e. g. , Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). These questions, of course, remain open for decision on the remand we direct today. We now turn......
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