Haddock v. State

• Decision Date: 05 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 101,508.,101,508.
• Citation: 295 Kan. 738,286 P.3d 837
• Parties: Kenneth E. HADDOCK, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

295 Kan. 738

286 P.3d 837

Kenneth E. HADDOCK, Appellant,

v.STATE of Kansas, Appellee.

No. 101,508.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oct. 5, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under the plain language of K.S.A. 21–2512(f)(2), if postconviction DNA test results are favorable to a petitioner, a district court is required to do two things. First, a district court must hold a hearing. Second, after the hearing, a district court must enter an order. But, in enacting K.S.A. 21–2512(f)(2), the Kansas Legislature did not require that this order grant the petitioner affirmative relief; even though the legislature listed several examples of affirmative relief, such as vacating the judgment or granting a new trial, it indicated the list is not exclusive. Rather, the legislature truly granted the district court wide discretion in the orders it may enter to serve the interests of justice. Dependent upon the peculiar facts of the case being heard, justice may be served by denying a motion for new trial.

2. Under K.S.A. 21–2512(f)(2), a petitioner seeking a new trial has the burden of establishing (1) the new DNA test results are favorable and (2) the new DNA test results are of such materiality that a reasonable probability exists the new evidence would result in a different outcome at trial.

3. DNA test results need not be completely exonerating in order to be considered favorable under K.S.A. 21–2512(f)(2).

4. On appeal, a de novo standard applies to the analysis if evidence is material to a determination of whether postconviction DNA test results are favorable or unfavorable under K.S.A. 21–2512(f); deference is given to the district court's factual findings.

5. A district court's order regarding whether a petitioner is entitled to a new trial under K.S.A. 21–2512(f)(2) is reviewed on appeal to determine if a reasonable person would agree with a district court's decision regarding whether postconviction DNA test results are of such materiality that a reasonable probability exists that the new evidence would result in a different outcome at trial.

[295 Kan. 739]6. The materiality component of the test for granting a new trial under K.S.A. 21–2512(f)(2) is not a sufficiency standard. Instead, the petitioner must establish that the favorable evidence is so material there is a reasonable probability the new evidence would have led to a different result. The potential impact of the evidence should not be examined piece by piece but should be examined as a whole and in light of all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory. Based on this total record, the court's function is not to make an independent factual determination about what likely occurred, but rather to make a probabilistic determination about the likely impact of the new evidence on reasonable, properly instructed jurors.

7. Under the facts of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining new evidence resulting from postconviction DNA testing under K.S.A. 21–2512, while favorable to the defendant, did not make it reasonably probable that the outcome of the jury trial would have been different with the new evidence.

Elizabeth Seale Cateforis, of Paul E. Wilson Project for Innocence & Post–Conviction Remedies, University of Kansas School of Law, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by LUCKERT, J.:

This appeal follows a district court's denial of a defendant's motions for new trial based on postconviction DNA testing that was allowed under K.S.A. 21–2512. The postconviction DNA testing produced some results that were favorable to the defendant, some results that confirmed evidence at trial, and some results that were inconclusive because the small amount and the degradation of the DNA prevented DNA matching. Weighing the mixed results of this evidence, the district court concluded there was not a reasonable probability that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial.

We have previously held that an abuse of discretion standard of review applies when the issue on appeal is whether a district court erred in ruling on a motion for new trial based on favorable postconviction DNA test results. Applying this standard to this case, we conclude reasonable people could agree with the district court that the postconviction DNA test evidence was not so material as to make it reasonably probable there would be a different outcome if there were a new trial. Hence, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the third appeal considered by this court in this case. In the first appeal, this court affirmed Kenneth E. Haddock's conviction and sentence for the premeditated first-degree murder of his wife, Barbara Haddock. State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 897 P.2d 152 (1995)( Haddock I ),overruled on other grounds by State v. James, 276 Kan. 737, 750–51, 79 P.3d 169 (2003) (altering appellate standard of review on suppression issue of whether defendant was in custody when interrogated by law enforcement officers). After that appeal, Haddock filed several motions, including two motions for new trial based on postconviction DNA testing. The district court denied Haddock's motions, and Haddock pursued a second appeal that culminated in this court's decision in Haddock v. State 282 Kan. 475, 146 P.3d 187 (2006)( Haddock II ).

In Haddock II, this court remanded the case to the district court after determining the district court erred in its treatment of Haddock's two motions requesting a new trial based on postconviction DNA test results. Haddock II, 282 Kan. at 525, 146 P.3d 187. On remand, further DNA testing occurred, and the district court heard evidence regarding the postconviction DNA test results. The district court then made the ruling that is the subject of this appeal, again denying Haddock's motions for new trial.

Resolving this appeal requires us to compare the evidence presented to the jury with the evidence revealed by the postconviction DNA test results. Consequently, a detailed discussion of the facts is necessary. Additional facts are included in the decisions in Haddock I and Haddock II.

Evidence at Trial

In November 1992, Barbara was found dead in her garage, buried under a pile of firewood. Police responding to a 911 call quickly suspected foul play because there was a pool of blood some distance from the wood pile and because Barbara's injuries were inconsistent with crushing injuries from falling wood. An autopsy revealed bruises and abrasions on Barbara's hands and arms that were consistent with defensive wounds, bruises and lacerations on her face, and other trauma to her head consistent with 6 to 12 blows with a blunt object.

Investigators concluded that the crime scene had been orchestrated. Blood spatters and smears suggested that Barbara had been moved from one location in the garage to the wood pile. Additionally, her blood was found on her car, which police found in the driveway. The location and nature of the blood spatter on the car, when considered together with other blood spatter evidence inside the garage, suggested that Barbara had been beaten while the car was in the garage. This led to the conclusion the car had been moved after the murder. Detectives suspected the murder weapon was a fireplace poker that had been wiped clean and was much cleaner that the other fireplace tools they found in the Haddocks' home.

On the evening of the murder, detectives questioned Haddock, at which time they observed and photographed two scratches on Haddock's right wrist that appeared fresh. Detectives also seized the shoes Haddock was wearing, in which they found wood chips. Haddock would eventually explain the chips were there because he had built a fire for Barbara in the early afternoon while he was at home for lunch. Detectives were suspicious of Haddock's response to the news of his wife's death, in large part because of his insistence that her death resulted from the falling wood. Haddock maintained his innocence, but he was arrested 5 days after Barbara's death.

The State built its case on circumstantial evidence, largely related to the orchestrated crime scene. Evidence was presented that the wood pile had fallen a few weeks before the murder and that Haddock and his family members were the only ones who likely knew of that incident. There was also evidence of marital discord and stress. Haddock had been found guilty in federal court of bank fraud and other offenses and had been sentenced to prison. After an appeal and remand, Haddock was facing resentencing but remained on bond at the time of the murder. Testimony from a friend of Barbara's established that Barbara would become very upset and emotional when discussing the future, she was “becoming very frustrated” with the expense of defending the bank fraud case, she was concerned they were going to have to use their son's college fund, and “she was getting angry with Ken that it kept going on and on and on.”

In addition, DNA evidence was presented that linked blood found on Haddock's clothing and shoes to Barbara. The clothing—a shirt and pants—were found by police on the floor of Haddock's home near the garage, and the shoes were those seized by detectives at their interview of Haddock. Haddock explained that he had placed the shirt and pants near the laundry room before he left the house because Barbara was going to mend the items.

Both pieces of clothing and the shoes had small amounts of blood on them. Significantly, no other blood evidence was found in the house. Haddock maintained the blood was transferred to the clothing when his daughters, who had discovered their mother in the garage, and his neighbors, who the daughters had summoned to provide Barbara first aid, walked by the...